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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTORY 
That the government of American cities has been 
perhaps the least successful part of the whole Ameri-
can political and governmental system has been a pat-
ent fact for many years. It is the one weak spot to 
which the critical foreigner nearly always points 
when comparing the faults of democracy with the effi-
ciency of the monarchical governments of the old 
world. 
During the nineteenth century revelations of 
well-nigh hopeless inefficiency and deep-planted co~ 
ruption in city government time and time again star-
tled and appalled the American people; and the disil-
lusionment which these revelations have wrought in the 
optimistic believers in a fated destiny of the western 
world has sobered and sombered the minds of many ob-
servers of passing events and tendencies. 
Nevertheless, the saving optimi m of the average 
I 
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American has stood him in good stead. He has stead-
fastly refused to admit that the great principle of 
democracy was in any way weakened--or even at stake. 
If public servants do wrong, or fail to execute their 
trust satisfactorily, "get the law after them," or 
elect better public servants, has been his reply. 
The more or less brief spasms of municipal reform 
and local crusades against intrenched "bosses" and 
"rings," characteristic of the last half century, 
have been a means of carrying this reply into action. 
In fact, the first remedy which the American 
people attempted to apply to their wasteful and in-
p.fficient city government was more democracy •• This 
was coincident with the rise of Jacksonian democracy 
and followed the early disappointments and failures 
of the "federal" plan of separation of powers and of 
checks and balances, borrowed from the scheme incor-
porated in the national government in 1789. Now a 
widening of the suffrage and an increase in the num-
• F. J. Goodnow, "Municipal Home Rule," 1897, 
p. 3. 
ber of elective officers took place. But democracy 
was not a panacea. The notorious "spoils system," 
the great stain upon American political life, found 
its chief lodgement in the cities. 
3 
It took some time before it fully dawned upon 
the American people that there was something wrong 
with the system--not with the principle of democracy 
and people's rule, but with the machinery of carry-
ing out that principle. But it was a realization of 
this fact that formed the basis of the next remedy 
to which they resorted to cure their corruption-in-
fested cities. Reform in the organization of munici-
pal governing bodies; a curtailment of powers here 
and an increase of powers there; a separation of 
functions here and a consolidation of functions there; 
easier and more effective means of holding local of-
ficers responsible, and responsive, to the voters 
who elected them; finally, in a number of states, 
the establishment of a rigorous control, or at least 
a sharr check, on local action by state officials--
all these methods have been employed in a fruitless 
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endeavor to make the government of cities more near-
ly approsimate the best American ideals of what shoul~ 
be the heritage of a democracy of freedom and oppor-
tunity--and of an intelligent citizenry. 
In the long run, what city dwellers want of 
their government is efficiency and economy, exten-
sive and judicious public improvements, well paved 
and well kept streets, a goodly number, or at least 
a modicum, of public parks and other recreation fa-
cilities, modern services and conveniences, such as 
water and light supply and sewerage, and, last but 
by no means least, low taxes--in short, a progress-
ive and business-like administration. Democracy is 
here no longer an end; a~d When it fails as a means 
it is discarded. Efficiency is the watchword in pub-
lic as well as in private business. It is the imme-
diate need of, and demand of, the city voter. 
But just as neces'sary is a proper form __ of 
Or&anization of government. In fact, correct organi-
zation must precede successful administration. The 
endeavor to obtain both these necessities has occu-
.. 
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pied nearly the whole time of municipal reformers. 
But, back of administration, and back of organi-
zation, lies just as vital a problem: the securing of 
the proper place of the city in the American govern-
mental system. That so fundamental a question should 
not have been solved long ago seems amazing to anyone 
for the first time meeting with it. Without it solvea, 
of course, attainment of perfect municipal government 
is rendered impossible at the outset. Fortunate it is, 
that it is becoming more and more evident to observ-
ers of municipal affairs that this question calls for 
immediate and concerted action; and let it be added, 
t~a~ it calls for the application of all the genius 
and foresight of statesmanship. 
In a certain sense it may be said that the ~ 
erican city has had a quite well defined place in the 
American governmental system. It has been the crea-
ture of the state legislative body--its tool and its 
plaything, entirely at the mercy of its creator, ex-
cept in so far as an alarmed and aroused electorate 
in a few states has, from time to time, placed con-
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stitutional limitations on the suzerainty of the com-
monwealth lawmakers. The evils to which unrestrained 
legislative control of cities has given rise have been 
widely commented upon by writers on city government 
in recent years;* and a portion of this thesis will 
attempt to describe the situation created by the 
practice in one of the forty-eight states: Oregon. A 
brief historical review of the relation of American 
Cities, in general, to the state legislatures will 
perhaps serve to make the e_tent and seriousness of 
the problem clearer. 
The historical origin of American municipali-
ties i~ to be found in the chartered boroughs, or 
municipal corporations, established in several of the 
English colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.*. The charters were granted by the royal 
* F. J. Goodnow, " unicipal Home Rule ," 1897, 
and "Municipal Government," 1910, Chaps VI-VIII; J. 
A. Fairlie, "Municipal Administration," 1901, Chap.V. 
** Fairlie, "Essays in Municipal Administration, II 
Chap. Iv.. , 1SIJl",1f !uniciral CorJtO"'ation~ in the Co~on.ie§," 
also j.t airlie', "Municlpal Administrat ion," Chap. V; W: 
B.Munro, "The Government of American Cities," 1913, 
pp. 1-4; • A. Schaper, "The City Charter Problem," 
in Papers and Proceedings of the Third Annual Meetini 
of the Minnesota Academy of Social SCiences, 1910. 
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governors as executive acts. They were on the same le-
gal basis as those of the boroughs in England, and so 
were independent of the colonial assemblies. The func-
tions, in turn, of these boroughs were limited strict-
ly to the enacting of local ordinances and the admin-
istration of matters of purely local interest, 
As times changed, however, and as these commu-
nities grew, local needs not provided for in t he 
charters arose, and the local authorities found it 
necessary to obtain special grants of power. These 
did not come from the royal governors, but from the 
colonial assemblies. The former were becoming more 
and more disliked and distrusted. This change was a 
notable one. Tho in each case a grant from the asse~ 
bly enlarged the actual functions and powers of the 
borough receiving it, this practice in time altered 
the status of municipal authorities so as to make 
them subordinate to the assemblies,· 
After the Revolution it was thus natural and 
easy for the state legislatures to assume the func-
• Fairl ie, "Munic i pal Administrat ion," p. 76. 
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tion .. of charter-making" as well as of charte;r-amending,. 
This put the municipal corporations in a still more 
dependent position; for their charters were thence-
forth simply legislative statutes, liable to be al-
tered or revoked by the legislature at any time. Of 
this the legislatures took full advantage. The upshot 
was, in short, that within less than half a century 
the state legislatures gained an absolute dominance, 
almost, over the most minute and purely local affairs 
of cities and towns. When the authorities of a city 
desired additional powers in order to provide for 
such local matters as the paving and lighting of 
streets and means of local transportation, water-
works, markets, and others, they had to seek the fa-
vor of a body of lawmakers the greater part of whom 
represented rural districts and exhibited an ignor-
ance of urban conditions and a prejudice toward the 
inhabitants of municipalities. 
Thus was the local "home rule" of the borou hs 
of colonial times virtually extinguished. In most of 
the states this is the situation today. The legal 
status of municipal corporations, as well as other 
units of local government, is stated by one writer 
9 
as follows: "In the absence of express constitutional 
restrictions, the local governments, city, county, 
and town, are creatures of the state legislatures, 
which can only exercise such powers as are definitely 
granted to them, and which the legislature can regu-
late; yes, make and unmake at will. Our state laws 
are thus centrally made and locally applied by local-
ly elected officers, to a very marked degree •••••••••. 
This system is popularly known as local self-govern-
ment."* The extent to which local self-government in 
America is merely a "popular" conception becomes very 
clear to anyone observing the course of legislative 
domination during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. 
So long as cities were comparatively small, and 
the needs of such communit~es meager, the situation 
revealed no such glaring abuses as to call forth much 
* . A. Schaper, "The City Charter Proolem," p.4. 
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protest. When it is noted that as late as 1820 there 
were only thirteen towns in the United States con-
taiIling more than 8,000 inhabitants and their com-
bined population was less than 500,000, or only 5% 
of the entire population of the country,* it is at 
once seen how insignificant were municipal affairs 
and municipal politics as compared with state KfKlI 
affairs and state politics. 
But there came a turn in events. The rapid 
growth of cities--a growth which by the end of the 
century became one of the phenomena of American po-
litical, social and economic life--made their con-
tinued government by state legislative bodies appear 
more and more cumbrous and anomalous. Municipalities 
became huge centers of population l larger, in many 
cases, than some of the former colonies. The com-
plexities of urban life increased in a manner alto-
gether unprecedented. Municipal activities grew and 
expanded with every year. 
* Fairlie, "MuniCipal Administration," p. 80. 
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The increase of functions did not at first, as 
events showed, mean an increase in the powers of cit-
ies; it meant simply more special acts to permit mu-
nicipalities to engage in new undertakings; it meant 
more interference by the legislature in municipal af-
fairs.* Some additional powers were, of course, gran~ 
ed; for example, in taxation; for this was imperative 
if the cities were goin~ to have the means of assum-
ing their new functions. 
This practice of legislation by special acts 
and interference in t~e most distinctly private af-
fairs of cities continued, and even grew in extent, 
in the face of the first manifestations of reaction 
and protest. At first the cities could assert them-
selves but feebly. Nevertheless, by securing Ii tIe 
concessions from state constitutional conventions in 
the form of partial checks upon the inroads of the 
legislatures, they laid the basis on which in later 
years municipal patriots could build a system of 
government suitable to, and responsive to, the needs 
* Fairlie, "l~unicipal Administration," p. 84. 
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of city dwellers of today. 
These restrictions on the interference by state 
legislatures in local affairs have been of great var~ 
ety, but it will not here be attempted to outline, or 
even mention, them all . As the most flagrantly evil 
results seemed to be traceable to the general habit 
of chartering municipal corporations only by special 
acts and enacting special laws for the current needs 
of individual cities, towns and villages , the logical 
remedy was simply to take away from the legislatures 
this power . This was done; but up to the present time 
such prohibitory clauses have been incorporated into 
hardly a score of state constitutions. · General and 
uniform laws for the incorporation of cities and for 
their government became, in these states , the only 
means by which t he legislatures could exercise their 
control over municipal corporations . Thus it was 
thought that legislative interference in local af-
fairs, prompted by prejudice or by partisan poli-
• Munro, "The Government of American Cities," p . 
55. 
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tics, would be effectually restrained. 
But it would be absurd to attempt to make all 
city charters uniform and all laws for their govern-
ment applicable to any and all municipalities, from 
the great metropolis of a million or more population 
to the hamlet of a few hundred inhabitants. In order, 
therefore, to make it possible to legislate ration-
ally for such divergences, municipalities were, by 
constitutional provision, divided into classes ac-
cording to population--or legislatures were empoW-
ered so to classify cities--and general laws to ap-
ply to the municipalities of one of the three or 
more classes created were made permissible. 
At best, such restrictions as these were of 
only negative value; and when a legislature was al-
lowed to classify cities without limitation as to 
number of classes, and to change the classification 
Whenever it wished to, the futility of it all made 
it necessary to look about for ~ome other manner or 
means by which live and energetic cities might be 
given room to develop in their own natural way and 
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grow in civic welfare as well as in size. 
The next step was a radical one: namely, to 
permit municipalities themselves to frame and adopt 
thei~ own charters, with the privilege of amending 
them and enacting, without let or hindrance, all 
such local legislation as the authorities and voters 
of the cities thought best. The city which can do 
these things is a truly "home rule" city; and it is 
wit~ the fortunes of this modern political creation--
and the reaspns for its creation--that this thesis 
has to deal. 
The plan originated in the state of Missouri, 
where it was advocated chiefly by the citizens of the 
largest ~itias in the state--St. Louis and Kansas Ci-
ty. When a constitutional convention met in 1875 to 
frame a new fundamental law for that state, a plan 
was incorporated in the constitution to permit cit-
ies of more than 100,000 population to frame and e-
nact their own charters. The drafting of such a char-
ter·was to be done by a board of thirteen members 
elected by the voters of the city desiring a new act 
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of incorporation.* 
The idea spread slowly. In 1879 it was adopted 
in California, in 1889 in Washington, in 1898 in Min-
nesota, in 1902 in Colorado, in 1906 in Oregon, in 
1907 in Oklahoma, in 1908 in Michigan, in 1910 in 
Arizona, and in 1912 in Ohio, Nebraska and Texas.** 
Is the right of cities to make and amend their 
own charters, and under them to enact local ordinanc-
es, to be unlimited? If not, how shall it be limited? 
There are interests which are vitally and primarily 
important to the citizens of a locality; but there 
are also subjects of local interest which affect just 
as forcible and vitally the people of a whole state. 
From the time of the establishment of the federal 
union in 1789 there have existed certain spheres of 
* Missouri constitution, Art. IX, Secs. 16-17. 
** California constitution of 1879, Art. XI, 
Secs. 6-8; ashington constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 10; 
Minnesota constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 36; Colorado 
const i tut ion, Art . XX , Secs. I - '" ; Oregon const i tu-
tion, Art. IV, Sec. 1 a, and Art. XI, Sec. 2; Okla-
homa constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 3; Hichigan con-
stitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 20; Arizona constitution, 
Art. VII, SeC$.I-~; Ohio constitution, Art.K£iiJ., Sec. 7,' 
Nebraska constitution, Art. Kd, Sec. I~ ; Texas con-
stitution, Art. "K1 , Sec. ~-. 
For a brief history of this movement, see M. R. 
'l.{al tb ie J tIC i ty- .(ade Charters," in Yale Rev iew, Febru-
ary, 1905. 
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ultimate state control, which the states must retain 
unless the system is to be radically changed. So loni 
as this nation continues to be a land of federated 
states these s rheres will exist. The "sovereign" 
state still lives, is the oft-re peated dictum in the 
decrees of our state courts. 
All constitutional amendments so far adopted to 
allow a greater measure of home rule for local com-
munities have--b1 express language or as interpreted 
by the courts--left this ultimate "sovereignty" of 
the state over the city unimpaired. It is only in 
the extent of its control thru the medium of the 
state legislature that there has been a real delimi-
tation of action in municipal affairs. In one state--
Washington--all that the "home rule" advocates have 
been able to obtain is freedom from legislative in-
terference by special acts. In all the municipal 
"home rule" states the constit tion and the general 
.laws, in so far as the latter apply to the accepted 
spheres of paramount state jurisdiction, have been 
untouched. 
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Has there, then, been any real positive change 
effected in the legal status of municipalities as a 
result of permitting them to frame, adopt and amend 
thei~ own charters? To the task of answering this 
question, as applying to one state, the major portion 
of this thesis will address itself. 
The question of the relation of a municipality 
to the state in which it is situated is so complex 
and intTicate, and involves such an endless chain of 
factors, that to study it in any detail in all the 
states--or even in the few hich have adopted the 
system of "home rule"--would require more time than 
has been available in the preparation of this the-
·sis . In the hope that the investigation of the prob-
lem in one typical state would yield approximately 
as valuable results, that most interesting common 
wealth on the Pacific coast--Oregon--has been chosen 
as the field of inquiry. 
"Home rule" is, of course, a question both of 
law and of practical politics; and, necessarily, the 
problem cannot be solved without a r eference to both. 
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Nevertheless, it is only with the legal and constitu-
tional proolems that this investigation will co~cern 
itself. They must be solved first of all. It is hope~ 
however l that at some future - time the inquiry may be 
extended to include a study of the actual workings of 
the plan in the state which has been chosen for con-
sideration. 
Radical as is the change inaugurated by the 
adoption of municipal "home rule" in a state, it is, 
at bottom l merely a modification of the method of ul-
timate state control of municipalities . In order l 
therefore , to arrive at a full comprehenSion of what 
the plan means in one state, one must have a know-
ledge of what were the principles and cO.1ditions ob-
taining befo~e "home ~ule" was ado~ted. The ~ages im-
mediately following willI therefore I treat in SOIDe 
detail of the est ablishment of local government in 
Oregon; this to be followed by an account of the rise 
and growth of legislative control, and a discussion of 
the legal principles upon which this control was for a 
half century based. 
CHAPTER II. 
BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN OREGON 
1. ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 
Community life in Oregon, as in most of the co~ 
monwealths of the United States, dates back to the 
trading posts and settlements of the first years of 
the nineteenth century. Historical origins are only 
indirectly involved in a study of modern municipal 
"home rule;" yet it may be illuminating as well as 
interesting to study the process by which units of 
local government are established and organized and 
their place in the governmental system secured. 
During the first three decades after the first 
permanent settlement, in 1811~ in what is now the 
state of Oregon, little attention was paid to this 
region by the pioneers who were steadily advancing 
the frontier line of the United States. In 1841, when 
the first attempt was made to establish civil govern-
ment~ the population of the region could be measured 
in hundreds. In 1843 a practically independent and 
19 
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sovereign state was established, tho the articles of 
~overnment adopted provid6tl that it was to continue 
only until the United States should extend its juris-
diction over the territory •• 
In 1844 the first steps were taken to organize 
machinery for the government of local subdivisions of 
the territory. By the organic act of 1843 the legi la-
tive body of the commonwealth was made to consist of 
representatives from four "districts,· which were at 
the same time created.·. As amended in 1844, the le~~ 
islative power was to be vested in a "house of repre-
sentatives" compoaed of delegates elected annually by . 
the voters of the several "counties."··· In reality, 
these divisions were identical with the districts es-
tablished in 1843. The same act provided that the 
judge of the territory should hold two terms of his 
court in each "county" during the year. Such county 
courts were by another act of 1844 authorized to ap-
point overseers in each county to have charge of 
road work and improvements, Which were thus brou~ht 
• Hubert Howe Bancroft, "History of Ore~on," vol. 
I, pp. 292-314 • 
•• Ibid., p. 472, footnote • 
••• Or. laws, 1843-1849, p. 98. 
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under the jurisdiction of county authorities. This 
law furnishes the first instance of the practioe 
whioh later became common in Ore~on of oompellini 
all able-bodied men to work on the public hi~hways 
for a certain period each year. Those who refused 
were made subjeot to fine. No provision was made for 
a road tax •• 
The first piece of "municipal" legislation in 
Oregon on reoord was enaoted at the followini ses-
sion, tho it must be explained that up to this time 
there had been no inoorporation of any towns or vil-
lages. On December 22, 1845, the house of represent-
atives decreed that the town of Robin's Nest should 
thenoeforth be known as Linn City •• • 
It would be superfluous to attempt to outline 
in any detail the steps taken durin~ the following 
years to organize the system of looal ~overnment. 
The people at this time owed allegianoe to no other 
oountry, but were continually olamoring for a full 
• Or. laws, 1843-1849, p. 88 • 
•• Ibid., p. 30. 
J 
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territorial government under the protection of the 
United states. With the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Ghent with Great Britain in 1846, fixing the north-
ern boundary of the territory under the jurisdiction 
of the United States at the 49th parallel, the peo-
ple hoped for immediate action. Two years more, how-
ever, they had to wait. On the 14th of August, ' 1848, 
congress passed an act providing for a territorial 
government, and in the spring of the following year 
General Joseph Lane came to take the reins as first 
governor. The population of that part of the terri-
tory south of the Columbia River--that which com-
prises the present state of Oregon--could at this 
time hardly have numbered 15,000. 
Numerous little towns and villages had at this 
time been laid out thruout the region, panticularly 
in the verdant Willamette valley, which from the very 
first had attracted a majority of the ~igrants. In 
addition to Astoria, founded in 1811, Oregon City had 
been laid out in 1840 and a large settlement was grow-
ing up at what is now the city of Salem. In 1845 two 
real estate. men from New England founded what later 
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became the metropolis of the Northwest--Portland. From 
the very first it grew rapidly. In the Columbia valla~ 
also, a few settlements had sprung up. Eighty-eight 
miles up from Portland, at the head of navigation, a 
mission had been established in 1838, followed by a 
trading station and military post; and around these 
greW up a town which received the name of The Dalles, 
or Dalles City. 
After 1850 a horde of immigrants poured in, fo1-
lowing the enactment by congress o~a land donation law. 
"The population (of that part of the territory south 
of the Columbia River) before the large immigration 
of 1852 was about 20,000, most of whom were scattered 
over the Willamette valley farms," writes the histor-
ian of the Pacific coast •• "The rage for laying out 
towns, which was at its height from 1850 to 1853, had 
a tendency to retard the growth of any of them. Ore-
gon City, the oldest in the territory, had not much 
over 1,000 inhabitants. Portland, by reason of its 
advantages for unloading shipping, had double that 
• Bancroft, History of Oregon, vol. II, p. 251. 
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number. The other towns, Milwaukie, Salem, Corvallis, 
Albany, Eugene, Lafayette, Dayton and Hillsboro, and 
the newe~ ones in the southern valleys, could none 
of them count 1,000." 
The first ter~ito~ial legislative assembly con-
vened in December, 1849. One of" its first acts was 
the establishment of a system of common schools. At 
the head of the system was to be a superintendent of 
schools, elected triennially by the legislature; and 
under him, it was prov ided, there should be one scho al 
commissioner elected by the voters of each county . 
Furthermore , the law provided that school districts 
might be formed by the people of any town or neigh-
borhood.* 
The second session, which convened in December, 
1850, continued the work of organizin& the activities 
of the territory carried on by local officers. Amoni 
the important laws enacted was OBB providing for 
general elections . Under this act elections were to 
* Laws first sess., Territorial Legislative As-
sembly, p . 66. 
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be held in each or~anized county, under the direction 
of county officials. In addition, "townships or other 
districts" were authorized to be set off by law as 
election precincts.* In 1851 a law was enacted stat-
ing that each election precinct in any county was 
entitled to at least one justice of the peace and 
one constable, to be elected by the qualified voters;*· 
and in 1852 another law provided that "the qualified 
voters of each township or precinct" should elect -
justices and constables.*** 
Nearly all local gov~rnmental powers were at 
this time in the hands of county, school district and 
road district authorities, especially the first men-
tioned. Thus the duties of county commissioners, cre-
ated at the second session, included the erection and 
repair of court houses, jails and other county public 
buildings; the laying out, altering and discontinu-
ance of roads and highways; the livensing and fixing 
* Laws 2nd sess., p. 101. 
** Ibid., .p. 164. 
*** Laws 3rd sess., p . • 
/ 
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of rates of fer~iage; the granting of saloon and such 
other licenses and the law authorizea to be granted; 
the levying~ assessing and collecting of taxes; and 
the superintendence of poor relief.· 
Not all powers and functions~ however~ were un-
der the jurisdiction of the governmental divisions 
mentionea. In 185@l she territorial legislature grant-
ed articles of incorporation to the inhabitants of 
Oreion City. In the following year a charter was 
granted to the city of Portland ••• As early as 1849 
some citizens of Portland organized an association~ 
elected trustees~ and built a school and a meetini 
house •••• 
It is in 1851 that the first reference is found 
in the general laws of Oregon to ~ncorporated towns. 
Under an act passed in that year~ it was provided 
that any person desiring to layout any town. should~ 
before selling any lots in such town, have a copy of 
the plat recorded in the county recorderts office • 
• Rev ised statutes 0 f the terr i tory, 1855, p.412 • 
• * It is unfortunate that these two charters are 
missing from the bound volumes of Oregon territorial 
laws which we~e used in this study. 
* •• Thomas L. Cole, chapter on "Portland," in 
"Historical Towns of the Western States," edited by 
Lyman P. Powell (1901). 
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Whenever any person or corporation desired any lot~ 
street, public square, or other land vacated in an 
unincorporated town~ the law required a petition to 
the board of county commissioners, who were author-
ized, if no objection was made, in their discretion 
to vacate the same . Whenever any person or corpora-
tion wanted any such land vacated in an incorporated 
town, the law required a petition to the trustees or 
other body of the town. Furthermore, whenever any 
public square, street or other land should be vacated 
in any unincorporated town, the law stated that the 
property should vest in the board of county commis-
sioners; but whenever any such land should be vacated 
in an incorporated town, it should vest in the trust-
ees, or other corporate body; and the proper author-
ities in either case were empowered to sell the land 
and appropriate the proceeds for the benefit of the 
corporation.· 
Thus was created the incorporated town in Ore-
gon. As will be seen later, the Oregon lawmakers did 
• Laws 2nd sess., p. 259. 
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not distinguish b,etween cities and towns, except in 
the ~ of organization (and even this was not fol-
lowed rigidly); so that here was launched by the leg-
islature that political entity--the municipal corpor-
ation--whose history will be followed in some detail 
in the following pages. 
Up to 1854 there is no mention in the general 
laws of the terms cities or villages. In that year, 
however, the territorial legislature passed an act 
relating to action on the official securities of 
public officers, and to suits by or against officers 
and public bodies, including any "county, city, ~ 
lage, or other municipal bO£Io" Among the officers 
empowered to prosecute actions in their official ca-
paci~ ' were those of any "municipal corporatio~"* 
At the same session of the legislative assembly, an-
other law was enacted providing that whenever "a city 
council of any incorporated city" should organize a 
fire department, certificates of membership in such 
department could be issued under such regulations as 
* Revised statutes, 1855, p. 165. 
might be prescribed by the city council.* 
Local option for Oregon cities and towns is 
proclaimed as early as 1855. On January 25 of that 
year the legislative assembly enacted thatl before 
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any person desiring to retail spirituous liquors 
could proceed to secure a license l he should, at his 
own trouble and expense, obtain the siinatures of a 
majority of the whole number of legal voters in the 
precinct in which he wished to sell liquorl prayini 
that the license be granted. If he contemplated lo-
cating a saloon in a city or town, he was required 
to secure the siinatures of a majority of the voters 
in the city or town; and if it was in a city divided 
into wards l then a majority of the ward in which he 
wished to set up his business was necessary.** 
2 • THE FIRST MUNICIPAL CHARTERS. 
On January 18 1 186' , the Oregon legislature 
passed an act incorporating the ~ of Astoria,*** 
* Revised statutes, 1855, p. 572. 
** Ibid., p. 547. 
*** Special laws, 7th sess., p. 2. 
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and on January 25 it incorporated the city of Eola.* 
Both the charters were essentially alike--in 
most respects identical. In the first place, the in-
itial articles creating the "bodies politic and cor-
porate" were alike in practically every detail. Asto-
ria, a "town," was to be ~overned by a board of trust-
ees of five members, and other minor officers. Eo1a 
was given what is generally regarded as more of a 
city !2!! of government; namely, a mayor and a co~ 
mon council, with minor officers and departments. But 
the enumerated powers of the two governing bodies 
were substantially equal. In both communities power 
was given to make by-laws and ordinances not repu~­
nant to the laws of the United States or of the ter-
ritory, etc.; to levy and collect taxes, within pre-
scribed limits, for county and territorial purposes; 
to protect the public health; to prevent and remove 
nuisances; to layout and im.rove streets; to license 
auctioneers, peddlers, pawnbrokers, etc.; to provide 
a workhouse; to preserve order; to impose fines and 
* Spec. laws 7th sess., p. 13. 
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other penalties for breach of ordinances; and to ap-
propriate for any item of the debts and expenses of 
the municipality. Both communities, also, were e~ 
powered to prohibit public shows and amusements, gam-
ing houses and saloons. In the Astoria charter it was 
provided that no person having paid a license to the 
city or town for any such purpose should be compelled 
to pay license fee to the county or territory. The 
F.ola charter went farther, by expressly stating that 
no law authorizing any county officer to grant saloon 
licenses should apply to persons vending liquors wit~ 
in the city limits. By this provision the holder of a 
city license was not only exempted from payin~ a li-
cense tax to the county, but apparently it was left to 
the city authorities to determine the amount of the 
tax, the conditions to be met before a license should 
be granted, and the term for which the license should 
be given. and even to provide the officials to see 
that the conditions were lived up to. Under a general 
law of 1849 these matters had been placed in the handa 
of county authorities.· 
*Laws 1st sess., p. 157. 
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The t~~ing powers of the governing bodies dif-
fered in the two communities. In the city of Eola the 
council was empowered to levy and collect a small tax 
in addition to that allowed in a previous section, 
whenever additional revenue should be required for 
some specific object. In the town of Astoria the board 
of trustees was given the same power, but on condition 
that the ordinance for that purpose be first submitted 
to and approved by the legal voters of the town. The 
board was also authorized to provide for the workin~ 
of the county road tax upon the streets and public 
highways within the town limits, under supervision 
of the commissioner of streets and harbor. There was 
no similar provision in the Eola charter. The Astoria 
trustees were ordered to post annually a statement of 
receipts and disbursements. This was not required of 
the Eola council. 
In the Astoria charter it was provided that the 
improvement of streets and walks was to be made and 
paid for by the owners of property fronting on the 
streets or walks whose improvement was desired by the 
trustees. But if such owners, or some of them, failed 
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to make the improvements, the commissioner of streets, 
if petitioned by the o~ners of more than half of the 
property in question, was to see that the improvement 
was made, in such manner as the board of trustees 
might provide; and then the commissioner could collect 
the cost from the property owners, according to front-
age. In the Eola charter nothing was said of property 
owners improving a street or sidewalk. The council, 
however, was authorized to layout and locate streets, 
alleys, landings, o~ wharves, when petitioned by two-
thirds of the legal voters of the whole city, and then 
to determine the amount to be collected from each own-
er of adjoining property. 
Some other srecified powers which were peculiar 
to the F.ola charter--to care for paurers, establish 
fire protection and night-watch and patrol, and erect 
market-houses and slaughter-houses--were probably due 
to special conditions existing in that city. 
It is to be noted that the Astoria charter con-
tained the provision that it was not to go in effect 
until submitted to the electors of the town and ac-
cepted by a majority of them at a meeting called for 
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that purpose. The Eola act of incorporation carried 
no such provision. Both charters, of course, con-
tained clauses reservin~ to the territorial legisla-
ture the powe2 to alter or repeal them at any time. 
The charters of both municipalities prescribed 
a general election of all officersj and every election 
was to be conducted according to the general state law 
on the subject. Certain qualifications of officers 
were laid down, and the Eola act prescribed the qua1-
ifications for voting, which were, however, in con-
formity with the qualifications ordained in the state 
constitution. 
In 1857 were incorporated the city of Salem,* 
the town of Corvalljs,** and Dalles City.*** In the 
main, their charters were similar to each other and 
to t~e just described. Some departures from the 
existing models are, howeveT, to be noted. 
The charters of the two first-mentioned dif-
fered from the others in that their governing bod-
* Spec. laws 8th sess., p. 22 . 
**Ibid., p. 33 . 
*** Ibid., p . 1. 
ies possessed some new minor powers, such as to es-
tablish hospitals, provide water for the city, pre-
vent and regulate the running at large of animals 
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and the discharge of fire-arms in the city. They 
differed from each other somewhat in their financial 
powers. Thus, the Salem charter, like those of Asto-
ria and Eola, gave the city council exclusive power 
to approrriate for any item of city expenditure and 
to provide for the payment of the debts and expenses 
of the city. The Corvallis act contained a like clau~, 
to which was added a proviso that the council might 
not create a debt greater than the estimated revenue 
for one year. In the Dalles City charter there was 
no clause &iving any express power to appropriate. 
Like the Astoria charter, that of Dalles City was 
submitted for ratification to the voters of the city; 
the others became effective from the time of passage 
by the legislature. 
Next year, 1858, a fe minor amendments were 
made by the legislature to the Corvallis charter, 
n a special act granting to the city council po~er 
to establish a market.* At the same session the act 
* Spec. laws 9th sess., p. 48. 
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of 1850 incorporating Oregon City was amended so as 
to enable the city council to abate any tax on appli-
cation to the city recorde~.* By a special act of 
January 16, a part of the town plat of Union Point, 
an unincorporated town, was declared to be vacated.** 
Another act~ of January 15,*** amended the Portland 
charter of 1851 in some minor particulars. By still 
another act of 1858 the office of port warden for 
the city of Portland was created. On the city co~ 
cil was devolved the duty of defining this officer's 
duties and fixing his compensation~ which, however, 
must be from fees.**** Finally, another charter was 
granted to the city of Salem~ tho its original char-
ter was only a year old. Unlike the first act of in-
corporation, this one was submitted to a vote of the 
people of the city. Some additional minor powers were 
given to the c~uncil, but a restriction was added to 
the city's borrowing powers. There was also a change 
made in boundaries.***** 
* Spec. laws 9th sess., p. 76. 
** Ib id., p. 71. 
*** Ibid., p. 13. 
**** Ibid., p. 32. 
***** Ibid., p. 3. 
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In 1859, at the last session of the territorial 
legislative assembly , two municipal charters were 
granted: one to Oregon City,* to replace the act of 
1850, and one to the town of Monmouth.** They dif-
fered in no essential respect from former charters. 
The former included a license clause similar to that 
in the Eola act , namely, in exempting any holder of 
a liquor license from the o~eration of any law autho~ 
ixing county officers to grant licenses. The latter 
followed the provision in the Astoria charter by mer~ 
ly exempting a licensee from the necessity of payin~ 
a double license tax. The authorities in each were 
permitted to levy a special tax in addition to the 
regular tax provided for in the charter , if such a 
tax were first submitted to and approved by the vot-
eTS of the city. The three charters granted in 1857 
contained no such provision. Finally, while one of 
these acts of incorporation , that of Honmouth, as 
submitted to a vote of the electors, the Oregon City 
* Spec . laws 10th sess., p. 3 . 
** Ibid. , p. 13 . 
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charter was not. 
This concludes the territorial period. In June, 
1857, after several ineffectual attempts to obtain a 
vote of the peorle of the territory favorable to the 
proposition of calling a convention to frame a con-
stitution as a state of the union, the voters elected 
sixty delegates to convene for that purpose. On the 
third Monday in August of the same year these dele-
&ates met at Salem, adopted a constitution, and sub-
mitted the results of their efforts to the electorat 
On the second Monday in November the election was 
held and the constitution ratified. For more than a 
year the peorle then had to wait for action by con-
gress. At last, on February 14, 1859, congress passed 
an act admitting Oregon as a state, and on the same 
date the constitution went into effect. 
As will be seen from the review of municipal 
legislation during Oregon's territorial period, the 
functions of cities and towns were exceedingly few, 
as compared to those of municipalities of today. Al-
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lowance must be made, of course, for the fact that in 
all new and sparsely settled countries, with only few 
and small communities, the demands for conveniences 
and services by municipal action are not comparable 
to the demands which property owners and others noW 
. 
make. Then, too, a half century ago no cities, large 
or small, undertook to provide services to nearly the 
extent which they do now, and which citizens have 
come to look upon as almost in the nature o~ "inal-
ienable rights." 
As to the functions which we find that these 
early cities in Oregon actually exercised, it is ap-
parent that the lawmakers had arrived at no very set-
tled policy. A general law for the incorporation of 
municipalities was evidently out of the question; in-
stead, the legislature had to provide, as best it could, 
for the individual needs of new munici palities as they 
arose. Considering how few were the cities in the ter-
ritory and how scanty the needs of each one, it would 
be drawing a hasty conc~usion to say that special lei-
islation was not the best method of dealing with mu-
njcipal problems, as with many others. Even if it were 
not, it had not at this time given evidence of any 
abuse as such. At the last session of the territorial 
legislature, something over 100 special acts of var-
ious kinds were passed. These included thirty-one 
grants of divorce, fourteen acts establishing terri-
torial roads f eleven acts for the relief of counties, 
persons, etc., and six relating to cities and towris--
hardly more than a healthy, active legislature could 
take care of in a month. The session in question 
continued two months, which gave ample time for the 
few additional general laws which were passed. 
As to the manner in which municipal powers 
were granted--the wording employed in conveyin~ a 
general grant of governmental power, as was done in 
every act of incorporation--variations are to De found 
on every hand, interesting, perhaps, to a student of 
legislative methods and legal niceties and shades of 
expression in the framing of lawsi but considered in 
connection with the settled rule of construction 
ado~ted by the courts in interpreting such grants of 
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power, they become of hardly more than antiquarian 
interest. The first charter considered--that of As-
toria--not only contained among its enumerated pow-
eTS that of making by-laws and ordinances "not re-
pugnant to the laws of this territory, or to the 
laws of the United States;" there was a special seo-
tion, apart from this, as follows: "It shall be the 
duty of the trustees of the town of Astoria to devise 
and adopt all such measures, regulations and ordi-
nances connected with the police, security, tranquil-
ity, cleanliness, improvement and ornament of the 
town, and the public health, prosperity and welfare, 
and the regulations of the finances and public ex-
penditures of the town, as shall be expedient from 
time to time, and in accordance with this act, the 
laws of this territory, and of the United states."* 
This grant was broader than those of some others, 
but not so sweeping as, for instance, that of Ore-
gon City charter of 1859. In this act the section on 
enumerated powers begins by empowering the city coun-
* Astoria charter, Art. II, Sec. 2. 
42 
cil to "make by-laws and ordinances not repugnant to 
the constitution and laws of the United States, or 
laws of this territory, necessary to carry into ef-
fect the provisions of this charter." Then, at the 
end of a long list of expressed powers, comes a clause 
authorizing the council "generally to do all thing! 
which a city corporation can or ou~ht, to secure th~_ 
healthl~~~d inter~t of the citizens of s~l£ 
corporation, and-12-Ere~~ve good order within the 
same. II. 
-
As will be seen later on, such variations in 
expression--for such is all they amount to--make 
absolutely no difference in the status of munici-
pal corporations before the courts. 
* Oregon City charte~, 1859, Art. IV, Sec. 2. 
CHAPTER III. 
A HALF CENTURY OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF LEGISLATIVE 
CONTROL. 
Constitutional Erovieions.--An enumeration of 
the constitutional provisions relating to municipal 
legislation and goverrunent, and a brief review of 
the judicial interpretation of them and of the pow-
ers of the legislature under them, may perhaps be 
profitabl, prefaced to a history of legislative ac-
tion in regard to the cities and towns of Oregon. 
As is well known from the nature of the Amer-
ican federal union, state legislatures are supreme 
governing bodies, limited only by the national con-
stitution, treaties and laws and the constitutions 
of the respective states--and as these are from time 
to time construed by the courts. In everythin~ that 
concern~ a state or the smallest minor subdivisions 
of a state, and is not delegated to the central gov-
ernment, the legislature is the supreme lawmaking a-
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gency--in so far as it is not restricted by the state 
organic law. 
Furthermore, enactments of a state legislature 
are usually regarded as final; that is, they ordinar-
ily do not depend for their validity upon any exter-
nal authority or exigency. To this som~ state consti-
tutions have provided exceptions. Thus, in the first 
article of the Oregon constitution--the bill of rights 
--it is provided that no law shall be passed "the 
taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon 
any authority, e.cept as provided in this constitu-
tion." The Oregon people have established an excep-
tion in their fundamental law in the form of a pro-
viso that "laws locatin~ the capital of the state, 
locatinu county seats, and submitting town and cor-
porate acts, and other local and special laws, may 
take effect or not, upon a vote of the electors in-
terested."* There is also a provision that "the op-
eration of the laws shall never be suspended except 
by the authority of the legislative assemblyr** 
* Art. I, Se~ 21. 
** Art. I, Sec. 22. 
45 
Durin~ territorial days, as has been noted, the 
legislative body sometimes submitted to the voters of 
cities and towns the question whether or not they 
wished to be incorporated under a charter framed by 
the legislature. But such a referendum was entirely 
discretionary with the legislature. This situation 
continued after the adoption of the constitution, for 
lac:er 
forty-four years ; the Oregon supreme court declared 
that this clause did not make it obligatory on the 
legislature to submit such acts to the interested 
voters of a locality. * During the fifty-six years 
since the adoption of the Oregon constitution the 
legislature has frequently ' taken occasion to submit 
measures of local in~erest to the voters affected, as , 
for instance, in the adoption of new charters. 
Until prohibited in 1906, almost the sole method 
by which municipalities in Oregon were incorporated 
was by special charter acts . In 1893 the legislature 
enacted a general law for the incorporation of cities 
* Baker County v . Benson, 40 Or . 220 (1901). This 
case involved the submission of an act pertaining to 
counties, not cities or towns; but the principle and 
applicaoility is the same. 
46 
and towns. According to this act, any portion of a 
county containing at least 150 inhabitants, and not 
already incorporated as a municipal corporation, was 
permitted to be incorporated. The act prescribed the 
procedure to be followed in incorporatin~; and it 
constituted the charter of any municipality that 
might be created in accordance with it.* 
Nevertheless, after the passage of this act as 
well as prior to it, rthelalmos~ sole method by which 
municipal corporations were created was by special 
act of the legislature. This policy as legalized by 
the constitution of 1857, which said: "Corporations 
may be formed under general laws, but shall not be 
created by special laws, except for municipal pur-
poses. All laws passed pursuant to this section may 
be altered, amended, or repealed, but not so as to 
impair or destroy vested corporate rights."* 
It is to be noted that the constitution did 
not originally state that only municiEal cor~tions 
* Gen. laws 1893, pp. 119-133. 
** Art. XI, Sec. 2. 
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might be formed by special laws; it said corporations 
"for municipal purposes," and while, at first sight, 
there may seem to be no substantial difference between 
the terms, the Oregon supreme court in 189.1 , in a care-
fully worded and painstaking interpretation, evolved 
a distinction in accordance with which counties, school 
districts, road districts, and similar governmental and 
administrative units were classed among corporations 
"for municipal purposes."· In arriving at its position 
the court throWB much light upon the status of munic~ 
palities in Oregon. 
"A corporation created for municipal purposes," 
says the court,"is a corporation created for public 
or governmental purposes, with political powers to be 
exercised for the public good and the administration 
of civil government, whose members are citizens, not 
stockholders; an instrument of government with cer-
tain delegated powers subject to the control of the 
legislature, and its members officer~ or agents of 
the goverrunent for the administration or discharge 
• Cook v. Port of Portland, 20 Or. 580 (1891). 
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of public duties. A city or purely municipal corpora-
tion is perhaps the highest type of corporation cre-
ated for municipal purposes, because it is a minia-
ture government, having legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers, but there is another class of corpor-
ation, such as counties, school districts, road dis-
tricts, which, tho varying in application and peculiaF 
features, are but so many agencies or instrumentali-
ties of the state to promote the convenience of the 
public at large, and are, in the broadest use of the 
term, for municipal purposes. It would be a narrow an~ 
unwarranted construction of language to say that mu-
nicipal purposes means only city, town, or village 
purposes. The constitution of this state evidently 
contemplates the creation of counties under the di-
rect supervision of, and by special act of, the leg-
islature; yet no direct power is given to cre~te them, 
and the section under consideration contains a direct 
prohibition against doing so, unless the word munici-
pal covers this class of corporations. We thus per-
ceive that the word municipal not only applies to cit-
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ies, towns and villages, but has a broader and more 
general signification relating to the state or nation . 
•••••••••• It was in the broader and more general sense 
of the term that the words municipal purposes were used 
in the constitution of this state."* 
The le~al status of municipalities will be stuG-
ied more in detail in the last chapter of this invest-
igation. All that is important to note, at this point, 
is that incorporation of municipalities by special 
laws was expressly provided for in the constitution 
of Oregon. But the power of the legislature to pass 
special acts of all kinds pertaining to cities and 
towns was somewhat curtailed by a number of constitu-
tional restrictions. They are summed up in the fol-
lowing subdivisions of Art. IV, Sec. 23: 
"The legislative assembly shall not pass srecial 
* The court also quotes Art. XI, Sec. 9, of the 
constitution, which states that no "county, city, towm 
or other municipal corporation," could by a vote of 
its citizens or otherwise become a stockholder in any jOint stock company, corporation, etc. But this clear-
ly shows that, unless the frruners of the constitution 
were here guilty of an oversight, the term "munic~pal 
corporation" is also to be given, in Oregon, just as 
bToad a definition as a "oor oration for municipal 
purposes." Does it not preclude the court from makini 
the dis$inction it does between the two? 
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or local laws in any of the followin& enumerated cases: 
"1. Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of 
justices of the peace, and of constables ••••••• 
"7. For laying, opening, and working on highways, 
and for the election or apr-ointment of surervisors. 
"8. Vacating toads, town plats, streets, alleys, 
and public squares •••••••• 
"10. For the assessment and collection of taxes 
for state , county, township, or road purposes •••••• 
"13. Providing for opening and conducting the 
elections of state, county, and township officers, 
and designating the places of voting." 
NotWithstanding this apparently clear prohibi-
tion, the Oregon legislature has habitually passed 
srecial acts governing cities and towns and relat-
ing to these subjects, and such matters have been 
included in the municipal charters it has granted. 
At no time has the supreme court of the state inter-
vened to prevent the exercise of this power. The ex-
planation is that the restrictions Were not intended 
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to apply to cities and towns. 
Art. IX, Sec. 1, of the constitution says that 
"the legislat ive shall provide by law for uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation:" and in 
Sec. 32 of the bill of rights this is repeated, in 
part, in the declaration that "all taxation shall be 
equal and uniform." The great variations in the rates 
at which the legislature has by charter prOVision and 
-rn .... ni a. ;f~{ l i/es 
otherwise permitted ~to t~~ local property shows that 
these clauses of the constitution do not refer to 
cities; and in numerous cases the state supreme court 
has held that the requirement of uniformity does not 
apply to local assessments.· 
Legislative control of municipal elections and 
office-holding is reserved in the folIo ing clauses 
of the constitution: 
"There shall be elected in each county, by the 
qualified electors thereof, at the time of holding 
general elections, a county clerk, treasurer, sher-
• King v. City of Portland, 2 Or. 146 (1865); 
Ladd v. Gambell, 35 Or. 393 (1899); King v. Port-
land, 38 Or. 402 (1900). 
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iff, coroner, and surveyor, who shall severally hold 
their offices for the term of two years. Such other 
county, township, precinct, and city officer~ as may 
be necessary shall be elected or appointed in such 
manner as may be prescribed by law •••••••• 
"No person shall be elected or appointed to a 
county office who shall not be an elector of the 
county; and all county, township, pr6binct, and city 
offjcers shall keep their respective offices at such 
place s there in, and perfornr such dut ies as may be pr~ 
scribed by law •••••••• 
"Vacancies in county, township, precinct, and 
city offices shall be filled in such manner as may be 
prescribed by law."* 
State control over the judiciary is providea 
for in Art. VII, Sec. I, which, among other things, 
* Art. VI, Secs. 6, 7, 8, 9. In Livesley v. 
Litchfield, 47 Or. 252 (1905), the court held that 
the section declaring officers of a city shall be e-
lected or apPointed in such manner as may be pre-
scribed by law, does not empo er the legislature to 
prescribe the qualifications of voters at municipal 
elections, but contemplates that the elections shall 
be by qualified voters (as stated in Sec. 6), the 
word "manner" meaning the mode of conducting the 
elections. 
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states that "municipal courts may be created to admin-
ister the regulations of incorporated towns and cit-
ies." 
Art. XI, Sec. 5, of the constitution declares 
that "acts of the legislative assembly incorporating 
towns and cities shall restrict their powers of tax-
ation> borrowing money, contracting debts, and loan-
ine their creait." As a rule, the charters framed by 
the legislature did carry provisions regarding all 
these matters, but, perhaps thru inadvertence, some-
times the lawmakers failed to say anythin~ about bor-
rowing money. The ~licy of the supreme court in con-
struing such restrictions, when made> has not been 
entirely uniform. 
The remaining constitu.tional provisions per-
taining to municipalities are as follows: 
"The state shall never assume the debts of any 
county, to n, or other corporati££ whatever> unless 
such debts shall have been created to repel invasion, 
suppress insurrection, or defend the state in war. 
"No county, city> town> or other municipal £2!: 
~ration, by vote of its citizens or otherwise, shall 
become a stockholder in any joint stock company, cor-
poration, or association whatever, or raise money for, 
or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such company, 
corporation, or association."· 
Judicial interpretation of l~islative control.--
One of the most significant facts in connection with 
the legislative control of municipalities in Oregon 
during the half century following the adoption of the 
constitution is that its validity was so seldom ques-
tioned in the courts of the state. The great mass of 
litigation invol Ving municipal corporations concerned, 
instead, the powers of municipalities under the char-
~ granted to them by the legislature. Another fact 
of equal significance is the almost entire uniformity 
and regulari~y with which the supreme court has up-
held the meddlesome action of the state lawmakers in 
their almost unlimited control over municipal affairs. 
The restrictions in the constitution upon srecial 
legislation on enumerated subjects have on a few oc-
casions been ~t forth in order to check the legisla-
• Art. XI, Secs. e and 9. For definition of "oth-
er municipal corporation," see footnote, p. 49. 
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ture. On nearly every occasion, however, the court 
has sustained the legislature, basing its decisions, 
in the main, on the old rule of favorable construc-
tion of acts of the lawmaking branch of the govern-
ment.* 
"A municipal corporation is but the creature 
of the legislature," said the court in a case brought 
before it in 1895, involving the largest city of the 
state,** "and in its governmental or public capacity 
is one of the instruments or agents of the state for 
governmental purposes, possessing certain prescribed 
political and municipal powers, to be exercised by it 
on behalf of the general public rather than for it-
self; and over it as such agent the authority of the 
legislature is su~reme and without limitation, other 
than such as may be found in the constitution. "*** 
* The position of the Oregon surreme court is 
that the "extraordinary" power of courts to declare 
an act of the legislature unconstitutional is one 
that should not be exercised unless there is a plain 
conflict between the statute and the constitution: 
Ki8~ v. City of Portland, 2 Or. 152l1865)i Cline v. 
Greenwood, 10 Or. 230 (1882); Cook v. Port of Port-
land, 20 Or. 580 (1891). 
** Simon v. Northrup, 27 Or. 487 (1895). 
*** Cited and aff&rmed in Brand v. Multnomah 
"It must be conceded that the power of the legisla-
ture over public corporations within the state, so 
far as concerns their existence and boundaries, is 
practically without limit, unless restrained by some 
provision of the constitution," said the Oregon court 
on another occasion."* 
One of the earliest cases before the court, de-
cided in 1866, •• furnishes a good example of the al-
most unlimited powers which the state supreme tribu-
nal, from the first, allowed the legislature to ex-
ercise over cities and towns, and how constitutional 
restrictions were liberally construed in favor of the 
legislature. By a special act, that is, by the char-
ter of Portland of 1864,.·. the recorder of that city 
was made ex-officio justice of the peace within the 
city limits; this des pite t he provision in the con-
County, 38 Or. 79 (1900), in which the court, after 
declaring that all power (in this case, the control 
of streets) must be delegated to a municipality be-
fore it can be exercised, adds: "Nor does the mere 
fact that the state has delegated certain po ers to 
the municipality inhibit it from again resumin& or 
exerCising such po ers." 
• Winters v. George, 21 Or. 251 (1891) • 
•• Ryan v. Harris, 2 Or. 175 (1866) • 
••• Sp. laws 1864, p. 14, 3ec. 5. 
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stitution prohibiting the legislature from passin~ 
special or local laws regulating the jurisdiction 
and duties of justices of the peace, and a general 
law of the state prescribing that "there shall be 
elected at a general election, by the qualified e-
lectors of the several eledtion precincts of this 
state, one justice of the peace." This general law, 
it was claimed, should be binding in preference to 
any charter provisions , particularly because the con-
stitution, in another clause, declared that "such 
township and precinct officers as may be necessary 
shall be elected or appointed in such manner as may 
be prescribed by la ."* 
In deciding that the Oregon legislature did 
have r~wer , under the constitution, by special act, 
as in a city charter, to make a city recorder ex-
officio justice of the peace, the court did not con-
sjder the question whether or not a general la is 
binding uron the legislature in enacting special laws, 
such as charters. It merely held that the general law 
* Art. VI, Sec. 7. 
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could not, in the present case, be construed to bar 
the action of the legislature, because, as the court 
reasoned, the general law only proposed that there 
should be at least ~ justice of the peace in each 
preCinct, and that that one should be elected. "But 
there is no prohibition," said the court, "to the ap-
pointment or election of as many more as the legisla-
ture at a subsequent time might provide." In refer-
ence to the alleged constitutional difficulty, the 
court held that the prohibition of ~pecial laws reg-
ulating the jurisdiction of justices of the peace 
referred merely to the giving of magistrates in one 
locality greater jurisdiction over causes of action, 
or greateT powe~s and authority, than in another--
not to territorial jurisdiction, 
The court really showed the actual reason for 
arriving at its decision when it .lated that, when 
statutes conflict, they "must be construed so that 
all may be in force if possible ." As far as such a 
ruling permitted the legislature full play in con-
tinually tinkering with and altering the general laws 
of the state by means of special acts concerning par-
59 
ticular municipalities, the court dismissed this ob-
jection with the following statement: "Concerning 
subjects not limited or provided for in the consti-
tution, the legislature has unlimited and absolute 
authority, guarded only by the right of the people 
to change their legislators."* 
The right of the legislature to fix the com-
pensation of municipal officers and regulate them to 
the extent of requiring a police judge to pay over 
the fees he collects as justice of the peace to the 
city treasury was called in question in two cases, 
but was in each instance decided in the affirmative.** 
In 1885 the legislature imposed on the city of 
Portland a "water committee," composed of prominent 
citizens of Portland named in the act,*** with au-
thority to construct a system of water supply for the 
* In 1871 the court, in state v. Wiley, ~ Or. 
184, urheld a charter amendment enacted by the legis-
Jature conferring the authority and jurisdiction of 
justice of the peace uron the police judge of the city 
of Portland, but ruled out that ortion of one section 
of the amendment which attempted to limit his juris-
diction to criminal cases only. 
** Adams v. Multnomah County, 6 Or. 117 (1876); 
City of Portland v. Besser, 10 Or. 2~2 (1882). 
*** Sp. laws 1885, p. • 
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city, contract a debt of ~700,000 for the purpose--
which the city had to shoulder--and select from their 
own number a permanent "water commission" to have 
charge of the system when it was completed. The su-
preme court u_held this act, reversing a ruling of a 
lower court.* In arriving at its decision the court 
laid down a doctrice, however, which in reality might 
h~ve formed the basis for restricting the activities 
of the state lawmakers much more than was realized by 
subsequent events. 
"The power of the legislature over municipal 
corporations, in the absence of constitutional re-
strictions, is unlimited," said Justice Thayer in 
pronouncing the decision of the court, "except so 
far as they are ~ndowed with rights incident to a 
private corporation, Which, according to Mr. Dillon,·· 
only extends to the private advantage of the particu-
lar corporation as a distinct legal r-ersonality, and 
to property acquired thereunder, and to contracts 
made in reference thereto." Taking up the distinction 
• David v. Portland Water Committee, 14 Or. 98 
(1886). 
** "Munici al Corporations," Sec. 66. 
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thus laid down between municipal (private) and state 
(public) affairs, and dismissing from discussion a 
decision of the supreme court of tichigan*--which 
classed boards of police commissioners under the head 
of state matters, but "water commissioners" and "sewer 
committees for a particular city" under the head of 
municipal matters--Judge Thayer cited a number of ca~ 
es from other state courts and from the United States 
~upreme court** making the distinction, and concluded 
that the matter of suP. lying the city of Portland with 
pure water was a subject of state-wide concern . "Pub-
I j c parks J gas, water and sewage in towns and ci t'ies 
may ordinarily be classed as private affairs," he 
says, "but they often become matters of public im-
portancej and when the legislature determines that 
there is a public necessity for their use in a cer-
tain locality, I do not think they can be designated 
as mere private affairs. That is a relative question. 
Take the case at bar. The city of Portland needs a 
* People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 ( ). 
** New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 
115 U.S., 650 ( ). 
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supply of water. It has to be brought from some place 
outside of the city. The matter is presented to the 
legislature, and it determines that it is a matter of 
public necessity; that steps should be taken to in-
sure to the city wholesome water at cheap rates; and 
can it be claimed that it was a mere private affair, 
and the legislature had not authority to interfere 
with it? It seems to me that this act bears upon its 
face ample proof that its object and design were to 
promote the public good, and that it is the exercise 
of a power that is governmental in its nature; nor do 
I discover in it any attempt or design to deprive the 
city of Portland of its autonomy. The city had, as I 
understand it, no right to establish waterworks. The 
act undertakes to do that and give the city the ben-
efit of it. It places the enterprise under the man-
agement of wealthy and prominent citizens of the town, 
and to remove all suspicion of a job in the affair, 
requires them to serve without compensation. The sole 
object appears to be for the benefit of the city and 
county at large •••••••••• The courtr I think, has a 
right to take judicial notice that the city of Port-
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land is the metropolis of the state; that citizens 
from every part of it go there to dispose of the 
products of the country and to purchase supplies in 
return; that the country depends upon it as a mart, 
and that it depends upon the country for its trade, 
and that the advantages are mutual •••••••• The people 
from every part of the state are drawn there thru 
business or for pleasure, and it is absurd to contend 
that they would not be incommoded, nor the state at 
large injured, if the town were stinted in its supply 
or furnished with a bad quality of a primary and es-
sential element of life •••••••• 1 conclude that it 
bears a semblance of arbitrariness, and that I would 
have been better satisfied with it if the city had 
been allowed to have issued the bonds; but they ap-
pear to acquiesce in it." 
Thruout all this run two not entirely separated 
distinctions : namely, between private (corporate) and 
public (governmental) matters, on the one hand, and 
betwen munici~al and state matters , on the other. The 
apparent confusion of the two renders it difficult to 
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draw any certain conclusions; but the clear recogni-
tion of the state-wide importance of the water supply 
in question, and the manifest emphasis given to this 
fact in forming the basis for its decision, shows 
quite clearly that the court recognized that here is 
a distincti9n of real legal importance. Were the pow-
er of the legislature in this case based only on this 
distinction, the question would present itself at once: 
Would the court deny a power to the legislature on the 
,~ound that it was exercised on a subject of only lo-
cal and municipal concern? Answer this question in 
the affirmative and what would be the result? A field 
of legislation and administration free from interfer-
ence by the state legislative body--in other words, 
nothing less than home rule. 
Of course, such a conclusion, logical as it may 
seem, is wide of the truth, as the further history of 
legislation and adjudication in Oregon shows--at le~st 
until 1906. While there have been a number of cases 
upholding the right of the legislature to legislate 
on municipal affairs, because the affairs in ques-
tion related to the cities in their public, govern-
mental capacity, the court has not had occasion to 
annul any acts of the legislature because they re-
lated to affairs not public and governmental. 
65 
In the same year that the Oregon court handed 
down its decision on the power of the ~egislature to 
impose upon the city of Portland a waterworks system l 
a special act of 1885* granting to a railroad com-
pany certain riparian XXglXi prorerty which had been 
dedicated to the city for use as a public levee also 
was questioned. In ruling that the legislature had 
. 
ample authority to pass such an actl the court said: 
"The plenary power of the legislature over public 
corporations l except as to vested rights of property** 
and of creditors l is indubitably established."*** 
In 18Q5, when the legislature passed a srecial 
act**** providing for the appointment of a "bridge 
committee," with,power to acquire, for the city of 
Portland, certain bridges and ferries, and for this 
* Sp. laws 1885, p. 100. 
** Dartmouth College Case l ~ Wheat. 519, cited 
on this point. 
*** Portland and Wi11amette Valley Railroad Co. 
v. City of Portland, 14 Or, 188 (1886). 
**** Laws 18n 5, p. 421. 
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purpose issue and sell bonds for the city, which were 
to constitute an obligation of the city, notwithstan~ 
ing that the bridges and ferries in question were to 
be turned over to the county court, which was to take 
charge of and operate them, and notwithstanding that 
the brid~es __ and ~ies were entir l y within the ~ 
its of the-2ity, it seemed that now the legislature 
was carrying its powers to the limit--and farther. 
But the supreme court blandly replied that the legis-
lature has power to compel a municipal corporation to 
perform a duty or e&e~ute some act in which the gene-
ral public beyond the borders of the municipality 
has an interest. To the protestations of the city 
that previous legislation of this character on the 
city's financial affairs had been followed by only 
evil results, the court said: "The qu~ion is on~ 
Eower al~L-and, however unjust, inexpedient or even 
~ppressive such legislation may be, the courts ar~ 
Eower~ss to declare it invali~if it is within the 
legitimate exercise of legislative Fowers."· 
* S~mon v. Northrup, 27 Or. 487 (1895). 
No better commentary on the evils of legisla-
tive misrule of municipalities and the hopelessness 
of attempting to improve matters without a radical 
change in the state fundamental law could well be 
presented. 
2. GROWTH OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 
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At the first regular session of the Oregon leg-
islature after the admission of the state into the 
Union, the entire legislation on municipal affairs 
was comprised in four special laws. The first was an 
act to amend the city charter of Portland so as to 
take away from the mayor and councilmen their right 
to receive compensation for their services, which had 
been specially allowed them by an amendment to the 
charter in 1858.* 
The second was an act "to regulate the fire de-
partment of the city of Portland."** It was passed 
because, as declared in the act, the corporate powers 
of the city ere at this time inade uate to institute 
* Gen laws 1st sess., 1860, p. 104. 
** Ibid., p. 88. 
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an effective fi~e service in the city. It was devoted 
chiefly to organizing the system of governin the fire 
department, not to establishing fire companies, sta-
tions, and equipment. These already existed, and we~e 
simply continued by this act, provision being also 
made for the admission of new companies and stations 
in the future. The manner in which such additions 
were to be made was prescribe~; but the administrative 
duty of making the additions and extensions was left 
to the authorities of the fir~department.* Tho the 
act went into the details of creating each and eve~y 
office which was to go to make up the department and 
of defining the size of each company, etc., some su-
pervisory powers were given to the locally elected 
city council. Thus, the council was to order all work 
and supplies for the department and locate all cis-
terns and stations which it might desire to estab-
lish. All work done for the department should be un-
de~ supervision of the chief engineer (a memoer of 
* The officers of the department, including a 
"board of delegates" from each company, were elected 
by the . ersonnel of the department, directly or indi-
rectly. The personnel, in turn, was selected by the 
board. 
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the department) and a committee of the council; and 
the engineer was required to report annually to the 
council. 
This act is typical of the entire period of 
special legislation. Whether this law was wanted by 
the people of Portland or not, is immaterial. Very 
probably it was; for it provided for a very obvious 
defect in the charter. Be this as it may, the law-
makers of the state--all more or less interested in 
the city which was at this time outstripping all the 
others in the state, but some undoubtedly little in-
formed of its actual needs--imposed upon the citi-
zens of Portland a fire department organized oy it-
self and in the choice of memoera of which the voters 
of the city had no part. The real power, that of de-
ciding whether or not the city should have an ade-
quate fire department, and of determining the es-
sential character of the service, was in the handS 
of the state legislative body. As if in recognition 
of the fact that the prevention and extinguishment of 
fires was really a local, municipal affair, the legis-
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lature permitted the local authorities a limited su-
pervision of th~administration of this function.* 
The remaining s'ecial legislation concerning 
cities and towns, at the first session of the state 
legislature, consisted of three charters: one incor-
porating the town of Jacksonville,** another the city 
of Albany,*** and the third a new act of incorpora-
tion for t~city of Salem.**** All three charters 
were submitted to a vote of the people of the re-
spective municipalities. 
At the second legislative session, in 1862, the 
special legislation on cities and towns consisted of 
but one act: to enlarge the ooundaries of the town of 
Corvallis.***** 
In 1866 two new charters were granted: to the 
city of Barrisburg****** and the city of SCio;******* 
* The arrangement was changed in 1882 (Sp. laws 
12th sess., p. 73) when it was provided that the fire 
department should be under the control of a board of 
commissioners appointed by the mayor, with the con-
sent of the city council. 
** Gen. laws 1st sess., p. 94. 
*** Ibid. , p. 83. 
**** Ibid., p. 107. 
***** By an act of 1870 they we ~ again enlarged. 
****** Gen. laws 4th sess . , p. 51. 
******* Ibid., p. 64 . 
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and the charter of Oregon City was amended in some 
important particulars.* The changes concerned the 
taxing and local improvement powers and, in addi-
tion, the power to grant liquor licenses, which was 
restricted so as to prohibit the issuing of licenses 
to women. In the charter of 1859 liberal powers had 
been given to the city for the protection of the pub-
lic health within the ci~1> includi:1g, among other 
things, the right to make regulations looking toward 
preventing the introduction of contagiOUS diseases. 
Appare:1tly this was not comprehensive enough, for in 
the act of 1866 "aaditional" power was expressly 
given to the city council to remove persona affected 
with contagious diseases from the city to any suit-
able hospital provided by the city for the pur.ose. 
Similarly, by the earlier charter the city was author-
ized thru its street commissioner to collect road 
taxes on the roads and streets within the municipal 
limits and anply them to the improvement of the same. 
Now the council was authorized to direct the expend-
* Gen. laws 4th sess., p. 48. 
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iture of a portion of the road tax upon roads outside 
the city. 
A more significant change in the charter, ho~­
ever, was in a limitation which it placed on the lia-
bility of the city for the torts of its officers, for 
damage to property resulting from work on streets, 
and for the performance of illegal contracts. As to 
contracts, it was now declared that the city should 
in no way be bound by any contracts not authorized 
by ordinance or made in writing and properly signed. 
As to torts, the city wa~ now declared exempt from 
liability for any loss or injury to person or prop-
erty growing out of any casualty or accident on ac-
count of the condition of any street or public ground. 
Very prudently, however, it was expressly provided 
that this should not exonerate any officer of the 
city~ or any person, from liability in any case when 
the loss or injury was caused by his neglect or miS-
conduct. 
Here was a distinct advance u~on the civil code 
which had been adopted in 1862 and which made the mu-
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nici~al corporation liable in all the cases mentioned.· 
Oregon City was now given a measure of protection not 
enjoyed at this time by any other municipalities. It 
might be p~rtinent to ask at this point: If these pro-
visions in the Oregon City charter were good ones, why 
were they not made part of the general laws of the 
state applying to all municipalities, or a number of 
them, so as to make more certain and definite the lia-
bility of city officers for their tortious acts and 
omissions? A study of the suits brought to the su-
preme court of Oregon during a half century shows that, 
had there been such an amendment as this, or a similar 
one, to the general civil code, making possible a full 
comprehension and agreement on the par t of legal opin-
ion in the municipalities as to what was the liability 
--particularly as to torts--of the corporation, on the 
one hand, and of its officers and agents, on the oth-
wr, there might have been avoided much expensive and 
vexatious litigation • 
• Laws 2nd sess., Code of Civil Procedure, Chap. 
IV, Title IV, Secs. 346-350. 
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The legislative session of 1868 is marked by 
the enactment of a larger number than usual of spe-
cial laws incorporating new municipalities or amend-
ing the charters of existing ones. This period, in 
general, marks the beginning of a henceforth increas-
ing number of such special acts, an increase which 
continued with added momentum with each succeeding 
session of the legislature , almost without exception, 
until the "home rule" constitutioI),al amendments in 
1906 put a stop to it. 
The special laws enacted at the session of 1868 
consisted of (1) an act to enlarge the corporate pow-
e!s of the city of Corvallis; (2) an act to amend the 
charter of Portland; (3) another to amend the Salem 
charter; (4) a new charter for Dalles City; (5) an 
act to incorporate the city of Roseburg; and (6) an 
act extending the boundaries of the city of Astoria. 
In 1870 seven more special acts affecting cit-
ies and towns were passed. They included acts incor-
porating the cities of East Portland and Jefferson 
and the town of Clatsop, and other acts amending the 
charters of Dalles City, Portland, Albany, and Cor-
vallis . 
In 1872 eight such special laws were enacted. 
They consisted of acts incorporating the city of 
Junction and the town. of Forest Grove, a new char-
ter for the city of ROdeourg, and acts amending the 
charters of Portland, East Portland, Salem, Jackson-
ville, and Astoria. 
At the session of 1874 the number of special 
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laws regarding municipal corporations incre~sed to 
sixteen. They consisted of amendments to eight char-
ters; seven new charters; and a s~ecial act author-
izing an individual to establish a gas manufactory 
in Portland. 
In 1876 four towns and cities were incorporated; 
new charters were granted to two cities; one charter 
was amendedj and special acts were passed to author-
ize an individual to establish waterworks in Albany 
and to empower the city of Salem to incur an indebt-
edness of ~50,OOO for the purpose of building a bridge 
across the ~illamette River. The total number of spe-
cial laws thus showed a decrease froe the preceding 
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session. 
The year 1878, however, showed an increase to 
fourteen special acts, including six incorporation 
acts; amendments to five chartersj two special acts 
to enable Dalles City to dispose of eertain lands 
which the city held; and a law repealing that of the 
year 1876 authorizing the establishment of waterworks 
in the city of Albany. 
In 1880 the number of special acts passed was 
twenty-two; in 1882 it fell to fourteen; in 1885 
the number r.more than doubled, totaling thirty-four; 
and at a srecial session in the same year fourteen 
more were added. In 1887 the number rose to thirty-
two; in 1889 to thirty-six; and in 1891 to eighty. 
In the last mentioned year the srecial laws covered 
973 pages, while the general statutes of the session 
required bu.t 188 pages. 
In 1893 was enacted what might have marked a 
turning point in the history of municipal legisla-
tion in Oregon: namely, a general law for the incor-
poration of cities and towns. One would naturally 
• 
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expect that a law such as this, providing for the au-
tomatic inco~poration of new municipalities and fur-
nishing a complete charter for such cities and towns 
as desired to be incorporated in this manner, would 
obviate the necessity of the legislature undertaking 
to frame and grant new charters, or at least that 
the number of such special acts would be considerably 
reduced. At the same session that this general incor-
poration law was adopted, however, there were passed 
seventy special acts relating to cities and towns. At 
the following session, in 1895, as was to be expected, 
their number fell off nearly 50%; namely, to forty-
one. 
Beginning with 1899 the number rose again, to 
fifty-one,.and in 1901 to sixty-nine . In 1903 there 
was a slight decrease, to sixty-four, but in 1905, 
at the last session of the legislature before the 
constitutional prohibition of special legislation 
incorporating municipalities, the number rose to 
eighty , thus just reaching the record set by the 
session of 1893. So voluminous were the session laws 
• 
78 
becoming at this time--for the charters were also in-
creasing steadily in length and complexity--that those 
en~cted in 1903 and 1907 were bound in two separate 
volumes, one for the general laws and the other for 
the special acts. The latter required a book of more 
than 1100 pages, as compared with 430 pages in the 
volume recording the general statutes. 
So much for the volume of special laws. That 
this sort of legislation was becoming, not only an 
unjust burden upon the state lawmakers, but a real 
nuisance, if not a positive evil, is quite obvious, 
even tho figures can tell but little. A better pic-
ture of the situation can be given by describing 
briefly how certain cities faTed as result of the 
numerous special acts passed concerning them. 
The city of Astoria, which was the object of 
many early acts, can be taken as a typical example. 
At the session of 1891 a new charter was granted to 
this city, and another special act authorized the 
municipality to erect a sea-wall and to grade streets 
and construct sewers in connection with the project, 
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and to issue bonds for the purpose. In 1893 the char-
ter was amended and the act authorizing the construc-
tion of the sea-wall repealed. At the following ses-
sion three acts affecting Astoria were passed: to a -
mend the charter in the matter of local improvements; 
to authorize the construction or acquisition of a 
bridge across Young's Bat, and the issuance of bonds; 
and to legalize some incurred indebtedness of the 
city. In 1898, at an extra session, acts were passed 
to grant exemption certifica~es to members of the As-
toria volunteer fire department, and furthar to amend 
the charter powers. In 1899 another new charter was 
framed for the city and in 1901 this charter was 
amended. 
The experience of Dalles City was much the same. 
From 1891 to 1905, inclusive, special acts affecting 
this city were passed at every session, except in 1898 
and in 1901j and new charters were granted in 1895 and 
in 1899. 
The city of Eugene received a new charter in 
1891j in 1893, 1899, and 1903 this charter was amended 
in more or less important particulars; and in 1905 
the municipality was once more reincorporated. 
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Oregon City was given a new charter at three 
successive sessions--in 1891, 1893, and 1895--and the 
last one was amended in 1899 and 1903. 
The charter of the city of Salem was amended 
by three distinct acts in 1891, tho all bear the same 
date, so that in reality there was only one general 
revision act; new charters were granted in 1893 and 
1899, and this last one was amended once in 1901 and 
twice in 1903. 
These are but typical cases. To get an idea of 
the extent to which the practice of special legisla-
tion can develop in exceptional cases, one needs only 
to run over the special acts passed during these years 
relating to the city of Portland. Portland, the only 
real metropolitan community in the state, was almost 
from the first an object of particular concern to 
the legislature; and even the supreme court of the 
commonwealth said in 1886* that what affected Port-
* David v. Portland Water Committee, l~ Or. 98; 
quoted on p. 60 and seq. 
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land affected the state as a whole. 
At the session of 1891 seven special laws were 
passed relating to Portland. First was the act creat-
ing the "water committee" to acquire a water supply 
for the city. The second was an act to authorize the 
consiguous cities of Portland, East Portland and Al-
bina to construct or acquire one or more bridges a-
cross the Willamette River. For this purpose a tem-
porary "bridge committee" and a permanet "bridge com-
mission" were pl'ovided for. Then followed an act con-
solidating these cities to form one municipal cor or-
ation for certain purposes, under the name of the 
"Port of Portland." It was created for the special 
purpose of improving the Willamette River at the 
point where these cities touched the stream, and al-
so for the purpose of constructing and maintainin& 
a ship canal in the Willamette and Columbia rivers 
the entire distance of 120 miles that lay betwen the 
cities and the ocean. 
After this was done a new charter was conferred 
unon the city of Portland, and this was further amen~ 
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ed so as to alter the boundaries and change some of 
the charter powers; and finally the act of 1882 es-
tablishing a paid fire department for the city was 
amended. All these changes Were made in one sess~on 
of the legislature. 
The history of the subsequent years is much the 
same. In 1893 the charter. was again amended, as well 
as the act creating the Port of Portland; the "bridge 
committee" and "bridge commission" created in 1891 for 
the consolidated corporation were authorized to ac-
quire andoperate a ferry; and finally still another 
charter was given to the city. 
In 1895 a speCial act was passed authorizin~ 
Portland to acquire a bridge and ferry, including 
franchises, and to issue bonds; and three amendments 
were tacked on the charter: (1) to change the city 
boundaries, (2) to correct an inadvertent omission 
in the charter of 1893, and (3) to amend those por-
tions dealing with the waterworks. 
At the special session of the legislature in 
1898 one more new charter was frruned for the city. 
In 1899 the act establishing the Port of Port-
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land was once more changed. 
In 1901 an act was put thru the legislature au-
thorizing the city to levy a special tax and to trans-
fer certain moneys to its special funds. This was on 
January 25. Just one week later this act was repealed. 
Other acts of this year included one to authorise the 
city to appropriate money for the Oriental Fair to be 
held in Portland in 1905; another to permit the city 
council to turn over a certain city block to several 
patriotic societies; and, last of all, an act to pro-
vide for a board of Portland citizens to frame a ne 
charter for the city. 
The student of municipal "home rule" at once 
seizes upon this as a tardy, withal, out nevertheless 
gracious, recognition oy the state legislature of the 
inherent justice of allowing a local community to es-
tablish its own instrument of government and provide 
for the needs of which it alone is informed and in 
which it primarily is interested. So it probably was. 
The movement for "home rule," which reached a success-
ful culmination five years later, was undoubtedly now 
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under way. The board which was to frame the new char-
ter consisted of Portland citizens, designated by name 
in the act. After the board should have completed its 
draft of a charter, it was to submit it to a vote of 
the electors of the city and, if approved by them, the 
bill for enacting it into law was to be presented to 
the legislature for adoption or rejection as a whole.* 
Finally, at the session of 1901, another amend-
ment was added to the act establishing the Port of 
Portland. 
At the following session, in 1903, the charter 
framed by the board of Portland citizens was adopted 
by the legislature. But this did not prevent the 
legislators from adding two amendments to the charter 
at the same session and to feel called u!on to pass 
four additional acts relating to the city: (1) to au-
thorize the levy of a special tax for the purpose of 
aCqUirin~ fire-boat; (2) to empower the city to 
build a bridge across the Willamette River, with pro-
vision for issuing bonds and submitting the whole 
* Sp. laws 1901, p. 296. 
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proposition to the voters of the city; · and (5, 4) to 
establish two more ferries across the Willamette. Two 
special acts also were passed revising and amending 
again the act incorporatine the Port Qf Po~tland. 
In 1905 the city charter was twice amended. 
But it would be superfluous to expatiate more 
on the subject of s pecial legislation. To any student 
of municipal affairs the evils of the practice, in 
those states in which it has not been effectually 
prohibited, are patent. The arguments which he has 
learned to regard as convicting such a rractice be-
~re the bar of an intelligent public opinion are 
everywhere pretty much the same. Their validity as 
regards the situation in Oreeon before 1906 differs 
in no essential respect from their validity as ap-
plied to other states. In short, perhapa the condi-
tions which have been described may be desienated as 
normal to all states peTmitting the practice. 
In fact, such a~ evi1 is an inevitable result 
of modern municipal conditions--continual changes in 
needs, the phenomenal growth within the last half 
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century of cities, and the unprecedented number of 
functions Which a modern municipality undertakes, 
and is called u~on, to perform. As has been ~revi­
ously r~inted out, there was, at the time when the 
state of Oregon first began to be dotted with an 
ever increasing nlIDlber of settlements, no other a-
gency than the legislative body of the commonwealth 
to give a legal status to these early cities and 
towns and put them in their proper place in the 
state governmental system. 
However, as the 'local communities grew in num-
ber and size, and the complexities of urban life in-
creased, it became impossible for the legislature to 
give ade~uate attention to the needs of each commu-
nity. Then the practice of providing for their needs 
by innumerable special acts did oecome a positive e-
vil. Even the enactment in 1893 of a general incor-
poration act did not prevent the evil from continu-
ing to grow, so long as the legislature reserved to 
itself the right of deciding on such needs of indi-
vidual cities and towns as could not be provided for 
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in a general law. 
That a check ought, sooner or later, be put on 
the activities of the legislature could hardly have 
been questioned. The difficult and fundamental question: 
should the state legislature entirely abdicate its r~ 
served power of determining matters of local munici-
pal concern, cannot be answered, if at all, before 
the experiments with "home rule" have yielded some 
definite results. It will form the subject of the 
concluding chapter of this study. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF ~UNICIPAL POWERS. 
To an understanding of what "home rule" actual-
ly can mean to the municipalities of Oregon--or of 
any other state--some information is necessary in re-
gard to what were the activities and functions of 
cities and towns, and bat legal powers municipal 
cor~rations possessed, while under the domination 
of the state legislature. As a study of judicial 0-
pinions will shoW, the more or less accepted, and 
more or less definite, srhere of municipal action 
during the regime of legislative control will have 
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a great influence in determining how large a sphere 
will be conceded to municipalities under a system by 
which they are permitted to frame and adopt their 
own charters. 
For the purrose of th i s study, the most import-
ant municipal po~rs, those throwing the most light 
on the question of local self-government versus state 
control, are (1) the financial powers, (2) the power 
to make local improvements, (3) the power to estab-
lish or regulate public utilities, and ("1) the gene-
ral police power. The last-mentioned includes partic-
ularly the power to license and regulate certain 
forms of business, such as the retailing of intoxi-
cating liquors. They will be taken up in the order 
named. 
Financial powers.--The very earliest charters 
in Oregon, as a rule, provided that the governing 
bodies of the' cities and towns might levy and col-
lect, for municipal purposes, ta~es on such pror er-
ty as was taxable for state and county _urposes. The 
maximum rate up to which a city or town could tax was 
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generally state~ in the charter. Sometimes permission 
was given to levy a special additional tax; but it 
was usually required that such a measure must be re-
ferred for aprroval or rejection to the voters of the 
municipality. Some acts of incorporation specifically 
empowered the authorities to Dorrow money and pay the 
debts of the municipality; others made no mention of 
borrowing or debts. In some the indebtedness was not 
allowed to exceed a certain limitj in others there 
wac no limitation mentioned. ThuB there was clearly 
no settled policy as to municipal financial powers 
embodied in the early legislative grants. 
During later years it may be said, in general, 
that the tendency was to permit individual cities to 
raise their tax rates from time to time, as their 
needs wncreasedj that the kinds of taxes they were 
allowed to levy increased in numberj* that more ade-
quate powers we e given city authorities to enforce 
the collection of t~~es from delinquents; that the 
* The poll t~~ appeared in the Dallas charter o~ 
1874; in North ~rownsville in the same year, and in 
the Halsey charter in 1876, etc. 
borrowing powers became more definitely fixed, and 
were in a great many instances increased, from time 
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to time, in response to the growth of cities; and that 
the powers of county authorities to collect road taxes 
within municipalities were gradually eliminated. The 
general incorporation act of 1893 for the organiza-
tion of new municipalities fixed a rate of 10 mills; 
and it provided that the authorities of no city or 
town coming under the act could in any manner create 
any debt or liability singly or in the aggregate ex-
ceeding the sum of 2,500, without obtaining permis-
sion from the legislature. ithin these limits, and 
with the furtheT restriction that their tax r egu la-
tions were to conform as nearly as possible to the 
general laws of the state, the city councils were 
empowered to provide by ordinance for a system of 
assessment, levy and collection of taxes for munici-
pal purposes. The act provided for enforcement of the 
collection of ta.~es, and also laid down a limitation 
on the council powers in this respect, so that redemp-
tion by formeT owners of property sold for taxes might 
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not be obstructed. 
The right to tax being essentially a sovereign 
attribute, it can necessarily be exercised by munici-
palities only in the manner and to the extent it is 
conferred upon them in their charters, or by general 
law. In a number of instances the authority of the 
Oregon supreme court had to be invoked te prevent 
city councils from attempting to tax objects which 
they were not entitled to. * Several attempts to 
avoid the payment of debts which cities had contract-
ed and of the interest due on such debts also were 
frustrated by the court.** These instances constitute 
the bulk of the cases in which the financial powers 
of O~egon cities were passed on by the surreme court . 
Local i~yement EOwers.--Chjef among the pow-
ers of a municipal corporation is, perhaps, that of 
making local public imrrovements . It is also the pow-
eT most frequently controverted. This power is de-
* Corbett v. City of Portland, 31 Or . 407 (1897); 
Gadsby v. Portland, 38 Or. 135 (1900) . 
** Monteith v. Parker, 36 Or . 170 (1899); Droc&-
way v . Roseburg, ~6 Or. 77 (1905). 
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rived, in the main, from two other powers: namely, 
that of eminent domain and of control of its streets 
and other public property. cloth these powers, it is 
hardly necessary to add, are delegated powers. 
Local improvement po era were from the first 
granted to the cities and to\ns in Oregon in liber-
al--or at least general--terms. Difficulties were, 
however, early met by the cities in carrying out 
these powers, because of the opposition of property 
owners. In this respect, the situation in Oregon 
was simply like that in all the othe r commonwealths 
of the United States where federal and state consti-
tutional guarantees of "due process of law," appro-
priation of private property for public use only 
when accompanied by just compensation, and others, 
gave recalcitrant people a basis for resisting muni-
cipal action involving the taking of any prorerty or 
the imposition of burdens to meet the cost of local 
improvements . 
In order to remdY inadequacies in the municipal 
1\ 
charters in the matter of carryin out desired im-
provements, the legislature early attempted to speci-
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fy more carefully and in more detail what the powers 
of municipalities should be. Typical of such attempts 
were the changes made in three charters in 1868. The 
clauses of the existing charter of Corvallis, con-
ferring in general terms uron the city council the 
rower to layout and improve streets, sidewalks, etc., 
were amended so as to empower the council to compel 
property owners to construct and repai~ sidewalks and 
improve the streets adjacent to their lots; and in 
case any improvement were made by the city, the coun-
oil was authorized to collect the cost from benefited 
pro erty owners by selling their lots, if necessary.* 
Similarly, the Portland charter of 1864, which 
provided that when a street had been once imrroved 
it could merely be "repaired," was now changed to per-
mit the city council, on petiticn of a stated propor-
tion of owners of abutting property, to order it to be 
"improved" again; that is, graded and laid out anew.** 
* Sp. laws 1868, p. 68. 
** Ibid., p. 90. 
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As the charter of the city of Salem was at this 
time amended, the council was given specific powers 
to improve the public grounds within the city, to es-
tablish and open streets and alleys, and to establish 
or alter the grade of, or improve in any way, any 
street or part of street, whether then or thereafter 
laid out in the city. The procedure to be followed in 
ascertaining the cost of improvements, the assessing 
of benefited property owners, and the collection of 
such assessments oy sale of the property, if necessary, 
was outlined in detail. Similar minute provisions were 
made for the awarding of damages to the owners of in-
jured property.· 
Two years prior to this, in 1866, the legisla-
ture had passed a general law authorizing incorporat~ 
ed cities and towns (as well as organized counties) to 
aid in the construction and rep~ir of public highways 
and river improvements, and levy an annual tax, run-
ning thru one or more years, for the purpose. This 
* Sp. laws 1868, p. 81. 
• 
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could be done by the municipal authorities, however, 
only when petitioned for by a majority of the voters 
or approved by them at a referendum election.* 
From time to time thenceforth additional and 
supplemental provisions were enacted to aid munici-
palities in carrying out local improvements, too nu-
merous and varied to enumerate. Under the general in-
corporation act of 1893, city councils were author-
ized to provide for the establishment of grades of 
streets, sidewalks and crosswalks, to open new streets 
and alleys, pave them, etc., and to improve any pub-
)jc grounds within the city limits. For these pur-
poses private pro~erty might be condemned or pur-
chased, in accordance with the general laws of the 
state .** 
Notwithstanding these generous provisions of law, 
the cities did not always succeed in realizing what 
were quite clearly intended to be their charter-given 
* Gen, laws 4th sess., p. 21. 
** In 1893, also, a general act arplying to all 
incorporated cities of 2,500 or more population was 
~assed to provide for the issuance of bonds for the 
improvement of streets and the laying of sewers. (GeR. 
laws l8~3, p. 171) 
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powers. In this case the courts frequently came to 
the aid of protesting property owners. As the state 
supreme court pointed out in 1886 , when the city au-
thorities of Portland attempted to put a liberal co~ 
struction on their assessment powers, the taking of 
private property thru ordinary assessment proceed-
ings constitutes a derogation of the old commoh law 
principle that no one shall be deprived of this prop-
erty without the judgment of his peers--and statutes 
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly 
construed.* This has been a guiding principle of the 
Oregon tribunal in a long series of decisions. 
As early as 1864 the Portland charter provided 
that, in all proceedings permitted in regard to lo-
cal improvements, the acts of the city council should 
be presumed to be regular and duly done, until the 
contrary were shown; and when any such proceedings 
should be, by other charter provisions, committed to 
the discretion of the council, such discretion or 
jUdgment, when exercised and declared, should be fi-
* Dowell v. City of Portland, 13 Or. 248 (1886). 
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nal and not reviewable, or called in question, else-
where. Such was the liberal grant of the legislature. 
But when the charter was cited in defense of the city's 
action the supreme court siWply replied that the char-
ter only barred a legal remedy; it did not prevent a 
resort to a remedy in equity, which was provided for 
by the general laws of the state.* In 1877 these same 
provisions in the charter were held not to dispense 
with the necessity of showing by the council record 
that the required notice of a proposed street im-
provement had been given. In other words, what these 
provisions meant was, not to presume the jurisdiction 
of the city council to pass an ordinace for improve-
ment and assessment, but that, after jurisdiction had 
been lawfully acquired, without which there could be 
no assessment, subsequen t proceedings should be pre-
sumed to be regular and duly done, until the contrary 
were shown/** 
Almost innumerable have been the cases before the 
Oregon supreme court simply reiterating, in one form 
* King v. City of Portland, 2 Or. 146 (1865). 
** Van Sant v. City of Portland, 6 Or. S95 (1877) . 
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or another, this general principle.· Taken separately, 
they are only so many cases of technical judicial con-
struction, but considered in the aggregate, they con-
stitute a continuous limitation on the powers of mu-
nicipal corporations which is not to be overlooked 
in any investigation of what municipal powers really 
and actually are. Municipalities are, in short, lim-
ited by both their charters and the state and fede-
ral constitutions- even by the common law, when nec-
essary--and as these are construed by the judiciary. 
Thus, the Oregon court has held that, where the char-
ter fails to afford property owners the notive and 
opportunity to be heard, which constitute, accordin 
to the modern interpretation, the requirements of "due 
process," the giving of a notice and hearing is just 
as imperative •• • 
• Among them are: horthern Pacific Terminal Co. 
v. Portland, 14 Or. 24 (1886); Hawthorne v. East Port-
land, 13 Or. 271 (1886); Ladd v. East Portland, 18 Or. 
87 (1889); Ladd v. Spencer, 23 Or. 193 (1892); Strout 
v. Portland, 26 Or. 29~ (189~); Smith v. Minto, 30 Or. 
351 (1897); Allen v. Portland, 35 Or. 420 (1899); Win-
gate v. Astoria, 39 Or. 603 (1909) • 
•• Wilson v. City of Salem, 2~ Or. 504 (18° 3); 
Strout v. POTtland, 26 Or. 294 (189~); Clinton v. 
Portland, 2 R Or. 410 (1894); Shannon v. Portland, 38 
Or. 382 (1900); King v. Portland, 38 Or. ~02 (1900); 
Hendry v. City of Salem, 64 Or. 152 (1913). 
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The paramount and primary control of the high-
ways of a state, including the streets in cities, 
lies in the legislature; but it has been the rule 
from the start that this control should be delegated 
to municipalities . This is necessary, for without 
such a control city authorities could not exerxise 
their very necessary powers of o~ening, grading, 
draining, leveling and repairing streets and alleys. 
In fact, so completely has this been recognized as 
being in the necessary order of things, that it is 
the accepted rule that when jurisdiction over streets 
has been given to a city, general laws in regard to 
roads and road labor cease to be applicable as soon 
as the city exercises its po ers.· 
But it is to be clearly noted that a municipal-
ity does not own its streets. unicipal corporations 
may own waterworks, market-houses, etc., but they can-
not own streets; that is, they can have no private 
property in them. This is a technical point, but it 
* Dillon , "[unicipal Corporations," ~ec . 534; 
1uo ted by Judge cArthur in Fast Port and v . lult-
nomah County, 6 Or. 62 (1876) . 
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becomes of importance when it is considered that a 
city's power over streets e~tends only to regulating 
their use for public purposes;* and the state legisla-
ture may, whenever it so desires, transfer their su-
perv ision and control to another governmental agency J 
such as the county court.** 
Public utilities--Franchises.--Public utilities, 
in the sense in which this term is used today, had 
hardly an existence in Oregon when it became a state. 
From the beginning, municipalities were permitted to 
establish systems of water supply and sewage disposal, 
but besides these the only ventures XI which cities 
and towns undertook were the building of wharves, 
markets and, in a few instances, slaughterhouses.Spe-
~jfic authorization to erect waterworks and reservoirs 
beyond the corporate limits was needed, and this later 
became quite common. Also, cities and towns from time 
both 
to time were given powee to erect lighting plantsAto 
light ,~ the streets and provide lighting for the 
* Portland & illamette Valley Railroad Co. v. 
City of Portland, 14 Or. 188 (1886). 
** Simon v. Northrup, 27 Or. 487 (1895). 
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people of the locality. 
Perhaps the earliest charter in which mention 
was made of franchises was that of Astoria of 1876.* 
The city was authorized to construct a system of 
lighting or, if it so desired, grant a franchise to 
a private person or corporation to use the streets 
of the city for that purpose. Such a franchise, the 
act declared, should be used and exercised "under 
such regulations as the council shall from time to 
time prescribe." A franchise might also be granted to 
a street railway company to use the streets; and the 
council was empowered to lay down the ternlS on which 
such a franchise might be exercised, including the 
making of regulations for the running of cars and 
the fixing of tates. 
The general incorporation act of 1893 authorize~ 
the granting of franchises for a lighting system, w&-
ter supply, wharfage service, street rail ay and tel-
ephone companies, and to fix the rates to De charged 
by these utilities; "and no such city or town shall 
* Laws 1876, p. 115, Art. IV, Sec. 2. 
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ever deprive itself of the right thru its common 
council of regulating and adjusting any such rates, 
so that the same shall be reasonable for the serv-
ices rendered, at least once in any period of two 
years." 
The charter of the city of Salem* gave the 
council exclusive E9wer to grant a franchise to a 
street railway company to use its streets; and this 
was construed by the municipal authorities to confer 
on them the power to grant an exclusive franchise. 
But this the supreme court denied them. Both the pri-
mary control of streets and the power to grant exclu-
sive franchises, said the court, rests in the state 
legislature, and while it is the universal practice 
to turn over the control of streets to municipalities, 
such i~ not the case with the granting of franchises, 
Therefore, declared the. court, when an exclusive 
franchise or privilege to use the streets of a city 
is drawn in question, and is claimed by the grantee 
to be derived thru a municipal ordinance or contract, 
* Laws 1889, p. 528, Sec. 6. 
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the power of the municipal authorities to pass the or-
dinance or enter into the contract must be free from 
doubt. "N~thing short of express legislative authori-
ty will authorize a municipality to grant such a pri~ 
ilege or enter into such a contract, II said the court.* 
Under a subsequent charter, the city council of 
Salem was empowered to grant a similar franchise "upon 
such terms as the council may prescribe;"** and under 
this provision its action in exacting a bond from a 
grantee Was upheld by the supreme court, even tho no 
mention was made in the charter of bonds. In addition 
to the authority given by the clause quoted, the court 
held there was an implied right of the city to require 
such a bond because the state legislature, the origin 
of the power, could do so.*** 
The position of the court seems to be that, as 
in the carrying out of local public in'lprovements, the 
city must show clear authority in acquiring jurisdi~ 
tion to grant franchises, but, once the jurisdiction 
* Parkhurst v. Capital City R'y Co., 23 Or. ~71 
(1893) • 
** Laws 1899, p. 924, 3ec. 6. 
*** Salem v. Anson, ~O Or. 339 (1902). 
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has been lawfully acquired, a goodly amount of discre-
tion will be allowed the city authorities in the ex-
ercise of their powers . 
Police ~wers--Licenses.--Power to secure the 
public health, peace, safety and general iall-being 
of the people of the community was common to all the 
early charters granted by the Oregon territorial leg-
islature, for which purposes city and town authori-
ties Were authorized to devise and adopt "measures, 
regulations and ordinances" apparently without re-
striction, except in so far as they might conflict 
with state and federal constitutions and laws. 
In addition, the councils were empowered to 
exercise these powers for such specific purposes as 
to establish night watch and patrol and fire protec-
tion; to regulate the running at large of animals 
and the discharge of fire-arms within the city; to 
prevent and remove nuisances, and, as a rule, to 
define what constituted nuisances; to suppress gaming 
and disorderly houses , saloo~s, public shows, etc.; 
a~d to suppress or regulate a.d license theatricals 
and the sale of intoxicating liquors. The licensin~ 
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power also covered peddlers, pawnbrokers, auctioneers, 
brokers, etc., etc., varying in the different charters 
according to the conditions in the several municipal-
ities--and as the legislature saw the conditions. 
As has oeen noted in a previous chapter, a sort 
of local option in the matter of licensing the sale 
of liquor was in effect as early as 1855. General 
laws for the licensing and regulation of saloons were 
early in operation; and some of the first charters 
provided that holders of city or town licenses should 
be exempt from paying any state or county license tax. 
But this was by no means a uniform practice. 
Later it did become more and more common to ex-
empt holders of municipal licenses from the necessity 
of paying additional license fee; and providion was 
made t~at no part of any license money collected by 
the cities should go to the county treasury. In sev-
eral charters it was prescribed that the license tax 
should not be less than that prescribed by state law. 
In one town, Dallas, legislative prohibition was in 
force for a time, as far as the indiscriminate sale 
W6 
in saloons was concerned, for its charter of 1874 for_ 
bade the sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors 
within the town, excepted imported liquors in the o-
riginal packages, or upon the written prescriptions 
of a practicing physician.* 
More severe restrictions on the licensing pow-
er also became common later on. Applicants for per-
mits were required to deposit bonds to secure compli-
ance witn the ordinances and laws regulating the sale 
of liquors, which becrune more exacting. In some char-
ters, as in that of Dalles City,** every applicant 
for a license was r~quired to post notices in a n~ 
ber of public places in the ward in Which he wished 
t o carryon ths business; and he had to secure the 
Signatures of a majority of the legal voters in the 
ward to a petition asking the city council to grant 
t~e license. After depositing petition and bonds, op-
portunity was given to oojectors to frustrate his at-
tempt to secure the permit , if they could muster a 
greater number of persons in the ward to sign their 
* Laws 1874 , p. 155 , sed. 5 . 
** Laws 1880 , p. 69 . 
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names to a remonstrance. No license could be granted 
to a woman or minor; and the selling of liquor to any 
woman or minor, or Indian, or to any intoxicated pe~ 
son or common drunkard, and the permitting of women 
or minors to frequent a saloon, were made cause for 
revoking a license. 
The import~Dce of these details is not so im-
portant as the fact that the legislature reserved for 
itself the function of determining the terms upon 
which saloons should be licensed in the individual 
cities and towns, and of fixing the regulative pow-
ers of the local authorities. General laws governing 
the licensing of saloons were passed by the legisla-
ture in 1885,* 1889** and in 1891;*** but they all 
expressly provided that they should ap~ly to no in-
corporated cities and towns. 
Cities and towns which might incorporate under 
t~e general incorporation act of 1893 were empowered, 
* Laws 1885, p. 25; amended oy another act of 
the s~ecial session of 1885, p. 38. 
** Laws 1889, p. 9. 
*** Laws 1891, p. 187. 
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thru their councils, to license, regulate and control 
any lawful business or occupation; to license, tax, 
regulate and restrain the s ale of intoxicants; to pre-
vent and restrain gambling, disorderly houses, and 
opium dens; and to "suppress or prohibit abything in-
jurious to the public morals, safety, or health, and 
make police regulations for the protection of the 
same." 
In 1904 the people of Oregon adopted a local op-
tion law, permitting whole counties to vote out sa-
loons, and also separate precincts, in case ahy coun-
ties should vote against prohibition. Municipalities 
as such were not permitted to decide for or against 
license.* 
It should be noted that, tho "exclusive power" 
was, as a rule, conferred upon city authorities to 
license and regulate the sale of liquors, the juris-
diction of state (county) authorities waa not, ac-
cording to the Oregon supreme court, abdicated in 
the matter of punishing violations of state law gov-
* Laws 1905, p. 41. 
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erning the operation of licensed bUsinesses, if the 
court could find any law investing them with the pros-
ecution and punishment of such laws.* In other words, 
the criminal law and its enforcement are matters of 
state policy. One exception is to be noted. The spe-
c ific a..'1d emphat ic language of the general law of 
1889, reinforced by just as clear language in a ch~ 
~er, giving city authorities power to prescribe and 
enforce the punishment for violation of local ordi-
nances relating to the sale of liquor, has been held 
to exclude the county court from its former jurisdic-
tion when the city charter has provided a municipal 
court to try such offendors.** 
It will not be attem~ted here to go into the 
judicial construction of charter powers relating to 
the regulation of 1icensea forms of b~siness, the 
suppression of nuisances, and other forms of exer-
cising local police powers. In general, it may be 
* Palmer v. State, 2 Or. 66 (1863); Burchard v. 
State 2 Or. 78 (1863); State v. Horton, 21 Or. 83 (189l~.--The same principle as to gambling: State v. 
Ayers, 49 Or. 61 (1907); State v. Baker, 50 Or.38l (1907)) 
** State v. Haines, 35 Or. 379 (1899). 
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said that the Oregon court has permitted local author-
ities a wide latitude in carrying out their powers, as 
long as the requirement of reasonableness has been 
complied with.* 
Public peace and safety, so far as the policing 
of cities and towns in Oregon was concerned, was in 
the beginning under the control of the legislature, 
to a gre at extent. Power to establish night watch and 
patrol was often granted in the early charters; but 
as a rule nothing was mentioned about these matters, 
and pres~mable the legislators preferred to take it 
upon themselYes to ~rovide for the policing of muni-
ci~alities. As time went, however, and the cities 
grew in size and population, the establishmeht and 
management of police departments were turned over to 
the cities t hemselves. 
The city of Portland affords a good example. By 
* As to liquor selling: In Re Schneider, 11 Or. 
288 (1883); Woods v. Town of Prineville, 19 Or. 108 
(1890); Beers v. Dalles City, 16 Or. 334 (1888); Hub-
bard v. Town of Medford, 20 Or. 315 (1891); Houck v. 
Ashland, 40 Or. 117 (1901); Cranor v. Albany, 43 Or. 
144 (1903).--As to gambling: Ex Parte Ah Hoy, 23 Or. 
89 (1892); Portland v. Yick, 44 Or. 439 (1904). 
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a special act of 1870,* the police force of that city 
was to be organized by a board of police commission-
ers of three members appointed by the governor. This 
board was empowered to appoint a chief of police, cap-
tains, lieutenants, patrolmen, and to remove or sus-
pend them for any cause which it deemed sufficient; to 
fix the compensation of all members of the force; and 
to make regulations for the government of the depart-
ment . In 1874 the board of police commissioners was 
made electife by the people of the city, and the pow-
er to fix the pay of members of the force and make 
regulations for its government and administration was 
transferred to the city council.** In 1880 the powers 
that remained with the commissioners were all given 
to the mayor and council . *** 
Public health was included in the police powers 
delegated to municipalities by the Oregon legislature . 
In 1905 a general statute was passed for the estab-
lishment of boards of health in municipalities. They 
* Laws 1870 , p. 120 . 
** Laws 1874 , p . 210 . 
*** Laws 1880 ~ p . 109. 
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were to consist of local officers: the mayor and the 
council when not otherwise provided. The legialature l 
however, fixed the compensation of all health offi-
cers and defined their powers and duties.* 
The enumeration of governmental powers might be 
carried out in endless detail l but it is believed that 
the foregoing-include substantially the most import-
ant. ~vo other functions often exercised by munici-
pal corporations--the conducting of local elections 
and the maintaining of common schools--have not been 
mentioned. The latter can be disposed of in a few 
words: It is in Oregon a function exercised by the 
state. 
As to elections: These were from firdt to last 
conducted by local officers, but always in accordance 
with law, tho in the latter charters more and more 
snecial regulations were laid down. As far as the 
right to vote is concerned, this was a constitutional 
mat~er and could not be restricted by the legislature 
* Laws 1905, p. 262. 
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thru charter provisions.* The legislature could, how-
ever, and often did, prescribe the qualifications of 
municipal officers. 
The people of a city have no inherent right to 
hold an election, said the Oregon su~reme court in 
1891.** Furthermore, said the court in a. other 9ase, 
tho, as a matter of convenience, it is usual to del-
egate to municipalities the right to provide their 
own officers, the state has a direct interest in the 
good government of its cities and towns, and there-
fore a reserved right, if it chooses to retain it, 
in municipal elections.*** 
Acting on this ~rinci~le, the Oregon legisla-
ture has enacted a number of laws of a general na-
ture to regulate the nomination and election of lo-
cal officers. In 1885 un act was passed to ~rovide 
for the regist~ation of vote s in cities and towns,**** 
* Livesley v. Litchfield, ~7 Or. 2~8 (1905). 
** State ex rel. v. Simon, 20 Or. 365 (1891). 
*** Robertson v. Groves, ~ Or. 210 (1871). 
**** The next year this part of the law was 
thrown out by the supreme court because re uiring reet-
istration as a pre equisite for voting and thereby 
the constitutional right of suffrage. (White v. Com-
missioners of Multnomah County, 13 Or. 317 (1886). 
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and the regulation of ballots, challenging of voters l 
duties of election judges, preservation of order at 
polls, counting of votes. These provisions were appl~ 
cable to all elections in the state, including those 
of incorporated cities and towns.* ~ost of them, ex-
cept as to registration, and in addition many other 
matters, were incorporated in a new elections act of 
1891.** In the latter year a primary election law to 
ap~ly to cities of 2,500 or more inhabitants, was 
enacted. It prescribed notices prior to primaries in 
the local newspapars, and the manner of selecting 
judges and clerks and their duties; and it rrohib-
ited intimidation, bribery, ba1lot-oox stuffing, etc.**. 
The general municipal incorporation act of 1893 
~rovided that elections in all cities and towns coming 
under the act should be ~Bld in accordance with state 
In 1901 another nrimary election 1a was adopted, 
this time to apply to cities of more than 10,000 popu-
* Laws 1885, p. 91. 
** Laws 1891, p. 8. 
*** Ibid., p. 4. 
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lation.* In 1903 an act was passed to extend the rro-
visions of the Australian ballot law to elections in 
all cities and towns contain i ng 2,000 or more inhabi-
tants. ** 
All these show plainly that the state legisla-
ture of Ore gon preferred to rese~ve to itself the di-
rection of all elections of municipal officers. 
It would be diffi-cult to sum up accurately the 
results on the status of municipal corporations and 
the extent of their powers of the fifty yea s of leg-
islative control . In general, the functi ons of mu-
nicipalities had increased in number, of coursej but 
so had also the opportunities of the state legislature 
to regulate municipal activities . As far as can be as-
certained from a study of judicial opinion, the half 
century had done nothing to change the status of cit-
ies and towns as almost completely at the mercy of 
the prejudices , partisan politics and whims of the 
state legislature . 
* Ge~. laws 1901, p . 317 . 
** Gen . laws 1903 , p. 250. 
CHAPTER IV. 
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 
1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THF SYdTEM. 
The years 1902 and 1906 were years of epoch-mak-
ing achievements in the political history of Oregon. 
Much as this state is now pointed to as being the most 
rrogressive commonwealth in the Union, as the most 
democratic democracy in the world, the state where 
reform innovations in government are first put to test 
and whose experiments mark the pathway for other pro-
gressive states to follow--the state, in short, where 
the sovereign people actually do rule, and do it ef-
fectively and efficiently--prior to the last decade 
the people of this western commonwealth were kno~n, if 
for anything, for all-round and rather extreme conser-
vatism.* 
But it would De culpable to fail to note that 
* JOseph Schaefer, "Oregon as a Political Ex-
periment Station," in Monthly Review of Revie s, Au-
gust, 1906. 
116 
b 
117 
the restricted opportunities of an undeveloped and 
s~arsely settled state had as much, and more, to do 
with this seeming unprogressiveness th~ any inher-
ent defect in the enterprise of the peorle . At the 
time of the admission of Oregon as a state there were 
only about 50,000 people inhabiting its 96,699 square 
miles. According to the United States census of 1860, 
the population at that time was 52 , ~65 . In 1870 the 
population was 90,923; in 1880, 17~,768; in 1890, 
313 ,767; in 1900, ~13 ,536; and in 1910, 672,765 . Of 
this number about one-third (207,21,*) lived in the 
city of Portland in 1910. 
Above all, the surprising achievements of the 
people of Oregon in practically revolutionizing po-
litical affairs afford ample proof that they are 
neither a slow nor an unprogre~sive people. The su~ 
priaing part of it, to those who take little stock 
in efforts of ordinary people to rule themselves, is 
that it was the bringing of the government more di-
rectly into the hands of the people of the state 
t~at started them on the way toward their unpreae-
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dented political , economic an d social reform. 
For fotty-five years after the original consti~ 
tution of Oregon was framed , in 1857 , this document 
remained unamended. Good as it may have oeen for the 
time when it was drafted , it necessarily oecame in 
time an antequated instrument of government. It then 
became necessary for the peorle either to amend it 
piecemeal thru the medium of the legislature and 
referenda to the voters , or have it thoroly over-
hauled by means of a constitutional convention, or 
provide some means whereby the peorle of the state 
could , whenever t hey desired, alter their Qonstitu-
t ion to suit ·themselves. They chose the last course . 
To detail the movement for direct rorular gov-
ernment in the state which has oeen selected for this 
study would be beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
Oregon , like all the western states , was rrofoundly 
stirred by the Populistic movement of the early nine-
ties; and it was probably on this account that the 
agitation for the initiative and referendum commenced 
here at this time . The idea, of course, was orought 
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from Switzerland. Several attempts to rrevail upon the 
state legislature to initiate a constitutional amend-
ment to carry out these princi,ples failed, until at 
the session of 1899 , when a joint resolution was passed 
by large majorities . The resolution was reintroduced 
two years later, as the constitution thenrequired, and 
only one vote was recorded in oprosition. It went to 
the people and was oy them adonted by an overwhelming 
rmajority . (1902). 
The way was now cleared for any changes which 
the peo~le wanted, either in t he constitution or in 
the laws . 
At the general election in June , 190~ , a local 
option law on the question of licensing the sale of 
intoxicating liquors was pro posed by t he people of the 
state by initiative proceedings and approved by them 
by a vote of 43 , 316 to ~O J 198 . ighteen days later it 
went into effect , pursuant to a proclamation of the 
governor • • Under this act of the peorle , the voters 
of any county could by a majority vote prohibit the 
* Gen. laws 1905, p. ~l . 
120 
sale of liquor in that county. The law was sometimes 
referred to as the county o~tion law. However, tho a 
majority vote in a whole county for prohioition for 
prohibition would prevail in every township, precinct 
and municipality within the c unty, a vote in favor 
of prohibition in anyone or more precincts would ren-
der those precinc ts "dry," des!,ite a "wet" majority 
in the county as a whole. 
One of the purposes of this local option law was 
to place the responsibility for the solution of the 
vexatious and ever recurring question of licensing 
saloons on the local communities directly affected, 
and thuB relieve the legislature of this ourden.· 
In this respect, the same purpose lay behind its 
enactment as that which brought about the adoption of 
"home rule" as a part of the constitution in 1906. 
That it did not have the desired result is manifest 
from a study of some of the municipal charters grant-
ed at the session of 1905. Some of these provided 
that the power conferred in them to license, tax, regu-
• A. H. Raton, "The Oregon System" (1912), p. 78. 
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late or restrain the sale of intoxicating liquors 
should be subject to the provisions of the local op-
tion law. Clauses to this effect appeared in the char-
ters of .Brownsville,* of Halsey** and of Junction 
City.*** On the other hand, several charters were 
granted at the same time containing clauses exempt-
ing the municipalities in question from the operation 
of the local option law. 
F.xamples of the latter are to be found in the 
charters of Condon,**** which stipulated that "no pr~ 
vision of the law concerning the sale or disposition 
of any ••••••• liquors in Gilliam county, nor an¥ la 
of the state now or hereafter enacted, shall apply to 
the sale or disDosition of the same in the city of 
Condon;" the charter of Estacada,***** which declared 
that lithe said laws of Oregon relating to licenses for 
the sale of ••••••• liquors shall not oe in force within 
the limits of said city;" and the charter of the city 
* Sp. laws 1905, p. 293. 
** Ibid., p. 34. 
***Ioid., p. 834. 
**** Ibid., p. 410. 
***** Ibid., p. 884. 
> 
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of Medford,* which, as amended in. 1905, empowered the 
city omuncil to "license, tax, regulate or prohibit 
barrooms, drinking shops •••••• and all places where •••••• 
liquors are sold or kept for sale, irrespective of any 
~eneral law of the state on this sub~ct enacted by 
the legislature or by the people ~ large." 
On the question of the power of the state legis-
lature, prior to the "home rule" amendments, to exempt; 
a city, by alteration of its charter, from the oper~ 
tion of the local option law, the Oregon supreme court 
in 1908 ruled that it had this power, declaring that 
"the legislature, when not interdicted by amendments 
to the organic act of the state, is a lawmaking body 
of coordinate authority with the people, when the lat-
ter exercise the initiative power they have reserved~·* 
As the Oregon court points out in thas case, it 
is quite probable that it was because of this attempt 
of the legislature to exempt certain cities from the 
operation of the local option law, which was a "peo-
~le's measure," and in order to prevent any further 
* Sp. laws 1905, p. 996. 
** Hall v. Dunn, 52 Or. 475 (1908). 
7 
123 
encroachment on the law, that the peo~le of the state, 
in the following year, by overwhelming majorities 
adopted the two "home rule" amendments to their state 
constitution to take out of the hands of the legisla-
ture the power to frame, adort and amend municipal 
charters and to place this power in the hands of the 
people of the municipalities themselves. 
This explanation is not, of course, intended to 
detract from the weight of the more imrortant reason 
for the adortion of these amendments--the evils which 
had arisen from the practice of the legislature in 
enacting and amending the charters of cities and towns 
by srecial acts, and the oiennial contests which had 
arisen as a consequence, particularly in regard to 
the affairs of the city of Portland. It does show 
very plainly, however, that local conditions often 
have more to do with such things as statute-making 
and constitution-changing in res~ect to municirali-
ties than casual observers of municipal affairs are 
wont to think. 
b 
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"Home rule" const i tut ional amendment s. --Art. XI J 
Sec. 2, of the Oregon constitution was in 1906, under 
popular initiative proceedings, by a vote of 52,567 
to 19,852, amended to read as follows: 
"Corporations may De f2rmed unde! general laws, 
but shall not be cre~d b1 the le~islative assembll 
by spec';al laws. The les;isl!!tive~~blx~hall not 
enact, ~nd, or_repeal ~E1 charter or act of incor-
ation for any municiralit_~y~l~c_i_t~y~,~ __ . ______ . ____ _ 
voters of eve!l-9ity a~~own are hereby &!anted-E2!~ 
er t~ena2~~d amend th~~uni~i~al charter l subjec~ 
to the constitution and criminal laws of the state of 
-- -------
At the same time, and also under initiative pro-
ceedings, Art. IV, ahach, as amended in 1902, reserved 
to the people of the state the powers of initiative 
and referendum, was, by a vote of 47,678 to 16,735, 
further amended by the addition of a new section (Sec. 
1 a), in part as follows: 
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"The initiative and referend~ ~owers reserved 
to the people by this c~titution~re hereby fu~!her 
~erved to the legal voters-2f every municipalitI 
!!E.sLdi~trich~~o_all local~ special and municipal 
!egulatlon, of every character, in or for their re-
srective !lluniciralities and districts;The manner of 
exerci~ing said P2wers shall be prescribed by general 
laws, except !hat citie~~ towns mal provide for the 
manner of exercising ~he initiatjye and referendum ro~ 
ers as to theiE-municipal legislation. Not more than 
ten percent of the legal voters may De re9ui!~~t£ 
Q!Qe!-the referendum nor_more than fifteen percent to 
propose any measure, bI the initiative, in anI citI or 
town." 
Thus, with one stroke and with a brevity that it 
striking and incisive, the old principle of local self-
government was asserted in the fundamental law of Ore-
gon. To every incorporated city and every incorporated 
town, from the largest to the smallest, was intrusted 
the power and the duty, thru its qualified electors, 
of framing its own credentials of olitical existence 
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and articles of government, and of changing these 
whenever in the judgment of these same electors a 
change was needed--with the sole restriction that 
any such steps should oe subject to the constitution 
and criminal laws of the state. 
The method by which "home rule" was thus grant-
ed to munic ipal corr'orat ions in Oregon differed from 
the mode employed in everyone of the states in which 
the pr.inc iple has been adopt ed; and the nature 0 f the 
grant can oe better understood by com~aring, oriefly, 
the Oregon plan with the system as introduced in Cal-
ifornia, Missouri, ashington, Minnesota , Colorado, 
Oklahoma, Michigan, Arizona, Ohio, lebraska and Texas. 
Aprlication of t~ plan.--In the first place, 
to what municipal corrorations does "home rule" apply? 
In the first two states--:,Hssouri and Califor-
nia--in which the system vas introduced, it was the 
large cities that first clamored for "home rule." As 
Portland felt more than any other city in Oregon the 
burden of legislative interference in municipal af-
fairs, so it' was the large cities in these pioneer 
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"home rule" states that felt most keenly the restraint 
uron their governmental activity. When, therefore, the 
constitutional convention which drafted a new funda-
mental law for Mis souri in 1875 was persuaded to give 
the new idea a trial, the rlan was restricted to cit-
ies with lCO,OOO or more inhabitants.* So it has re-
mained in Missouri , with the result that only two mu-
nicipalities--st. Louis and Kansas City--can avail 
themselves of the privilege of making and amendid& 
their own charters. In California, also, which adopt-
ed a new constitution in 1879, the "home rule" privi-
lege was limited to cities of 100,000 population,** 
but it has since been extended to include any munici-
rality containing more than 3,500 population.*** A 
distinct departure has been made in California in al-
lowing counties also to adort charters framed by boarrls 
of freeholders.**** 
The Washington constitution of 1889 granted "home 
rule" to cities of the first class; that is, to such as 
6-8. 
* Missouri constitution, Art. IX, Secs. 16-17. 
** California constitution of 1879, Art. XI, Secs. 
*** Ar~. XI, Sec. 8 as amended jn 1887 . 
****Art • . XI, Sec. ?i. as amended in 1911. 
, . . 
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contained 20,000 or more population.* 
Minnesota, modelling her constitutional amend-
ment of 1898 u!'on the Hssouri plan, carried it to 
its logical conclusion by making it apply to any city 
or village in the state.** As interpreted by the Min-
nesota supreme court from the title of the act pro~o6-
ing the amendment and a subsequent enabling act passed 
by the legis18ture in 1899,*.a it was the intent of 
those who framed the amendment that it should apply 
to only incorporated cities in existence at the time 
of its adoption and to any and all villages which 
might later desire to become incorporated as cities-~ 
but not to cities that might thereafter be incorpor-
ated under general law. **** In order, therefore, that 
cities which might in the futuTe desire to be incor-
porated under general law and afterward avail the~ 
selves of the privilege of amending their charters--
* ashington constitution, Art . XI, Sec. 10. 
** Uinnesota con:3t i tut ion, Art . IV, Sec . 36. 
***Gen. laws 18Q9, p . 462, chap. 51. 
**** State ex rel . v . O'Connor, 81 Minn. 79 
(1900) • 
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slight as is this possibility--the legislature in 1907 
amended the enabling act of 1899 so as to include "any 
city or village in the state of Minnesota, whenever 
incorpora~ed." * 
Under the Michigan constitution as adopted in 
1908,** it was ordained that each city and village 
should have power to "frame, ado~ t and amend" its 
charterj and in a case brought to the su~reme court of 
the state in 1912,*** it was contended that only pro~ 
pective cities yet to oe organized were intended to 
come within the scope of these provisions, thus tying 
the hands of all the many and im~ortant cities already 
incorporated. This contention the court rejected, but, 
apparently to remove all doubts in the matter, an 
amendment was adorted in the same year, permitting 
each city and village to "frame, adort and amend its 
charter, and to amend an existing charter of a city 
or village heretofore granted or .a sed by the leg-
iolature."**** 
~ Gen. laWs 1907, p. 532, chapter 375. 
** Art. VIII, tiec. 8U . 
*** Gallur v. City of Saginaw, 170 .{ich.195 (1912). 
**** Art. VIII, aec. 20, as amended in 1912. 
c 
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The constitutional amendment ado~ted in Colorado 
in 1902 permitted cities of the first and second class 
to frame and adopt their own charters.* ThuS all mu-
nicipalities having more than 2,000 inhabitants are 
included; but the legislature may at any time change 
the classification. Oklahoma, in its new constitution 
of 1907, also conferred the privilege upon cities of 
more than 2,000 population.** The Arizona plan, adopt-
ed in 1910, was patterned uron that of Oklahoma, but 
restricted its application to cities of more than 
3,500 people.*** In Ohio, under the new constitution 
of 1912, any city or village is included.**** In the 
same year Texas and Nebraska adopted amendments grant-
ing "home rule" to cities having more than 5,0(;0 in-
habitants.***** 
The Oregon amendment::3 of 1906 -orohibi t the ·state 
legislature from enacting, amending or repealing the 
charter of any munici~ality, city, or ~; empower 
* Colorado constitution, Art. XX, Secs. ~, 5, 6. 
** Oklahoma constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 3. 
*** Arizona constitution, Art. XIII, Secs.}, 2, 3. 
**** Ohio constitution, Art. XVIII, uec. 7. 
***** Texas constitution, Art. XI, 3ec. 5; Ne-
braska constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 13. 
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the voters of every city and town to enact and amend 
their charter; reserve the initiative and referendum 
to the voters of every municirality and district; and 
provide that cities and towns may nrovide for the man-
n er of exercising these powers . With such a variety 
of expression, to give a technical and distLlctive 
meaning to each of these terms would be to introduce 
an almost endless list of possibilities of interpret-
ation. Hapr ily, the Oregon surreme court has endea-
vored to reconcile such conflicting constructi6ns as 
have been attemr-ted , and to bring forth t~e substance 
of what the Oregon peonle really believed they were 
voting for when they ado r ted these amendn:ents . 
The broad defin ition given by the Oregon court 
to the terms "corporations fo nmniciral ~urposes" 
and "munic i ral corT"Orat j ons" has already Deen noted; 
how they were defined so s to emorace counties, school 
districts and road districts, as well as cities and 
towns--and even such creations of t he legislature as 
incorrorated ports. Following this definition, the 
court in 1907 held that t he ter ms "munici al i ty" and 
"fiistrict" were ex _,ressions of !quivalent import . * In 
* Acme Dairy Co . v . Astoria, ~9 Or. 520 (1907). 
-
b 
132 
the same year the legislature passed an act** estab-
lishing and incor~orating the Po~t of Columbia, sim-
ilar to the Port of Portland, establidhed in 1891; 
and the question at once arose as t o the power of the 
legislators to do this, in view of the amendments of 
1906. In ruling against the attem-;t of the legisla-
ture, the c ou~t hinted that such a r ort was a munici-
pal corporation, as it had itself decided sixteen 
years before. In this case, howev ~ r, it was not nec-
essary to base its decision on this ground, oecause, 
as the court pointed out, under the constitution as 
amended in 1906 the creation of any corporation, puo-
lic or private, by srecial laws, was foroidden.** 
The next year t he court had to give a categor-
ical answer to the question as to whether or not the 
"home rule" amendment s ayn") l ied to incorporated porta 
as munici~al corporations; for the power of the Port 
of Portland to amend its charter was disputed. The 
court then arnlied the definition it had given in 
* Laws 1907, p. 182. 
** Farrell v. port of Columb ia, 50 Or. 169 (1907) . 
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1891 and declared that incorporated ports could amend 
their charters just as other municipalities could; tho, 
as the court added, such a port "is neither a city nor 
a town in the strict sense of the word."* In still 
another case** the court held that, since incorporated 
ports, tho municipal cor~orations, were neither cit-
jes nor towns, they were not meant to oe included in 
that clause*** of the constitution which provided 
that acts incorporating cities and towns shall re-
strict their powers of contracting debts. 
Bearing in mind the definition of muniCipal 
corporation to include counties, school districts and 
road districts--and, in fact, all public corporations 
created by a state--and the fact that this was used 
as a basis by the Oregon court for including incor-
rorated ports in the germ "municipality," the inter-
esting question arises: Does not the Oregon system 
also mean "home rule" for counties, school districts 
and road districts? Obviously, the limited character 
* Farrell v. Port of po_rtland,~ 52 Or. 582 (19G8). 
** Straw v. Harris, 54 Or. 424 (1909). 
*** Art. ~I, Sec. 5. 
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of school districts and road distric~s precludes in-
cluding them in the plan, at least for the present. 
But is not "home rule" for counties at once possible 
and feasible? Has not California already introduced 
such a plan? Sweeping as is the declaration of the 
Oregon judges in 1891 and pregnant as are the possi-
bilities which can by analogy by conjured up from it, 
some recent statements of the court leave the matter 
still in SOllie douot. 
"A county is a municipal or quasi-mWlicipal 
corporation," said the court in a recent case,* "com-
prising the inhabitants within its boundaries and 
form~d for the purpose of exercising the powers and 
discharging the duties of local government and the 
administration of public affairs conferred u~on it 
by law •••••••• A county is not, in a strict sense, a 
municipal corporation •••••••• In a certain sense, it 
comes within the rules and prinCiples of la applic-
able to such corporations •••••••• In this state we have 
a dual system of legislation. By the provisions of our 
constitutional amendments, the right to enact local, 
* Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or. 503 (1912). 
~35 
special and municipal measures is reserved to the le-
gal voters of their 'municipalities and districts. This 
authority is to be exercised in the localities by 
means of the initiative process. Whatever have been 
1~1Ld~ies ~d powers of counties-p!ior to the ad~ 
tion of th~e amendments, we see no reason why such 
guasi-munici~l},ti~or districts cannot be endowed 
with legislative functions by the pla~n provisi~ 
2i the constitution. " 
Method of framing~d ado!'ting "home rule" char-
ters . --Whatever the extent to which "home rule" is to 
be applied, it will be granted that to allow any lo-
cal subdivision of the state to frame and adopt its 
own charter of incorporation without the interven-
tion of the legislature is nearly to effect a revolu-
tien in constitutional law. But shall the "sovereign" 
state, from which every corporation, public and pri-
vate, derives its existence , permit its creatures--
cities and towns- -to do this with no restriction what-
ever? Certainly , not. Shall the state allow them en-
tire discretion as to the manner in which such char-
ters shall be framed? So far, this has oeen done in 
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but one state--Oregon--tho the constitutional amend-
ment ordained by Texas in 1912 contains only the re-
striction that the adoption of "home rule" charters 
shall be subj ect to such limitati ons as may be pre-
scribed by the legislature. In all the other states 
above mentioned, the oonstitutions either give di-
rections as to the mode of framing and amending 
charters or amstruct the legislatures to give the 
directions. 
Thus, in Missouri, California, Washington, Min-
nesota, Neoraska, Oklahoma and Arizona, boards of 
freeholders perform the task of drawing u a charter 
draft for submission to the voters of each city. In 
Colorado the framers must be taxpayers, while in Mich-
igan and Ohio they need only have the qualifications 
of electors. Election by the people is the mode of 
choosing the boards or commissions in every state in 
which the method of selection has been laid down, ex-
cept in Minnesota, where the judges of the district 
court aproint fifteen freeholders, either on their 
own initiative or on retition of 10% of the voters of 
b 
the city. 
Various means of taking the initiative in the 
matter of selecting charter makers have been provided 
in the other states-- sometimes the city council onlY I 
sometimes only the voters on petition of 1% to 25%, 
sometimes either the one or the other. In four of the 
states--Caljfornia, Colorado, Oklahoma and Arizona--
an election is first held to determine whether or not 
a board or commission to frame a charter shall be 
chosen, and if this is ratified by a majority vote 
another election is held to elect members of such 
board or commission . In Michigan oot t ~rorosals are 
voted on at the same time; if the first loses there 
is no canvass made of the votes cast for commission-
ers . In the other states a vote on members of the 
charter-framing body is taken at once, it oeing pre-
sumed that the initiative taken oy the people or the 
city authorities is a sufficient indication that it i~ 
the desire of the voters that there shall De frbmed a 
charter for submission to tte electors. 
In three states it requires more than ratifica-
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tion by the voters of a municipality to accomplish 
the'legal adoption of a charter or charter amendment. 
In California the constitution prescribes that, if a 
majority of those voting on the charter pro Josition 
vote in favor, it must De submitted to the state leg-
islature and be approved by a majority of Doth houe-
es, separately or by jOint resolution; but they must 
approve or re j ect it unaltered. In Oklahoma and Ari-
zona a charter must receive the approval of the gov-
ernor, who must sign it if it ioes not conflict with 
the constitution or the laws of the state. 
Are "home rule" amendmentti self-executing?--In 
several states the vital issue has been raised as to 
whether or not the constitutional amendments confer-
ring "home rule" uron cities and towns ere self-ex-
ecuting ; and much litigation has res ulted. The issue 
is vital because u~on it depends the question whether 
or not there must be legisl ative action in order that 
municipalities may avail themselves of the rrivile e 
of framing and amending their charters, and whether or 
not the cities are to be subject to a continuing con-
• 
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trol by the state legislature thTu this means . In Ore-
gon, perhaps, the issue is most complicated, because 
of the fact that "home rule" was conferred in that 
state by simultaneous but separate amendments which 
have been construed differently on this point . Much 
confusion has been the result, and after nearly a 
dozen rulings on the matter by the state supreme 
cou~t, the situation is not yet altogether settled. 
Before venturing into an analysis of these decisions, 
a brief outline of the situation in the other "home 
rule" states may be of value . 
"Any city .• •• •• may frame a charter for its own 
government," are the orening words of Art . IX, Sec . 
16, of the ~ issouri constitution; and a majority of 
the states which have followed the lead of Missouri 
have copied a1so the style emnloyed in this ioneer 
attempt to phrase a~ adequate grant to municipalities 
to rule themselves . fhe question whether or not this 
section of the Missouri constitution is self-executing 
has never oeen made the basis of a test in the courts; 
but so the supreme bench has obviously assumed it to 
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be . In California* and Oklahoma** the supreme courts 
have pronounced the "home rule" grantd to be self-ex ... 
ecuting, so that subsequent action by any legislature 
for the purpose of laying down terms under which mu-
nicipalities might avail themselves of the grant would 
be void--or, at oest, superfluous. 
In the light of the~e decisions it is difficult 
to understa::1d t:1e contrary position of the supreme 
court of Washington. Art. II, Sec. 10, of the consti-
tut ion of t:'lat state commences as foll OWd: It Any city 
containing a population of 20,000 inhabitants or more 
shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own 
government •.•.• " In a case brought oefore it in 1895 , *** 
t~is cou t held that it was com~etent for t~e le isl~ 
ture to supplement t!le constitutional provision by 
pointing out the manner in which the right conferred 
by the constitution mignt be exercised, and by pre-
scribing rules for the guidance of city councils in 
regard to procedure to be followed in carryin into 
* People v. Hoge, 55 Cal . 616 (1880) . 
** State ex reI . v. Scaleo, 21 Okla. 68 (19u8). 
*** Reeves v. Ande~oon, 13 Wash . 17 (18 15). 
- ---~7'------------------------~---.,----*----------
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effect the constitutional grant--even tho the Washing-
ton constitution of 1879 makes quite detailed provi-
sion therefor. The court seems to rest its argument on 
a quotation from Judge Codley's "Constitutional L~mita­
tions," to the effect that a constitutional provision 
is not self- 3xecuting "when it merely indicates prin-
ciples, wi:hout laying down rules by means of which 
those ,rinciples may be given the force of law ••••••• • 
Pe~haps even in such cases (wher e the ower is self-
executing), legislation may be desirable, by way of 
providing remedies for the protection of the rights 
secured , or of regulating the claim of the right so 
that its exact limits may De known and understood. " 
Following the ruling of the California and 
Oklahoma courts, the "hoIlle rule" grants in Colorado, 
Arizona and Ohio should De rut down as self-executin , 
for they are almost exactly alike in the language they 
employ. 
On the other side, the linnesot a amendme. t of 
1898 and Secs. 20 and 21 of Art. VIII of the Michigan 
consti tut ion are not. self-execut ing, and have oeen so 
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construed by the courts. The runended Sec. 36 of Art. 
IV of the l,Unnesota constitution begins thus: "Any 
city or village in this state may frame a charter for 
its own government as a city, consistent with and sub-
ject to the laws of this state, as follows: The le -
!sla~re shal~ rrovid~J unde such restrictions as it 
deems p"'oDer, fol' a board of fifteen freeholders ••••• II 
The section includes also the following clause: "Be_ 
fOl'e any city shall incorporate under this act the le~ 
islature shall nrescribe by general law the general 
" limits within such chartee shall oe framed. In 1902 
the Minnesota court, accordingly, held the an~endment 
not to be self-executing, and it u held all enaoling 
act of the legislature.* 
The clauses in the :achigan constitution of 1908 
covering the "home rule" provhdons read as follows: 
"The legislature shall provide by general law for the 
incorporation of cities, and by general law fo the 
incorporation of villages. Dnde such gendral laws, 
the electors of each city and village shall have power 
* State ex rel. v. Kievel J 86 inn. 136 (1902). 
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and authority to frrune, adopt and amend its charter, 
and, thru its regularly constituted authority, to 
pass all laws and ordinances relating to its munici-
pal concerns, subject to the constit~tion and gene-
ral laws of this state . "· The state sUTlreme court in 
1911*** declared that these provisions were not self-
executing, and in 1912*** the authority of the legi6-
lature was helct to be limited to the passage of one, 
and only , one, general law for incorrorating cities , 
and to one law for incorro .ating villages, thus pre-
venting the state lawmakers from enacting further 
legislation for the regulation of current municipal 
affairs . 
In orevity and conciseneo6 t~e "home rule" grant 
in ,Uchigan is similar to that in Oregon, but in aP1I1Y'"'" 
ing the constitutional provisions of tne latter state 
bewildering difficulties have been met. 
* This section was ame ded in 1912, DUt the a-
mendmen t did not change its character as a non- se If-
executing instrument . 
** Attorn~y General v . Common Council of $e-
troit, 164 :Uch. 369 (1911 ). 
*** .Attorn~y General v . etroit Common Coun-
cil, 168 Jich . 2~9 (1912) . 
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Legislati~e provision in Oregon for local ini-
tiativ~and referendum.--Because of the perplexities 
and doubts as to the power of cities to amend their 
charters, in accordance with the two amendmanto of 
1906, without an enabling act of t~e state legisla-
ture, that body, on Webruary 25, 1907, passed an act 
for that pur.ose.* It was in the nature of an emer-
gency act for the "Auolic safety," to re~eal a law 
of 1903 whjch was enacted to carry into effect the 
initiative and referendum amend~ent of t:e year be-
fore and which was found ot to be comprehen8ive e-
nough in view of the exten8ion of these powers of di-
~ect legislation to municipalities. Its s ecial pur-
pose was to provide for and regulate elections to be 
held under. tile "home rule" amendments. It will be re-
membered t hat one of these amenmne ts stated that the 
manner of exercising the i itiative and referendum 
powers should oe nrescribed oy general la s, "except 
that cities and towns may provide for the manner. of 
exercising the initiative and referendum ro er~ as to 
* Laws 1907, pp. 3~8-408. 
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thei municipal legislation." The enabling act , there-
fore , provided that its provisions should apply only 
to such cities and towns as had not made the necessary 
provisions , or, in case they had made provioion , the 
law should a~nly only to such matters on which the 
municipal aut horities had not made, or should not 
make, "conflicting" provisions . ~ 
Both the initiative and referendum of bills 
were to be invoked oy petition, according to the act. 
In case of the former, the ercentage of the voters 
necessary was not st atea,l but the const it.lt ional a-
mendment of 1906 set it a~ not more than 15%. In case 
of the latter, 10%, the maximum percentage permitted 
by the constitution, was fixed oy the law. Any per-
son was qualified to sign a ~etition for the initia-
tive or refe endum for any measure ur on which he was 
* Two other exceptions were as folIo s: "This 
act shall not arnly to the general laws gov rninb the 
method of determi L.g whether dtock of any kind shall 
oe permitted to run at large in any county or portion 
thereof, nor to the prOVisions of the local option 
laws providing methoJs of determinin~ whether the sale 
of intoxicating liquors shall oe prohioited in any 
county, city , preCinct, ward or district." 
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entitled to vote under the laws of the state. Such pe-
titions should be addressed to the city clerk, audi-
tor or recorder. 
Initiative petitions could demand submission to 
the people of both proposed ordinances and charter 
amendments. A referendum could oe invoked on either 
the whole or a ~art of an act of the city council--
whether an ordinance, franchise or resolution. On 
receiving an initiative petition, the c ouncil might 
eit~er (1) pass the ordinance or amendment desired, 
without referring it to the people, (2) pass it and 
refer it to the people, (3) rej ect it, in which case 
it must be ref ~ rred, (4) take no action on it, in 
which case it also must be ref~rred, by the city 
claerk, auditor or recorder, 0 "(' (5) whethe it re-
jected it or took no action on it, submit a compet-
ing ordinance or amendment to the electors. Any act 
submitted to an4 approved oy the peo:le was ~ot sub-
ject to the veto of the mayor. 
To give opportunity for the circulation of ref-
erendwn petitions, the act provided that no ordinance 
1 7 
resolution or franchise enact d by 0 city council 
should toke effect until thirty days afte it a-
sage oy the council and ap rov 1 oy t e mayor , x-
ce t measuras necessary fo the immediat preoe va-
tion of the peace, health or afety of the ci~y; a d 
no emergency measu e ohall become immedi t~ly 0 e a-
tive unless iw shall state, in e arate... ti o 
the reaso . y it is neces a~y t at it ~houl 0 come 
imme iately operativ~ , nd shall De a .• rove by t e 
affi mative vote of three-fou s of al the membe~ 
elect d to the cit council , an alao a •. ove y the 
mayor. " 
In ad ition to refe e m on etition, hich in-
cluded also the omia ion oy the co ncil of com t-
ing mea u as, th 1 'ovi e t at cha t 
might De o,oaed a~d submOtte by the co cil out 
eti~lon of any Kin. uch amen vnt mig t oe vat on 
at elthe a ene al 0 ecial 
* The 
'" "ion. 
J thei 
it the 
em, if 
a m 
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Legislative provision versus local enactments.--
At the time this law was passed the~e had been no ad-
judication oy the courts as to whether or not the "home 
ruChe" amendments of 1906 were self-executingj but the r e 
was ~ending a suit which reached the state ~upreme 
court three months later.* The case ar088 from an at-
herein are not mandatory, and if substantially fol-
lowed in any retition it shall be sufficient, disre-
garding clerical and merely technical errors." 
\2) Safeguards for securing action on ~e titions, 
by giving the right to arply for mandanus to compel 
the authorities to act, and giving the county courts 
jurisdiction of such cases. (3) Placing the desired legislation on the bal-
lots; providing for a title to the act, with a true 
and impartial statement of its purrose, written by 
the city attorney. (4) 'Elect ion pamph lets, to be puol i shed under 
direction of the city clerk, auditor, or recorde , 
with argUll1ent8 pro and con, includine any arguments 
wh j ch any person, com_any or organization might ish, 
which were to be filed with the prorer aut_ority for 
printing and distribution, at the expense of those 
desiring such ~rinting and distribution. (5) The manne of voting unon such measures, 
which was to oe "the same as is now or may be required 
and provided by law;" provided that no measure should 
be adopted unless it received a major~ty "of the total 
number of res ective votes casy on such measure." 
(6) Counting of the votes by the regular ooards 
of judges, clerks, etc.; canvassing of the returns by 
the city clerk (or auditor or recorder) iT the pres-
ence of the mayor, who was to issue the proclamation 
announcing the result. 
* Acme Dairy Co, v. Astoria, ~9 Or. 520 (1907). 
b 
149 
tempt of the city to amend its charter. A local pri-
vate corporation deeming the amendment objectionable, 
called i~ question the ~ower of the city to alter its 
charter. Power to do this, the complainant attempted 
to show, could be derived, if at all, only from Art. 
IV, Sec I a, which permitted cities and towns to pro-
vide for the manner of exerciaing the initiative and 
referendum ~owers as to their "municipal le islation." 
That the amendment of city charters was "municipal 
legislation" was denied by the com;-lainant. 
In overcoming these oOjections, the court point-
ed out emphatically that Art . IV, Sec. 1 a, must be 
read together with Art . XI, Sec. 2, amended at the 
same time, which gave the legal voters of every city 
and town power to enact and amend their charter. Do-
ing this, the court concluded that it was the inten-
tion of the frame s of Art. IV, Sec. 1 a, ana also of 
the people who ratified it, "to vest an incorporated 
town with authority to provide the manner of exercis-
ing the initiative and referendum powers as to amend-
ments of a charter, which change is reasonaoly within 
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the generic term of 'municipal legislation. '" Art. XI, 
Sec. 2, might not be self-executing,* the court held, 
but Art. IV , Sec. 1 a, was. "A section of the funda-
mental law is self-executing," said the court, "when 
it prescribes a rule the a~plication of which puts 
into operation the constitutional provision ••••••• The 
amendment quoted hav ine; eX:9ressly author ized cit ies 
and towns to provide for the manner of exercising the 
initiative as to their municipal le~islation, the pro-
vision is therafore self-executing in resrect to the 
class of enactments srecified."** 
Very similar was a case brought to the supreme 
court the next year.*** It involved the validity of 
that part of the enabling act of 1907 which provided 
that charter amen~ents might be proposed and submit-
ted to the voters by a city council without an initia-
7)01 
* So held to be in Kiernan v, Portland, 57 Or. 
454 (1910). " 
** The court makes the technical ooservation, i~ 
this case, that, while Art. XI , Sec. 2, as amended, 
de~rives the legislature of all authority to enact, 
amend or rereal the charter of any city ot town, the 
voters of the municipality are em owered only to e-
nact and amend their charter.--See also cKeon v. City 
of Portland, 61 Or. 385 (1912) . 
*** McKenna v . City of Portland, 52 Or. 191 (1908). 
151 
tive petition. This was questioned in view of the a-
mendment of 1906 reserving the initiative and refer-
endum powers to the voter~ of municipalities and pro-
viding, as interpreted in the Astoria case, that this 
initiative power might De used in the amending of 
city charters. It was contended that the right of the 
voters of a munici~ality to enact or amend their char-
ter was, in fact, only by virtue of the initiative 
powers reserved to them, and that therefore any act 
of the state legislature providing a different proce-
dure was void. To this the court replied that t e 
right to enact or amend a charte~ was .ot necessarily 
an initiative ~owerj that, instead, it existed by 
virtue of Art. ~I, Sec. 2, as amended; and that the 
e aoling act of 1907 waa for the pur.ose of carrying 
into effect this amendment, as well as Art. IV, Sec. 
1 a. This bei~g so, a city might be i st ucte oy the 
legislature as to the manner of exerciai g its ower 
of amending its charter. 
There a.pea ~ to be no question, thcrefo~e, that 
Art. XI, Sec. 2, is not self-executing.* On the other 
* In Hall v. Dunn, 52 Or. ~75 (1908), th~ court 
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hand, the dictum of the state court on the other "home 
rule" amendment, Art. IV, Sec. 1 a, is that it is self-
executing. In other words, the grant to mumucipalitiea 
to enact and amend their. charter.s free from legisla-
tive interfer.ence needs legislative action to make it 
available to the peo ~le of the municipalities, while 
the reservation to the voterB of cities and towns of 
the powerd of initiative and referendum as to their 
municipal legislation is fully accomplished by the 
constitutional amendment, needing only the action of 
the municipalities themselves to . ut it into prac-
tice. When it is conside~ed, however, that the term 
"municipal legislation" includes the amending of char-
ters, and might just as easily oe construed to include 
their enactrnent--now that this is no longer a state 
legislative matter--the distinction her.e laid down is 
-----------------------------------------------------
says: "The amendment of Sec. 2 of Art. XI of the or-
ganic law empowering the legal voterB of every city 
and town to enact and amel d their munici~al c~arters, 
subject to the constitution and criminal laws of the 
state, is not self-executing, and orerates , ros nect-
ively only, so that the adortion of such arne ndnen t 
did not alter the charter of the city of Medford as 
enacted by the legislative assembly, Feb. 7, 1905." 
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at once seen to be merely a fine legal nicety without 
any sUbstantial value--all of which the Oregon court 
practically agrees to when it says that the two amend-
ments are to be read together. 
In 1911, when the sllYlreme court was called uron 
to rule on the validity of an act of the authorities 
of the town of cl~ringfield in calling and holding an 
election on amending the town charter, in a manner 
slightly different from that laid dOrn in the act of 
1907, without having nrovided for such method by ordi-
nance or charter , as the law provided, the court de-
clared its rosition as follows: "As cities and towns 
are authorized to provide the manner of exercising 
the initiative and referendum powers in municipal 
legislation, except as to the number of legal voters 
required as netitioners therefor, a d as this clause 
of the organic act is s~lf-executing, no enabling act 
was required to put into oreration this provision of 
the fundamental law, and such being the case the gen-
eral law requiring cities and towns to • ovide oy or-
rtinance or charter the manner of exercising such row-
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ers is advisory only, and does not rrohibit the adop-
tion of any other reasonaole manner of exercising the 
powerd reserved. H• 
This obviously refers to Art. IV, Sec. 1 a. Three 
other decisions of the same court, however, show very 
clearly that it is only in a limited way that this a-
mendment is self-executing. If this statement is not 
true, then the alternative is to hold the Oregon su-
preme court guilty of a contradiction. 
To take un the first of these c ases :** Accor~ 
ing to the Portland charter of 1903,*** a city ordi-
nance went into effect immediately on its aprroval by 
the mayor, contrary to the act of 1907 to carry into 
effect the ameadments of 1906, ~hich provided that no 
ordinance should taka effect until thirty days after 
its ap roval by the mayor, within which time referen-
dum petitions might oe filed against it. In order to 
unhold the law as against the cnarter, so that the 
right of refere dum might not De l e st to the ~eople 
* McBee v. Town of S::-,rLJ.gfield, 5(j Or. 459 (1911). 
** Long v. City of Portland, 53 Or. 92 (1909). 
*** Sp. laws 1903, p. 20 , vee. 49. 
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of Portland, the cour t deemed it necessary to show the 
absolute necessity of the law of 1907 to carry into 
effect the constitutional amendme ~t in cuesti on, which 
did not provide for any time in which to file refer-
endum petitions, and so was, in this respect, not self-
executing,. In the language of the court: "Sec. 1 a, 
Art. IV, of the constitution is not self-executing, 
for the reason t hat it makes no rrovision as to its 
enforcement. It only declares or reserves t he right, 
without 1ayi~g down rules by means of which this right 
may be given the force of law. It contains no provi-
s ion as to the time and place of fi 1 i r.g the pet it ion" 
nor the time when, or the manner in which, the law 
voted upon shall take effect; rud , in view of Sec . ~9 
of the charteT , some providion is required to give 
time and opportunity to invoke the referendum a ainst 
an ordinance passed by t he council fia 'l • • This was reC-
ognized by the framers of this amendment, a~ it pro-
vides therein that the manner of exercioing ouch power 
shall be prescribed by general laws or by the city."· 
• The othe,. cases uT'holding this view are: State 
ex reI. v . Portland Railway, Llgl1 t and 1'0 er Co., 56 
Or . 32 (1910) , and Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or . 503 (1912). 
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3 . THB CITY v~us THE STATE. 
Fundamental limitations upon "home r~--The 
American political system, ati at praoe t constituted, 
requires that a municipal cor oration shall oe subor-
dinate absolutely to the state . It is only from the 
lawmaking branch of the governMent that the "home 
rule" city is to be freed; and even t h is freedom is 
not ab so lute . Vhere the limit at ion is not laid do n 
in the constitution itself, the courts have undertak-
en to supply it . In Oregon, oy way of pref ce, it may 
be stated that the restrictions have been laid own 
in both manners . As will be ramem e ed, Art. XI, S c . 
2 , as amended in 19 6, grants to cities a d to ns the 
po er to enact and arne. d their charter, suo ' ect to 
the conatitution and cr'minal 1 s of the tate of 
Oregon. " The further rvstriction lai do n oy t e 
state supreme court wil l oe co sidered in the follo 
ine pages . 
l~ot all the state have rovided the sa e l iI!l-
itations in their contititution ; but they al l contain 
he restr ict ion , ex. res e or im. 1 ied, thi1t charter 
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franJed by the voters of municipalities shall be in 
harmony with and subject to the constitution and the 
laws of the state--at the very least, to the general 
laws on such subjects as are deemed to be of state-
wide concern . If this were not so, the peo le of 
"home ruled" cities could with im!,'Unity and at will 
set aside as many state laws as t ~ey liked and set 
u:r a real "imy)erium in i m!'1erio . " That such a situation 
would be far oe "ond what was ever contemplated by the 
framers of constitutions and constitutional amendment 
conferring the r rivilege of "home rule" uron rmn ici-
r'al it ies has een so fre (!Ue llt 1 y asserted by the courts 
and by write r s on municiral goverlll .ent that no argu-
ment is necessary . 
The Hissouri constitution, the fil'st to reco-
nize fully the r rinciyl e of "home rule " in charter 
making, declares merely that such a charter s L.al1 su-
persede any existing charter or amendments thereto. 
Such a clause is common to nearly all the constitutions 
cov .:o rine the subj ect . Other states' have attemr ted to 
sT'lec ify more exactly what state laws are sUI'erseded, 
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and what are not . By constitutional amendments in Cal-
ifo~nia and Colorado, freeholders· charters have Deen 
declared to prevail over ~ l aws inconsistent there-
withj but, sO far as known, no court in either of these 
states has stated or intimated t hat a general law uran 
matters regarded as of state-wide im~ ortance and not 
of purely local concern is sur-erseded o~ annulled by 
a city-fr amed charter . The Michigan and Texas grants 
most nearly r esemble that of Oregon, the reservation 
in these states being that charters must be subject 
only to the constitution and eeneral laws. The Okla-
~oma constitution , and that of Arizona coried from it , 
declare that "home rule" charte~s shall become "the 
organiC law" of munic i ~ aU ties and surersede any ex-
isting charterb and chart er amendments a1d uch or-
dinances as are not consistent ith the ne charters. 
The Washington constitution on this roint is 
the most conservative of all, as only s r ecial la s-
laws which in the other states considered are 1 ,1'0-
hib i ted al together- - are sU'nerseded. In contrast i th 
the 'Vash ington const i tut ion of 1889 is the new funda-
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mental law of Ohio adopted in 1912 . Srecial laws are 
forbidden only as to the incorporation of municipal-
it ies. Sr,ecial acts may be passed for the government 
of cities and villages, but such laws must in every 
instance be referred to the electors of the munici-
pality affected. In addition to framing, adortin~ and 
. amending charter8 for their own government, cities 
and villages may "exercise all r.9!~-2U.9.9~l_.?elf:. 
gov~~nt and adort and enforce within their limits 
such local police , sanitary and other similar regul&-
tions as are not in conflict with the general laws . " 
The peorle of California have amended their 
constitutional provision for municiral !t horne rule" 
six times since the ado~tion of the constituti n of 
1879. Under the &riginal arrangement, only inconsist-
ent srecial laws were s~pertieded by freeholders' char-
teTs--just as is still the situation in 'a hington--
and the su!'reme court in a number of caBes construed 
this to mean that a general law was to prevail over a 
charter in all matters, whether of purely loca con-
e~n or not . * But the large cities--San francisco and 
* The case of Davies v . ~ity of Los Angeles, 86 
Los Ange1es--were not satisfied with this state of 
affairs , and in 1892* obtained the ratification of 
an amendment to the constitution striking out the 
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word "s:recial" and making freeholders' charter:.:> su-
~erior to "all laws inconsistent with such charter." 
But the~e was another section of the Califor-
nia constitution authorizing the legislature to lass 
general laws for the incorpo~ation and organization 
of cities and expressly stating that all charters 
"framed or ado~..,ted by authority of th i s constitution 
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws." 
No excertion was made of rrunici.al affairs, and the 
rossibility thus remai~ed that the su~reme court 
might hold general laws, even in strictly municinal 
affairs, sunerior to "home rule" charters . Further, 
there being no constitutional limitation on the n~ 
Cal . 37 (1890), furnishes a tyrical examrle • No dis-
tinction such as was later adorted oetween matters of 
stOate end municinal concern was made in th ~ s dechdon, 
and a general law on the o_enihg and widening of 
streets was held raramount to a charter clause on the 
same subj ect . 
* Other amendme~1ts had oeen ado:"'ted in 1887 and 
in 1890. 
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ber of classes of cities which the legislature might 
create' and legislate for, the restriction to general 
laws might be entirely evaded.* In 1896 , therefore , 
another amendment waS incornorated in the fundamental 
law nroviding that all charters "framed or ado. ted by 
authority of this constitution, ~ t in munici~ 
Affair~ , shall be subject to and controlled by gener-
al laws." 
As has been stated in a previous charter , muni-
ciral corporations in Oregon were , before the adortio~ 
of the principle of "home rule , " the mere creatures 
not only of the state, but of the state legislature . 
~n granting cha~ters to cities, and in creating muni-
ci1"al corrorations , " said the surrerile court in 1868 .. 
"the legislative assembly do not intend to sever the 
rolitical relations already existing, that a city 
only obtains certain local rights , such as better irr~ 
provement of highways, more rrot~cti on against danger 
* .Hlo R. ~altbie , "City- .,ade Charters," in Yale 
Review , ~ebruary , 1905. 
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and damage from fire , disease, violence , etc., with 
the power to pass local laws a9rlicable to the new 
state, not inconsistent with general ones . "* 
The old established rule in regard to the rowers 
of muhicipal corporations is that such only can be 
exercised as are (1 ) granted in express words; (2) 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the 
powers expressly granted; or (3) essenti&l to the de-
clared objects and purposes of the corporation--not 
s i WPly convenient, but indis~ensable . ** It is ~er-
fectly plain that this rule ,applies whether the char-
ter is a rroduct of the state legislature or an act 
of the peo .. le of a municirality . The question of ju-
nicial interpretation of charte provisions in cases 
where they are invoked to ju.stify the actiol of city 
authorities is not , therefore , of any direct import-
ance in a study of "home rule . It The real problem a-
~ises in the conflicts between ch&rter r rovisions and 
the general statutes of the state . 
* Craig v . ~osher , 2 Or . 323 (1868) . 
** J . F. Dillon, ".uniciTal Cor~orations," Vol. 
I, p. 448 . 
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So long as both charters and general laws pro-
ceeded from the same source--the legislature--such 
conflicts as did arise did not critically affect any 
fundamental constitutional and legal principles. A 
study of the decisions of the court in adjudicating 
such conflicts will show that the judges were guided 
by ~ossibly four princinles: (1) a later statute as a 
rule prevails over a former one ; * (2) the intent of 
the framers of the law is to oe given much weight;** 
(3) rereals by imrlication are not to be favored; *** 
and (4) whenever two apparently conflicting laws can 
be reconciled without greatly stretching their mean-
ing and intent, this should by all means be done . **** 
As justifjcation for the last-mentioned pri ciple the 
court would often cite the charter itself, hich usu-
* O'Harra v . City of Portland, 3 Or . 525 (1869) ; 
Hall v . Dunn, 52 Or . 475 (19G8) , and other local op-
tion cases . 
** O'Harra v . City of Portland, supra; State ex 
rel. v . McKinnon ~ 8 Or . ..... 93 (1880); Sandys v . ' illiams , 
~6 Or . 327 (1905) ; Hall v. Dunn, BUTra; State ex reI . 
v. Malheur County Court , b ..... Or . 255 (1909) . 
*** St ate ex reI. v . 'alheur Count y Cour t, bupr a. 
**** Burchard v . State , 2 Or . 78 (1863); Palmer 
v . State , 2 Or . 66 (1863) ; King v . Portland, 2 Or . l~6 
(1865) ; Mayhew v. City ofugene, 5 Or . 102 (1910) . 
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ally contained the reservation that such powers aa 
were granted by, and enumerated in, that instrument 
were to be exercised in a manner not incon~istent with 
the laws of the state . 
out the introduction of municiral "home rule" 
puts an altogether new face on this question. 
What is the rosition of municiralities in the 
state governmental system under such a regime? Has 
their relations toward the state legislature been ra~ 
ically c~anged? Vfuat is the standing of a city-made 
charter rrovision as opposed to a conflicti~g state 
law on the same subject? In what way is it essentially 
different from the former status of charte-r clauses 
which failed to comply with the rrovisions of general 
statutes? These questions must oe answered with some 
definiteness before any judgment can be passed on the 
value of the right of cities and towns to frame, adopt 
an,d amend the ir own chart ers . 
In the first case brought to the Oregon supreme 
court involving the "home rule" amendments of lQ06, 
and local action under the amendments, the ortimi tic 
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view of great and extensive powers and ossibilities 
of inderendent municiT'al action received a rebuff. }.S 
has already been described, the state local o~tion 
law of 1904--whose rrovisions were in a numoer of 
cases evaded by charter amendments enacted by the 
legislature in the following year granting to certain 
citjes the right to license the sale of intoxicating 
liquors irres~ective of any general state laws on the 
subject--provided that if a county voted "dry," such 
a vote would prevail over every part of the county, 
notwithstanding one or more rrecincts voted "wet;" but 
if the ccunty as a whole voted "wet," such a vote would 
not prevail in such rrecincts as voted "dry." 
At the general election in 1906 the quebtion of 
prohibition was submitted to the voters of a numoer 
of counties in the state , including the county of COOb, 
in which is situated the city of Coquille. Coos county 
voted "wet" as a whole, out West Coquille precinct , 
which embraced the entire city of Coquille and also 
Gome territory beyond the city, voted for prohibition, 
which was accordingly ut L1tO effect thruout the pre-
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cinct. In August, 1906, the city of Coquille, acting 
under the "home rule 11 amendments of that year, by a 
vote of its citizens amended its charter so as to 
authorize the licensing of saloons in the city. Then 
the city council granted a license to a certain par-
ty, who was soon arrested fo1' violating the local opo-
tion law; whereu~on he cited his license ~nd the 
city charter amendment. 
In this case the court went direct to the con-
stitutional amendment granting to cities the right to 
amend their charte-rs, subject to the constitution and 
criminal l~~f th~ate~ The local o~tion law is 
a criminal law, ruled the court, so that it prevails, 
wherever ado~ lted, over any charter T'rovisions. The 
"home rule" amendment, aid the court, " oe6 not af-
fect the right of the legislature, or of the people 
by the initiative, to enact any law they deem rroner 
affectir..g the criminal laws of t .le state, and changes 
therein and new criminal laws ill ppply to the cities 
regardless of their chariiter."* 
* Baxter v. State, ~9 Or. 353 (1907).--$ee also 
obite dictum in state v . Cochran, 55 Or. 157 (19)9). 
1 7 
But , it may be inte ro ed , he~e i c e ar-
ticularly and srecifically excepted by the co tituti on 
from the ordinary a lication of the "ho e rule" amen-
ments . ill not the courts , in every othe ort of 
attempted inf ingement u on the ivile e of "home 
rule," whether oy the legislature or by the eo 1e 
th u the initiative , annul and revent uch attem t d 
inf~ingement as cannot justify i self 
inal law? 
bein a e i 
In 1909 the le islative asse bly en ete a e-
e al la for the ineor 0 ation of e-
tion was rai e that, eontr y to t e home len 
mendments , it in effect attem.te ~o n t ch r-
ter of uch eitie- as mig t be inc u d n hat r 
ortD ould be estaoli hed in aeco 
This the court denied , eela in th t t 
" ireetly atte t to amend the eh rt of any city or 
to n ithin the boun the"'eof. Un e vi 
aid the court , lIit rna only ffeet the cha t an 
* Gen , la s 
** St ra v. 
, . 78. 
is , 5~ 0 • ~2 (1 ) . 
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ordinances of such cities and towns to the extent that 
they may be in conflict or inconsistent with the gen-
eral object and rurpose for which the port may be or-
ganized. " To the contention that the cre tion of a 
port would take away from the cities included within 
jt their lawfully conferred control of wharves and 
locks, and that to deprive them of this control would 
amount to an essential amendment of their charters, 
the court gave rerly in the following decisive fash-
ion: 
"True, the language used in the ame.dment con-
sidered would arpear to give to incorporated cities 
the exclusive control and management of their own af-
fairs , even to the extent , if desired, of legislating 
within their borders without limit , to the exclusion 
of the state . But •••••••• those provisions must De con-
strued in connection ith others of our fundamental 
laws ••• • •• • • Whatever may De the literal import of the 
amendment , it cannot De held that the state has sur-
rendered its sovereignty to the munici~alities to the 
extent that it must be deemed to have per.etually 
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lost control over them. This no state can do. The 
logical sequence of a judicial interpretation to such 
effect would amount to a recognition of a state's in-
dependent right of dissolution. It would but lead to 
sovereigntial suicide. It would result in the creation 
of states within the state, and eventually in the sur-
render of all state sovereignty--all of wh-ich is ex-
pressly inhibited by Art. IV, Sec. 3, of our national 
constitution •• Power to enact local legislation may 
be delegated, but this of necessity, whether stated 
or not, is always limited to matters consonant with, 
------- --
and germane to, the gene!al purnose and objects of 
the nunici alities to which such prerogatives may De 
~~~~----,~~~~ 
granted •••••••• Munici~alities_are but mere depart-
ments or ag.~nc ies of the state, charged ith the r.er-
formance of duties for and on its behalf, and suoject 
always to its control. The state, therefore, regard-
less of any declarations in its constitution to the 
contrary, may at any time revise, amend, or even re-
* "No new state shall be formed or erected with-
in the jur isd ict ion of any other state." 
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peal any or all of the charters within it, subject, of 
course, to vested rights and limitations otherwise r,ro-
vided for by OUT fundamental laws . This, under the 
constitution as it now stands, may be done by the leg-
islature thru general laws only, and the same author-
jty may be invoked by the peorle thru the initiative 
by either general or special enactments; only the leg-
islature being inhibited f om adorting the latter 
method. " 
The meaning is quite plain. lliat the "home rule ~ 
amendments really and actually gave to the cities and 
towns was the power to enact and amend their charters 
and, thru the initiative and referendum, to enact 
legislation, as to matte~s consonant with , a d ger-
mane to, the general rurnose and objects of munici-
palities. 
In 1910 the Oregon Bu~reme court was called on 
to consider the validity of a charter amendment ado~ 
ed by the peonle of 1f1c:.h!.,m,w·'. four year before . fter 
citing the case just quoted and declaring that the 
state can delegate any local powers to incorporated 
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cities and towns, Justice King 6ay~: "But in the ab-
sence of any clear and express declaration to that 
effect, by the source from which the authority eman-
ates, only those rowers incident and geymane to the 
city government may be deemed delegated, and they are 
always subject to control and regulation by the law-
making department in the manner nrovided by the con-
stitution."* 
One more enunciation of this doctrine will be 
quoted. The city of Portland was 5M 13 involved, the 
question this time being in regard to the power of 
the city, by amendment of its charter, to obtain the 
right to locate a public b~idge over the illamette 
River at a r oint where the river was exclusively 
within the munici~al bounda~ies. In deciding in fa-
vor of the city, the court said: "The peo le of this 
state, by the constitutional ~nendment heretofo e 
quoted, have seen fit to confer uron municipal cor-
porations the right to enact their own charte Sj the 
* City of Mc.Unnville v. Howenstine, 5 Or. '%51 
(1910). 
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only limitation upon that right being that such char-
ters shall not conflict with the constitution or the 
criminal laws of the state. We take it, the~efore, 
that within the limits of the municipality , and for 
those purposes which are strictly municipal, the 
city of Portland may Llclude in its charte.~ by amend-
ment any p!.2vision or right that the legislature might 
have granted before the constitution was ao amended."· 
This pronouncement sums up, it is oelieved, bet-
ter than a score of rulings on actual details of pow-
ers could do, the judicial attitude as to what the 
"home rule" amendments really accomplished. Any right 
or nrivilege which the state le6islative assembly 
might have confereed uron cities and towns, in the 
exercise of its own powers , may not De assumed by the 
municiralities themselves as of rigt t under the co~­
stitution. For is not this new right of municipal 
corporations limited by, and subject to, solely the 
fundame ntal law and the source whence cooes the fun-
damental law--namely, the reople of the ::;tate? But the 
* Kiernan v. Portla d, 57 Or. ~5~ (1910) • 
• 
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one great limitation remains and mu8t ever oe kept in 
mind : Such riehts and rrivileges which the municipal-
ities may now assume must be for purI?oses which are 
strictly ~unicinal . 
Thus tbe whole of the vital question as to what 
municipalities can do--and in what respect they are 
freed from the control of the state legislatu~e--be­
comes a judicial matter. Up to the rresent time the 
Oregon court has had occasion in only a very fe cas-
es to decide what are a~rropriately matters of local 
and municipal interest and what concern rather the 
state as a whole . Its hint , however, that it will ·oe 
gu ided, within limits, by hat the legislatu e under 
the old egi~e chose to delegate to the cities and 
towns affords a fairly definite basis fo~ a nredic-
tion as to what functi ons the court will in the fu-
ture concede to fall within the sntere of municipal 
activity. 
What this field of municiral affairs has oeen in 
Oregon has oeen dwelt on in ~ome detoil in a preceding 
chapter . An attemrt to determine what the sphere of 
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legislation and administration is, or will be, under a 
system of "home rule" will, therefore, nececlsarily in-
volve some re~etition. Of course, a rigid adherence 
by the courts to what have been municipal powers in 
the past is not to be expected. Times chan~e; and, tho 
the sphere of municipal activity, as opposed to the 
state, may not have ap~reciably widened, a d may not 
in the future--in fact, in some matters, such as the 
control of public utilities, the movement thruout the 
country just now seems to be the other way--the daily 
functions of municiT1al corporations will chfinge and 
expand with the ever growing and changing conditions 
of public life and the :leeds of the people. 
Tho the Oregon supreme court ha~ not stated as 
much, it is reasonable to infer that it ill be gUid-
ed in dete mining what are local abd what are state 
matters by what the legislature has in the past chos-
en, and will in the future choose, to confer on cit-
ies and towns; or, by what it has not reserved, and 
will not in the future reserve, to itself. This, it 
seems, must of necessity De the case. While the gen-
eral right of municipalities to enact and amend their 
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own charters, and adopt local legislation, i now part 
of the public pol icy established by the people of the 
sI 
state in their constitution, nevertheless, the determ-
ination of what are local and municipal affairs, and 
what are not, is just as clearly left a part of that 
portion of public policy which is directed and de-
tel"lnined by the legislat ive branch of the government-
and interpreted and re3tricted by the judicial oranch, 
Adopting this infer.ence will make it less dif-
ficult to form an estimate of what the "home rule" 
amendments accomplished in reserving or conferring 
powers of one kind o~ another on municipal corpora-
tions--and denriving t~e legislature of those powers . 
Primarily, then municipal "home rule" is a 
question of power~ . It is .owe!~ that constitute the 
sphere of municipal action . These will be taken up 
briefly, as found in statutes and judicial opinions . 
Then u brief review of the gene al tendency of the 
legislature in confo ming its activities to the prin-
c irle laid down in the arne dn1ents of 1906 will be 
preclented; and from the i for.;lat i 0 t' us ootained, 
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an attempt wil~ be made to estimate the real status 
of "home rule." The short time that has elapsed since 
the "home· rule II amendments went into effect in Ore-
gon will, unfortunately, make any treatment of the 
subject inadequate. 
Fin~~al-E0wers.--As pointej out in a preced-
ing chapte~, the power to tax for municipal purposes 
was conferred on all cities and towns, tho the rate 
and the objects to be taxed were matters regulated 
by the legislature. Similarly, in borrowing, while 
it was a power almost as common, the limitations on 
the amount to ~vhich indebtedness could oe incurred 
were prescribed by the legislature . 
After the adoption of the "home rule" amend-
ments the city of Gnants Pass amended its charter, 
by initiative rroceedings, so as to authorize its 
common council to incur an indebtedness of 200,000, 
far oeyond what was permitted under t~e charte" as 
granted by the legislature prior to 1906. The ques-
tion then arose: Is municipal indeotedness a matter 
of state concern? And the court decided that it as . 
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While the power of the legislature is unlimited when 
not restricted by the constitution, said the court, 
such unlimited powers do not extend to a city, which 
must confine its activities to municipal affairs.· 
The Oregon court has not had occasion to say 
whether or not t~xation for local revenue purposes is 
a matter of municipal concern entirely. As far as the 
!,ight to tax for municipal purposes is concerned, it 
is hard to see how a city could be prevented oy the 
legislatu e from putting such a right in its charter--
if there were no other manner oy which a municiral 
corporation could oe provided with means for carrying 
on its necessary functions. But another question aris-
es when the limitations on the exercise of the power 
are considered. The right to tax is a sovereign func-
tion; and the power to tax is a ower to destroy. 
Hence, the power in the hands of any other authority 
than the state must be carefully limited; in other 
* Riggs v. Grants Pass, 6 Or . 266 (19l3).--The 
same rosition has been taken by the supreme court of 
Minnesota: Beck v . City of at. Paul , 87 inn. ,)81 
(1902); American Electric Co. v . City of Waoeca, 102 
,hn • 329 (1907) . 
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words, the power and the function must remain primar-
ily a state power and function . 
Local im~rovement rowers.--In the examination 
of the power to make local im~rovements, in a pre-
ceding chapter, it was found that it was universally 
and in generous terms delegated to municipalities; so 
much so as to make it essentially a local and munici-
pal function. Where the power of eminent domain as 
involved, it was found to be delegated to the cities 
and towns, tho the constitutional and common law 
guarantees of private property rights formed a con-
tinuing restriction on the exercise of the right. Where 
the control of streets was involved, it was a practi-
cally unlimit ed, tho delegated, power, except that 
streets must be used for nublic purposes. 
As in taxation, 'so also here it must oe borne 
in mind tilat the conferring of these functions did 
not at all mean that the legislature divested itself 
of the power, or even the ~ractice , of regulating 
the exercise of the local improvement ro ers. As-
sessments afford a good example. Tho the power and 
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the mode of exercising the power were conferred in 
more or less detail in the individual charters, the 
legislatu~e by a number of general statutes made nu-
merous additional regulations. Thus, in 1901 and 1905 
laws were passed permitting property owners in any 
incorporated city or town, when assessed for more than 
~ 25 for sewer im'Y'rovements, to pay their assei;)sments 
in installments. As the law ~tood in 1905, this priv~ 
ilege could not oe accorded anyone by whom old assess-
ments on swwer or street improvements remained unpaid. 
Despi te t he "home rule" amendmentd of the fol-
lOWing year, and despite the fact that local improve-
ments and the assessment of pronarty therefor are so 
much a local function,* the regulatio~ s of these gen-
* In 19~9 the Ore gon supreme court held that a 
tax levy and bond issue for the const~uction of a 
sewerage system were autho ized oy a charter clause 
permitting such a tax and bond issue "for any s !'ecific 
purpose within the authority of the cor. oration, " for, 
as the cou- t said, a sewe~ is "a s!'ecific city pur-
pose. "--Naylor v. ,,fcCulloch, 54 Or. 305. 
The building of bridges within the city limits 
is also a municinal matter.--Kiernan v. Portland, 57 
Or. 454 (1910). ~ 
The courts of issouri and Minnesota have indi-
cated that the manner of le.vying and collecting as-
sessments for local improvements is so much a local 
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eral functions manifestly remained unimpaired in their 
application. This is shown by the fact that in 1907 
the law was amended to permit application for the pay-
ment of sewer a~sessmentB in installments even tho 
old assessments remained unpaid. * At the same session 
of the legislature another law was enacfed in regard 
to laying out or im~rovi~g streets. It applied to all 
cities of 50,000 or more population--thus only to 
Portland. The privilege of paying assessments in in-
stallmets was accorded to pronerty owners whose oen-
efits were valued at more than ~50. The act also e~ 
powered the city authorities to issue bonds for the 
total of s uch assessments as were not paid at once; 
and the terms and conditions of such bond issues 
were prescribed in detail.** 
In 1910, in one of the most im~orta. t "home 
rule" cases to come before the Oregon supreme court, 
function as to su~ersede state laws on the sane sub-
ject: State ex rei. v. Field, 99 Mo. 352 (1889); Tur-
ner v. Snydert 101 Minn. 481 (1907). 
* Gen. lals 1907, p. 361. 
** Ibid., p. 231. 
181 
that tribunal was called uron squarely to decide whe-
ther or not the power of eminent domain was a right 
inherent in munici~al cornorations under the amend-
ments of 1906; that is, whether or not ~ city could 
exercise this right without an ex~ress grant from the 
legislature or the people of the state. The decision 
of the court was in the affirmative.* 
The facts in the case were as follows: In 1907 
the city of McMinnville adopted an amendment to its 
charter authorizing its wate~ and light commission to 
acquire by condemnation nroceedings all necessary 
rights over lands for a pipe line for its waterworks, 
even to the extent of extending such a line out~ide 
the limits of the ci~y, and to extinguish any ripari-
an rights that might interfere with the project. The 
case was diffe ent from any that the court had ever 
before been called upon to decid.e; and similar prob-
lems ruled on oy other state courts related to the 
exercise of eminent domain within municipal limits 
* City of ~c~innville v. Howenstine, 56 Or. 451 
(1910). 
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only. With no precedents to fol low, therefore, the 
Oregon judges had to decide whether or not (1) the 
supplying of water to a city was a munici_a1 matter 
and (2) whether or not the right of eminent domain 
inhered in a municipal corporation. 
In pronouncing the opinion of the court on the 
first point, Justice King said: "That the construc-
tion of waterworks for the use of the citizens of any 
municipality is germane to and necessarily incident 
to the health and nrosrerity, as well as essential to 
the continued growth and existence of our cities, 
there· is no room for discussion •••••••• Under the rap-
id growth and complexity of municipal governments in 
layer years, with the advanced knowledge and imrroved 
methods for the prevention of enidemics, as well as 
against destruction by fire~ , etc., it would seem that 
without question the procurement of a pure and aoundant 
suprly of water is as much an incident to city govern-
ment, and equally as essential to the security of the 
health, life, and success of its inhaoitants as is the 
existence of a police force." 
18$ 
Perhaps it was because of the necessity of a 
city having a pnre water supply, and other factors of 
exped~ency , that the court gave an affirmative answer 
to the s,econd quest ion also. It s argument cont inued 
as follows: 
"Would it be reasonable, then, to hold that our 
cities and towns, before being permitted to exercise 
the right of eminent domain, must await the action of 
16. yV 
the leg islature by the enactment of some general ,-l ap-
plying to all the cities of the state? To do so would 
be to say that no city may exercise thi~ right without 
the same privilege being extended to all incor~orated 
towns. Such has never been the course pursued in this 
state. It has oeen tne rolicy , since the inception of 
our government, to 'g t ant to the cities such rights 
only when by the legislature deemed proper and advi~ 
able; doing 60 only as the occasion might arise, spe-
cifically and not gene~ally •.•••••• If, then, it was 
not intended to permit municipalities to assert this 
right, when deemed proner by the majori ty of the cit-
izens thereof, in the event the legislature fails to 
Iwovide a general law on the subj ect, including there-
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in all such localities, the only way left open for any 
public incorporations of this character, hen dedirin~ 
to open or widen streets, provide for waterworks, or 
make other public im~rovements, when the price of prop-
erty essential to be taken for the purpose cannot be 
agreed upon, would be to initiate and submit a oill 
to the people of the entire state, which could occur 
every two years, else submit to the extortion of the 
individual owner." !he "home rule" amendme ta, added 
Judge King, were "obvious1v intended to aid and not to 
embarrass" cities and towns.· 
Regarding extension of the right of eminent do-
main beyond the city limits, the court held that this 
was permissible, for this had so frequently been 
granted by the legislature that it was manifestly the 
intention of the framers of the constitutional amenQ-
* Decisions of the courts in Ussouri, ' i !lesota 
and ColoradO agree with the docrtine here laid down: 
Kansas City v. Irarsh Oil Co., 1'±0 .Io . 458 (1897); .craun 
v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108 (1909); State ex rel. v. 
District Court of Ramsey County, 87 Minn. 1'±6 (1902); 
Londoner v. City of Denver, 52 Col. 15 (1911).--The 
supremeeourt of Washington has taken a contrary view: 
In Re Cloherty, a Wash. 137 (18~1); Tacoma v. State, 
'± Wash/ 64 (1892). 
mente of 1906 to include this privilege with other 
rights of local legislation. 
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Public utilities~--Monopolies in the form of 
exclusive franchises, it has been said, are matters 
of state concern. But the granting to prifate per-
sons or corporations of permission to establish and 
operate local public utilities, such as waterworkS, 
lighting plants, street railway lines, and others, 
was very commonly devolved upon the municipalities 
in Oregon. So in 1911 the supreme court held that, 
since supplying a city with water was a necessary 
incident to a municipal corporation, the right to 
gTant a franchise therefor was to be implied.· 
Since 1906 the Oregon legislature has enacted 
,~dic.o~ 
several laws on municipal utilities, which very .. 
clearly an intention that they shall conform to a 
genera l state-wide policy. In 1909 a general law·· 
was passed to provide for a ystemat ic regulat ion, 
distribution and use of water, and for the determ-
ination of private rights and uolic rights in con-
* City of JOseph v. Joseph Waterwo ks Co., 57 
Or. 586 (1911). 
** Gen. laws 1909, p. 319. 
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nection with securing a supnly of water. The act di-
vided the whole state into two geogra~hical divisions 
for this purpose, and it provided that, subject to 
existing rights, all waters in the state might be 
appropriated for use. 
In 1911 a general act was passed authorizing 
any incorporated city or town controlling or operat-
ing a system of waterworks or electric light and pow-
er plant l and any person or corporation controlling 
or operating the same under lease or wwnership, to 
sell water or electricity either within or without 
the limits of the city or town.· Anoth~ r la of the 
same year authorized incorporated cities and towns 
to construct drains, ditches and sewer~ beyond the 
corporate limits. In this case, however, th~ city 
authorities had to petition the county court, which 
was to annoint commissioners to view the route of 
~ -
the proposed ditches or sewers and assess benefits 
and damages accruing from the pronosed unde taking 
• Gen. laws 1911, p. 121. 
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of the municipality. The commissioners were then to 
report to the county court, which , if satisfied that 
the imnrovement was needed , was to issue an order ap-
proving the project.* 
In 1911 the Oregon legislature enacted a gener-
al law for the regulation of all public utilities in 
the state , municipal and otherwise. They were to be 
under the supervision and regulation of the state 
railroad commission. Section 61, which dealt with 
municipal utilities, declared that every municipal-
ity should have rower to determine tne quality a d 
character of every kind of .roduct or servicea within 
the city. Withih the limits of the act, each munici-
pality could also determine the terms and conditions 
uron which any public utility corporation should oe 
permitted to occupy its streets or ather public pro~ 
• 
erty. The city could require of any utility company 
any "reasonable" modifications, additions and exten-
sions to its physical plant, equipment or service; 
could designate the location and nature of all such 
* Gen. laws 1911, p. ~43 . 
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additions and estensions, the time within which they 
must be completed, and all conditions under which 
they must be constructed--subject to review by the 
state commission. Any determination of these matters 
by the local authorities should be, the act declared" 
p rima facie reasonablej but on complaint of any pub-
lic utility the commission was to grant it an oppor-
tunity to prove that it was not reasonable. Tne law 
contained the following interesting prov,iso : "No 
ordinance or other munjcipal regulation shall oe re-
viewed by the commission •••••• which was, prior to sucfu 
review, enacted by the initiative or which was, prior 
to such review, referred to and approved oy the people 
of said munici~ality, or while a r eferendum thereon 
is rending ." Despite a little ambiguity in the lan-
guage of this last provision, it can undoubtedly be 
said to carry out fully the spirit of the constitu-
tional amendments of 190 and to grant "home rule" to 
the peor'lle of all munic ipal it ies hich desire to avail 
themselves of its libe al provisions,· 
* Gen. laws 1911, p . ... 83 , Sec . 61. 
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Pol!£e powers--Local 0Etion.--Local police pow-
ers for the protection of the public peace, health and 
safety, as has been previously described, were bestowed 
in generous_portions on localities by the Oregon leg-
islature; and several rulings by the state su-~reme 
court show that the safeguarding of morals is plainly 
to be seen in the restrictions on the liquor traffic, 
also a commoh local function. 
Power to punish offenses against the public 
peace borders upon the criminal power of the state, 
and so must be strictly construed in th i s re..;rect. It 
covers only what the words mean: public peace, or 
public tranquility. Thus, it does not carry with it 
power to punish such offenses against ~ublic policy 
as keeping stores open on Sunday, which does not 
disturb the peace or tranquility of t he people.* Sim-
ilarly, power to prevent and reatrain riots, noise, 
and other disturbance does not carry with it the po 
er to punish the crime of assault with a deadly weap-
on. ** In other words, the cr iminal law and penal law 
* City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Or. 139 (1882) . 
** Walsh v. jity of Union, In Or. 589 (1886). 
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are matters of state policy; so that, as a rule, vio-
lations of the conditions on which licenses of any 
kind are held are subject to state law in the matter 
of penalties, aside from forfeiture of the license . 
The prevention of fires is of prime importance 
to local communities , and, as has oeen sho n, the 
Oregon legislature came to recog ize this fact. The 
state surreme court in 1888 declared that municipal-
ities may enact regulations for this purpose under 
the ir general pol ice po~vers , * evident 1 Y alluding to 
the "gene-ral welfare , " or similar clauses, CvIDDlon to 
nearly all the charte~s. The declaration is imrort-
ant as indicating that , not only the protection from 
fire hazards, but also all other local safety and 
general fo lice regulations, are inhe-rently local and 
municipal functions . 
The prevention and removal of nuisances has oeen 
commonly delegat ed to the local authorities in Oregon; 
and with this power has commonly been that of definin 
what shall constitute a nuisance . Jurists have dewel-
* Beers v . Dalles City , 16 Or . 33~ (1888) . 
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oped a number of rules restricting the right of a le 
islative body, whether of a municipality or of the 
state, to define nuisances; but it is believed that 
the Oregon supreme court stated these in a nutshell 
recently when it declared that, so long as the def-
inition of a nuisance in a charter is not clearly 
arbitrary and unjust, and manifestly wrong, the 
courts will uphold it.* The sa~e princi.le ap~ lies 
to the enactment of ordinances. 
In a little earlier case the court u~held the 
right of the city of Portland to repeal an ordinance 
graliting a right to maintain a slaughterhouse, on the 
ground that such an industry, tho not necessarily a 
nuisance, may become so, and a municipality cannot 
bargain away its police powers. In deciding when a 
slaughterhouse becomes a nuisance, the court held, a 
large share of discretion is to be allowed to the lo-
cal authorities. "Tho unde a general grant of po er 
over the subj ect, II samd the court, "a common counc il 
* :.{ayhew v. City of Eugene, 56 Or. 102 (1910). 
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has no authority to adopt an ordinance declaring a 
thing a nuisance which is in fact not one, yet in 
doubtful cases, depending upon a variety of circ~ 
stances requiring an exercise of judgment and discre-
tion, thei~ action is conclusive and, pursuant to 
such grant, they are empowered to ado~t an ordi~ance 
declaring a slaughterhouse within the corporate lim-
its a nUisance."* 
Municipal corporations have no inherent power 
to levy or collect license fees of any kind;. it mUbt 
. be delegated to them. ** Yet the power has oeen so uni-
versally delegated that it seems to oe fully a local 
function, so far as its exercise is concerned. In some 
instances the power to license and regulate io exten~ 
ed to prohibition, as in gambling a.d prostitution. 
Baiore 1906 the power to license in Oregon had to be 
* Portland v. Cook, ~8 Or. 550 (1906). In this 
instance the charter authorized the council to "li-
cense, tax, control and regulate slaubhterhouses •••••• 
and to urovide for their exclusion from t~e city." 
(Laws 1891, p. 806). 
** Lent v. Portland, ~2 Or. 488 (1903).--rlut it 
may be implied from the po\ er to license an re ulate: 
Abraham v. City of Rosebur" 55 Or. 359 (1910). 
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expressly delegated; it could not be inferred from 
the term"regulate . " In so holding, the court plainly 
expressed the intent of the state legislature that in 
the particular case in question saloons should not be 
permitted; and the moral side of the question was 
recognized. * 
Prior to 1904, then, to the function of licens-
ing was a local one, it is clear that the determina-
tion of TIolicy as to whether or not the sal~ of liq-
uor should be re mitted was rese"yed to the state 
legislative body. ** But the people of Oregon have 
since then changed their rolicy--three times . In 1904 
the county local o' tion law , already descrioed, made 
the determi~ation as to license or no license a mat-
t~r to be settled by countieo , except that preCincts 
within a county might by vote yxohibit the sale of 
intoxicants within their limits . Tho the Ie islature 
* Pacific University v . Johnson , ~7 Or . ~~8 
(1906 ) . The charter .rovi'ion in question as of the 
cjty of Forest Grove , where a college was located. 
** Such has also been declared to oe the situa-
t ion in two othel" "home rule" states, {innesot a and 
Colorado : Grant v . Berrisford, 9~ Ainn. ~5 (l~C~)j 
Walker v . People , 55 Col . ~02 (1913). 
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could, nevertheless, exempt a municirality from the 
orerat ion of the local ort ion law before the ador-
ti0n of the "home rule" amendments in 1906,* a city 
could not , after 1906, by its own action exempt it-
self fTom the results of a county 0'" precinct vote . ** 
At the general election in 1908 a prorosal for 
amending the constitution on this subject was suo-
mitted to the ~oters of the state. It consisted of 
an addition to Art . XI, Sec. 2, which granted the 
voters of cities and towns power to enact and amend 
their charters . It read as follows: 
• '" " ••••• "and the exclusive power to license , regu-
late, control and tax, or to su.!,ress or rrohibit 
theaters , race tracks , pool rooms , bowling alleys , 
b illiard halls, and the sale of Ii uors , buoject to 
the rrovisions of the local o~tion 12 of the s a e 
of Oregon vithin the corporate limits of an y munici-
pality, is vested in such municirality . " 
Tho advocated as a "practical home rule" mea-
sure by its sur orters,*** it was plainly an effort 
* Hall v. Dunn , 52 Or . ~75 (1908); see p. 122. 
** rlaxter v. State , ~9 Or . 353 (1907)j see p. 166. 
*** Argument filed with the secretary of state 
and published in the election prunphlet of 1908 , ~. 60. 
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of the saloon, pool room and theater interests to free 
the cities from the control of the legislature and the 
peorle outside the cities and leave them unrestrained 
in runing towns "wide o:pen."* It was bitterly and pub-
licly denounced allover the state as an attempt to 
nullify the ~rovisions of the local ortion la , which 
it undoubtedly was , even tho it expressly declared that 
its provisions should be subject to this law. The re-
suIt of the vote showed that the people in 1908 were 
on the whole satisfied with the principle of county 
option, or at least that they wished to eive the prin-
ciple a thoro test before abandoning it.** The PEO 0-
sal was defeated by a vote of 52,3~6 to 39,~~2. 
Two years later, however, in 1910, the liquor 
interests were successful--but to their own grief, as 
was shown four years after ard. The rrorosa1 for an 
amendment was now submitted in a slightly different 
form. It read as follows: 
•••••••••••• "and the exclusive po er to lice se, re ~ 
* Argument filed with the secretary of state and 
fublished in the election ~amrhlet of 1908, f P' 61-62 . 
** Eaton , "The Oregon oystem," p. 
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late, control, or to suppress or prohibit , the sale 
of intoxicating liquors therein is vested in such mu-
nicipality; but such municipality shall withjn its 
limits be subject to the ~rovisjons of the local op-
tion law of the state of Oregon." 
Fathered by the "Greater Oregon Home Rule Asso-
ciation," and the signed petitions of ".t-O,OOO "leadin 
citizens, including business and professional men , 
farmers, bankers, and many ministers , II. this amend-
ment was adorted by a vote of 53,321 to 50,779. Muni-
ciral "home rule" had evidently oecome somewhat of a 
success , because it was now a shioooleth to be e~ 
ployed in cajoling the voters of a state into per-
mitting liquor interests further to intrench them-
selves in the large~ cities, particularly Portland, 
untouched and unaffected by whatsoever might be the 
sentiment of the peo~le of the state outside the mu-
n j c i "-,a 1 it i e s • 
Municipal option was really out another form of 
local option, which had GO far proved quite success-
ful. At the 1910 election the anti-saloon reo. Ie pro-
• Argument filed with the secreta~y of state and 
rublished in the election pamphlet of 1910, p. 75. 
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posed a constitutional amendment for state-wide pro-
hjbition. They also had two initiative bills put on 
the ballot, one to provide for searches in enforcing 
prohibition in "dry" territory and the other to reg-
ulate shiI"lments of liquor into terr i tory from which 
saloons had been ousted. These measures went farther 
than the Oregon people ca~ed to go at thio time, in 
view of the satisfaction which the local ortion prin-
ciple had given, and this fact undoubtedly aided in 
the defeat of ~rohibition by more than 17 ,00 votes l 
and the success of the reactilnary rrorosal of the 
liquor intetests.* 
In the fall of 191~ the li~uor interests in 
Oregon met their Waterloo. Perhaps it was oecause 
women were now permitted to exercise the right of 
suffrage. At any rate, at the general election in 
November , the 17,000 majority again t rrohioition 
of four years before was now wiped out and tte elect-
ors adonted an amendment to their constitutiGn or-
* Eaton, "The Oregon System," p. ~l. 
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daining that after January 1, 1916, the manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating li.uors should be prohioited 
thruout the state . 
In view of this result, it is not of such reat 
irnrortance to investigate what we~e the legal effects 
of the ador t ion of the 1910 amendmert.* An intereot-
ine construction of the declaration contained in it 
that municipalities should within their limits De BUb-
ject to the loc~l ortion law ha , ho ever, been iven 
by the state surreme court . *. The amen ment im.liedly 
rerealed , said the court, so much of t he local 0 tion 
law as permitted t Le vote~s of a c cunty to eti t ion for 
a prohibition election, or vote u on such a ue t'on, 
when any part of the county consi ted of an incor.or-
ated city or town . It amen ed the local o: tion law BO 
as to allow , instead , an election i any a d or pre-
cinct of a municipality, even tho rohibition ha car-
ried in the entire county . ut the local o.tion la as 
* The amendffient was in 1912 hel to be self-ex-
ecuting: state v . Perkins , 61 Or . 163. 
** State v . Schluer , 59 Or. 18 (lQ11). 
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su'ch st ill remained, for it could De put into 0:: era-
tion in such country districts as desired it, an in 
such municipalities as desired it. The right granted 
to cities, however, was necessarily governed oy 11 
the ~rovisions of the local o~tion law that could be 
made arplicable; so that, in initiating a change for 
or against proh ibition, the petition to the county 
court which the law required was still necessary. 
Notwithstanding that the amendment of 1910 w 
so obviously a measure in favor of the liquor inter-
ests , the surreme court has held that it did not give 
the people of a city in a local option election power 
to compel the city to license the sale of liquor. 10~ 
withstanding a vote against rrohibition, said the 
court, a city may, either thru its councilor oy in-
itiative, ~rohibit the s le of intoxicants.· 
The amendment, said the court in anothe"" case, 
also made the municipalities the sole agenta of the 
state in exercising the police power respecting teg-
ulation of the sale of intoxicants within their li~ 
• Salem Brewery Assn. v. City of Salem, 9 Or. 
120 (1914). 
200 
its. In other words , the state had, by its constitu-
tion, delegated a portion of its police power; but, 
said the court , the power cannot be delegated or bar-
8~jned away so as to place it oeyond recall. In this 
statement the light of subsequent events can make a 
rrophecy appear.* 
Municipal elections.--The conduct of municipal 
elect ions, as ha's been shown in a preceding chapt er, 
was before 1906 regarded as a matter of state-wide 
concern; and in accordance with this rrinciple the 
legislature enacted a series of laws regulatin the 
matter . As a matter of convenience, however, the ac-
tual holding of elections was done by the local au-
thorities . But all such functions we~e expressly del-
egated, and from its power to hold an election for 
city officers a nnmic iral counc i 1 could not claim a 
right to heaT and determine election contests . ** Thi 
function,. too, was commonly delegated to municipalities, 
* State v. Hearn, 59 Or. 227 (1911). 
** Robertson v. Groves and City of Corvallis, 4 
Or. 210 (1871); State ex reI . v . McKinnon, 8 Or. 493 
(1880) . 
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but, unless so specified in the charter, it did not 
give the city council exclusive and final jurisdiction.* 
The same principle obtained in reference to the power 
of a city council to be judge of the election and 
qualifications of its own members.** 
But the "home rule tl amendments of 1906 changed 
matters greatly. "Cities and towns may provide for the 
manner of exercising the initiative and referendum 
powers as to their municipal legislation," reads 
Art . IV , Sec .l a , of the constitution . Under this 
amendment , provisions which municipalities may make 
regarding direct legislation by their citizens pre-
vail over general laws on the subject enacted by the 
legislature . *** They are limited only by the con ti-
tution. The amBndment just quoted declares the initia-
t ive and referendum powers to be reserved to the II le-
gal voters" of municipalities; therefore, a city has 
* State ex rel. v. McKinnon, 8 Or. ~93 (1880); 
Simon v . Portland Common Council, 9 Or . ~37 (1881) . 
** State ex r el . v. Kraft, 18 Or . 550 (1890). 
*** McKenna v. City of Portland, 52 Or . 191 (1908), 
cited on p. 150; McBee v. Town of sprir.gfield, 58 Or . 
~59 (1911) , cited on p. 154. 
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no right to limit the exercise of these powers to reg-
istered voters.* The amendment carries the further 
restriction that not more than 10% of the legal vot-
ers of a city may be required to order the referendum, 
nor more than 15% to propose any measure . It was un-
doubtedly in regognition of this change of policy that 
the Oregon supreme court in 1913 declared that munic~ 
pal elections and the choice of municipal officer~ are 
matters of purely municipal concern.** Elections for 
the purpose of enacting or amending charters are also 
necessarily included, for the amendment of charters is 
now a municipal affair in Oregon.*** 
Ann~ion of territory.--A vote of a municipal-
ity to extend or alter its boundaries amounts to a 
charteT amendment.**** Are the people of a city, ac-
cordingly, to be unrestrai~ed in whatever steps they 
* oodward v. Barbur, 59 Or. 70 (1911). 
** State ex rel. v. Portland, 65 Or. 273 (1915).--
It may be remarked here that in California and Colora 0 
amendments have been incorporated in the constitutionb 
conferring upon municipalities the right, under their 
privilege of adonting and amending their own charters, 
to nrovide for the election of local officers. 
*** Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria , ~g Or. 520 (1907), 
cited on p. 148. 
**** Cook v. portland, 69 Or. 572 (191~). 
* 
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may wish to take in absorbing adjacent territory? M~ 
ifestly, no . Interests in no way urban or municinal 
would be involved, so that it would no longer De a lo-
cal matter .* 
4. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL TJNDER "HOM 
While it is beyond the scope of this investigation 
to attempt to deteTmine whether or not "home rule" 
has been successful in the Oregon citie and to ns in 
which it has been put into operation , or to compare 
the present situation with conditions during the five 
decades of special legislation, nevertheless, in the 
preceding pages some reference has neces arily been 
made , from time to time, of the workings, and advan-
tages and disadvantages, of the two systewB. A de-
scription of the "home rule" plan ould also De in-
complete without an account of ho~ the state legisl~ 
ture--at whose activities the reform of 1906 as 
aimed--has conformed its conduct and field of 0 ... era-
* State ex reI. v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Or. 332 
(1912)j Thurb~r v. MvMinnville, 63 Or. ~10 (1912)j 
Landless v. City of Cottage Grove, 6~ Or . 155 (1913). 
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tions to the letter and spirit of the "home rule" a-
mendments . 
It was the intent of the framers of the amenQ-
mentw of 1906 that not only the creation of munici-
ral cor~orations by srecial acts, but also any s pe-
cial legislation whatever affecting the local inter-
ests of but one city or town, should oe ~rohibited; 
for that is reserved to the legal voters of each mu-
nicipality. Desrite this clear intent, the legi~la­
tUTe, at its first session after the ado~ tion of the 
constitutional amendments, passed four acts that were 
clearly local and special. 
One of these was to establish and incorporate 
t he Port of Columbia • • The legislators were pe~hars 
not aware that, sixteen yea~s before, the state su-
preiBlS court had ruled that the term "munici. a1 cor-
:9orat ions It inc luded incoT:90rated ports) ·* but the 
judges had not forgotten it, and when objection was 
made to the ac t ion of the legis1&ture and brought 
• Gen . laws 1907 , p. 182 . 
** Cook v. Port of Portland , 20 Or . 580 (1891) , 
cited on p. 47 .--See also Farrell v . Port o~ Port-
land, b2 Or . 582 (1908) , cited on p. 153. 
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oefore the court, they promptly ~ronounced the act 
null and void. It Was in reality because the amend-
ments of 1906 forbade the creation of any kir.d of 
corporation, public or private, by srecial act, how-
ever, that the court held ,the act to be in viclation 
of the constitution.* 
Another act of the 1907 session was one declar-
ing all county roads within the city of Cornelius to 
be streets of the city, and giving the city authori-
ties jurisdiction over them. It required that 40% of 
all property taxes and all road 011 taxes collected 
within the city 11 oe turned over to the city trea-
surer. Thus far, perhars no objection could De made 
to the act, even tho clearly special in nature; or, 
as has been said, the primary and original control 
of streets and highways is lodged in the legislature, 
and in this case the legislature had manifestly not 
relinquished its control. Furthermore, the soverei n 
right to tax is essentially a state function. 3ut 
the act went farther and srecified that the taxes 
* Farrell v. Port of Columbia, 50 Or. 169 (1907). 
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mentioned must be set apart by the city as a serarate 
"c i ty street improvement fund.« It ordained that thw 
cit y should use the roads in question as city streets 
and work and maintain them and improve them; and the 
street improvement fund could thenceforth be expended 
ohly for this ~urpo8e.* 
The ex~ediency and advisability of neithe the 
act nor any of its ~rovisions is here questioned. It 
was passed as an "emergency measure. 1\ But some of its 
provisions violated the snirit of the "home rule" a-
mendment without a doubt. 
Similar was an act to create a public playgroun 
board for the city of Port1and.** This board wa made 
to consist of the mayor of the city, the judge of the 
juvenile court of Multnomah county, the district su-
perintendent of schools, the 1iorarian of the city 
public library, and the president of a local athletic 
club. It was given exclusive control of ruolic play-
grounds and gymnasiums, and was authorized to levy a 
* Gen, laws 1907, p. 99. 
** Ibid., p. 308. 
207 
Bmall tax for the purpose of acquiring land needed 
for playgrounds . The management of public playgrounds I 
a part of the educational system, is undoubtedly a 
state matter in Oregon; but when the legislature em-
powers a board of this kind tc levy a tax on a pt.rtie-
ular city and to purchase and hold property "in the 
name of the city," and imposes the duty uron the mu-
niCipal water board to provide water for _laygrounds 
and gymnasiums "free of charge," it seems that there 
is a real interference with local authorities in a 
sphere that is usually reserved to municir~l action. 
Final ly, at the session of 1907 the legislature 
passed an act to validat e the appointment of certain 
employes of the city of Portland whose selection had 
unintentionally been made in a manner not complying 
with the civil service rules laid do n in the char-
ter. Suit having been brought in the county court 
against one of these em.loyes, and a decision adverse 
to his continuance in the employ of the city having 
been given, the legi~lature,. in order to rreve t the 
court from annulling the aPPointments of 17~ others in 
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the same situation, noW passed an act to validate the 
same . * 
In 1909 the legislature authorized the "water 
commission" of the city of Corvallis--a body of four 
members chosen by a previously established "water 
committee" (whose membership was fi~ed by an act of 
1905) from its own membership--to acquire property " 
outside "the city which was needed for protecting the 
munic ipal wat er supply. Like the "water corami ttee It im.. 
posed on the city of Portland in 1885 and th~ Corval-
lis "water committee" of 1905, the commission wao now 
empowered to issue bonds--to the surn of '2:0,000--which 
the city was obligated to ay.** Here, a ain, the ex-
~ediency , or even the fossible necessity, of the act 
is not drawn in question. But that the s . irit of "home 
rule" was violated by it there can oe no douot. 
In 1911 several special acts we e passed, one of 
which was subseque~tly thrown out by the supreme court. 
This one*** rrovided that every incorporated port 
* Gen. laws 1907 , p. 119. 
** Gen. laws 1909, p. 265. 
*** Gen. laws 1911, p. 319. 
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which contained more than 100,000 po~ulation, as shown 
by the last federal census, should be governed by a 
board of seven commissioners apl'ointed by the governor 
of the state . Obviously, tho general in form, the act 
referred only to the Port of Portland, and this the 
court took into consideration when it declared the act 
unconstitutional . If there is to De any cla sification 
of ports, or of any other corporations, said the court, 
it must be based u~on Bome real and actual distinction, 
which the court could not see in the ~resent case.* 
On this principle it would seem that the same 
objection could be made to a law ado~ted in the same 
year providing for the manner of calling elections in 
cities of more than 100,000 porulation , uron the que~ 
tion of annexation of territory.** At the same time 
the legislature passed an act to ~rovide for consta-
bles and deputy constables in cities having more than 
100,000 inhabitants, and fixing their te~mb of office, 
salaries , etc. Constables and deputy constao1es are 
* State ex reI. v. SWigert, 5g Or. 132 (1911). 
** Gen, laws 1911, p. 422 . 
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undoubtedly state officers, so that no real objection 
can be made to the act. At the same time, the fact 
that they were made elective by the peop~e of the city 
--Fortland--would seem to indicate that the legisla-
ture recognized that to some extent the persorulel of 
these officers can sometimes oe of s~ecial concern to 
a municipality.* 
In 1911 the legislature once more came to the 
rescue of the city of Portland. At an election in 
1909 the voters of that city adopted an amendment to 
the charter authorizing the city council to issue 
bonds to the amount of ' 2,000,000 for the purpose of 
construct ing a bridge across the illamette Riv~r , 
and for acquiring arrroaches for the same. In accord-
ance with this amendment, 250,000 in bond a sold 
without any question being ~aisedj but when tbe coun-
cil put (. 500,000 more on the market several Buits were 
instituted to test the validity of the amendment and 
the authcrity of the city to incur an indebtedne s to 
this amount without an act of the legislature. In or-
* Gen. laWS 1911, p. 3~3. 
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der to set at rest all questions, therefore, the leg-
islature now enacted that the city wa fullyauthor-
ized and em~owered to ado~t the charter amendment in 
question and to construct the brid~e and is ue oonds 
therefor,; and any errors or irregularities in such 
proceedings as had been taken Were declared to De 
"cured and validated."* 
5. CONCLUSIONS. 
It is difficult to draw any conclusions from 
these acts. Whi le some of them seem clearly to in-
vade the intended field of municipal legislation r 
served by the constitutional amendments of 1906, oth-
ers simply show that there is a large, tho undefined, 
field of government~l action in which the combined 
activities of both local communities and the state 
legislative body must continue and commingle. It is 
a close analogy to the "twilight zone" oetween the 
snheres of federal and state action, which has formed 
such a vexatious and delicate problem for American 
* Gen. laws 1911, p. 23. 
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statesmen and the jurists who have had to meet this 
most elusive source of difficulty in the American 
constitutional system. 
Still others of these acts show on their face 
that it was to meet real and pressing exigencies 
that the legislature intervened. The real field of 
municinal action has not, by far, been determined in 
Oregon. Only a very few years have ela~sed since the 
experiment of "home rule It was rut into operat ion, so 
t hat the unsettled situation, in this resrect , is not 
to be wondered at. 
As is apparent to all, the field of municipal 
action can never be a static thing. rot only will the 
quantum of municiral powers and functio~6 change, due 
to changi:1g conditions of social, economic and polit-
ical life, but the relation of the city to the state , 
that governmental unit which is itself undergoing a 
silent transformation, will necessarily vary with the 
~ortunes of the latt er . What effect rotential changes 
in the 1"osition of the states in the Ame"l"ican federal 
system will have upon the relation of municipal cor-
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porations to the state, particularly in the "home rule" 
states, is a question too remote to call forth a ven-
ture at prophecy. The relation is too indefinite and 
uncertain, as it is. 
As in the past, so in the future the course of 
events will be shaped by the trend of soc ial and eco-
nomic life--and as interpreted by the legislative and 
judicial branches of the government. The question of 
"home rule" being to such a great extent one of un-
defined powers and spheres of action, it is incon-
ceivable that a scheme of local self-government cLuld 
be evolved without the guidance, di ection and re-
straint of the courts. In this lies also the inhere t 
difficulty and unsat isfactori.less of the whole Ian. 
Municipal corporations will always have duties of a gov-
er.nmental nature a8 agencies of the state to perform, 
as well as private functions of a cor~orate character, 
and so long as this is true, the~e must alway~ be an 
undefined sphere of governmental action where the du-
ties of local corno~ation and agency of the state 
blend. The possession of this two-fold character of 
21 
municipalities , furthermore, makes any material rel~ 
ation of ultimate control by the state impossible. 
It is undoubtedly because of these facts that 
the e is such a lack of harmony among thoughtful stu-
dents of municipal government as to the ultimate val-
ue of a plan whereby municipalities are enaoled to 
frame, adopt and amend theil' own acts of i corporation, 
and under them enact local legislation free from in-
terference by the $egislative body whose d~ ty it is to 
determine the great mattera of state policy . 
"The congregating togeth~r of a lal'ge numoer of 
individuals on a small surface does not change their 
relation to the 3tate , and it wo ~ld be dece~traliza-
tion gone mad to permit the establishment of a number 
of small sovereignties, inde'Y'endent, unde the con-
stitution, of the centr~l power, and yet all members 
of the same commonwealth ," was the emphatiC assertion 
of a speaker nearly twe~1ty years ago at a national con-
ference for good city gove~nment.* 
* F. W. Holls, "state 30ards of .uniciral Con-
tr-ol;" paper read at the Fourth lIat i('nal ~nfel'ence. 
1'01' Good 8 By Government J 189 , un~er auspIces of t.'le 
National .~unicinal League, ProceedIngs, p. 226 . 
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If sovereignty were divisible, "home rule" cit-
ies might be conceived as being, perhap , part sov r-
eign. But the study which has been made of the scheme 
as adopted and put into practice in Oregon shows a 
clearly as one could wish that it was never t. e in-
tention of the fr,~"Ilers of the "home rule" constitu-
tiunal amendments in that state to set up a y "sov-
ereign" political entities . It seems also to ~how 
that such c ould never De the effect, even if contem-
plated, in any state of the Union. 1 unicipal "home 
rule" is not, therefore, a scheme of a nature to call 
forth such violent ccndem .. ation, tho the inher .... nt di~ 
ficulties in the Ian must be admitted. 
Perhaps the greatest authority in the United 
States on the legal asrects of munici~al corporations, 
in referr ing to the idea of haviLg the peo. Ie of lo-
calities vote on the ado. tion of ch<lrters and charte 
amendments, says: itA rompt, frank and sincere recog-
nition of local requirements by the legislature will 
usually render unnecessary any reaort to a refe e.-
dum such as is here ~rovided for, and it may De ques-
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tioned, u~on experience up to the present, whether 
freeholders' charters will prove to oe so satisfac-
tory as to come into general use thruout the country."· 
This criticism does not prese1t any insupe aole 
difficulties in the way of putting "home rule" into 
successful operation. It merely suggests that the leg-
islature, which has oeen wanting in the rast, might 
awaken to the need of putting the creation of munici-
pal corporations on a higher basis than it hati. The 
doubt cast on the ability of municipalities to frame 
satisfactory ch arters for their own gove n etn is also 
something which remains to be nro~ed. 
The greatest difficulties , it is believed, are 
the ones which have oeen brought out in thio inquirYj 
and they can be summed u~ in the single statement that 
the plan as so far deve lored has not presented a clea~ 
and definite solution of what should be the cor ect 
relation of the city to the state. Perhaps this is as~ 
ing too much of the nlan . In the field of public law 
and noli tical science, the intangioleness and relativ-
* J. F. Dillon, ",unicipa1 Corporations," vol. I, 
p. 112. 
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ity of the materials uron which to experiment--the 
human equation, the many-sided character of the re-
lation of social beings with one another and with the 
social or political group, and the perpetual flux of 
life and evolution of conditions--make the attainment 
of rigid , automatic and definite solutions of rob-
lems at once impossible and---undesiraole. 
But this does not necessarily mean only egative 
reaults from this i~vestigation. Municiral "home rule 
is still in the experimental stage. Its i.troduction 
into a state cannot be expedted to bring about an imme-
diate detel"rnination of the sY'here of action which is 
to be conceded to local communities. From a state of 
practically complete dependence u~on the state legis-
lative body, with a chaotic confusion as to hat were 
its governmantal functions and what were its function 
as a ousiness corporat~on, it would oe im.ossiole at 
one stroke to cleave a line and mark out the s.here 
which a municipality could thenceforth call its 0 n. 
Tno, as has been pointed out, there will always 
e a "twilight zone," it is apparent that the srhere 
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of municinal action will become more and more clari-
f ied and definite, and if the court and the legisla~ 
tive bodies of the states can be prevailed u[.on to 
refrai~ from unnecessarily enc~oaching u~on that 
sphere, the problem of the correct relation of a 8 ity 
t o the state will be brought much nearer solution. 
How to combine the greatest freedom of local ac-
tion with sufficie t control on the part of the state, 
and how to limit the interference of the l eg islature 
wi thout preventing that interference when required, 
i s the "roblem to wh ich the experiment of "home rule , " 
more than any other rlan, is directly addres~ing it-
s e lf. It is this which makes munici pal "home ule" a 
living issue . 
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